USA zunehmend wieder Kriegsbereit: Airseabattle, JAM-GC,Offshore Controll

USA zunehmend wieder Kriegsbereit: Airseabattle, JAM-GC,Offshore Controll

Die US-Bevölkerung wird nach neuesten Umfragen wieder kriegsbereit, wenngleich volatil, aber sie sammelt sich.Die meisten US-Amerikaner sind für Bodentruppen gegen IS und für Militärschläge gegen das iranische Atomprogramm, sollten Iran den Nukleardeal hintertreiben. Gleiches ist auf der operativen Ebene seiner Entscheidungsträger und des Militärs zu vermerken. Nachdem US-Navy und US-Airforce als Teilstreitkräfte das neue operative Konzept „Airseabattle“initierte, das vor allem China und Iran, das Süd- und Ostchinesische Meer samt Pazifik und den Persischen Golf als Zielgebiete hatte, hat sich nun mit der Ukrainekrise ind IS das alte Paradigma „No boots on the Ground“ tendenziell aufgelöst und sind nun Europa und der Nahe Osten auch wieder potentielle Kampfgebiete, die nicht nur mit US Airforce und US Navy abgedeckt werden, sondern bei denen die US Army wieder eine wichtige Rolle spielt.Folgender Beitrag steht für diese Änderung, die nun Air Sea Battle durch das „Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC),“ ersetzt mit Beteiligung nun der US Army.

Conventional Deterrence of Russia

In diesem sehr grundsätzlichen Artikel wird darauf hingewiesen,dass die Abschreckung Irans und Chinas vor allem auf See erfolgt, die Abschreckung Russlands aber vor allem eben kontinental und damit mit Bodentruppen, wenngleich nicht allein. Zumindestens wird mit der Ukrainekrise der US Army wieder eine zentrale Rolle nach Airseabattle zugestanden.

Die Schlußfolgerung daraus:

New US Concept Melds Air, Sea and Land
By Paul McLeary 4:36 p.m. EST January 24, 2015

“The Pentagon’s five-year-old Air-Sea Battle concept is undergoing a major rethink as it opens its focus to incorporate input from the land services and combatant commanders, senior Joint Staff and Navy planners told Defense News on Jan. 22.
The effort to expand the predominantly Navy and Air Force-heavy concept kicked off last fall when the Joint Chiefs made a recommendation to Chairman Gen. Martin Dempsey to open it wider to the other services.
Dubbed the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC), the emerging plan „is not trying to replace Air-Sea Battle with Joint Access and Maneuver, and it’s not ‚throw the Air-Sea Battle concept out and start all over again,‘ “ said Navy Capt. Terry Morris, deputy director for Air-Sea Battle in the Pentagon. „It is an understanding of the environment, and the advances we have made since 2009 when we first started with this.“
As part of the change, JAM-GC will be supported by the Joint Staff’s Joint Force Development Office, or J7, and is expected to produce a concept paper by this fall.”

So why has the U.S. Department of Defence dropped ASB? Many in the U.S. Navy and Air Force – the lead services in the programme – have pointed the finger squarely at the U.S. Army, accusing it of sabotaging the scheme for fear of being excluded from future U.S. strategic policy. Others blame a general level of U.S. political squeamishness. However, whilst one should never underestimate how much an armed service that feels its finances to be under threat can scream, or underplay the current crippling paralysis at the top of the U.S. government, the truth is simply that ASB was the first serious contemporary attempt to tackle an incredibly complex problem and – totally unshockingly – it didn’t get everything right the first time. As a result, change was in order.

Konkret hat diese Änderung schon früher begonnen in folgender Form:

‚Valiant Shield 2014‘ demonstrates US joint force capabilities in the Asia Pacific
Kelvin Wong, Singapore – IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly

Exercise ‚Valiant Shield 2014‘, which was conducted from 15-23 September, involved the USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) and USS George Washington (CVN 73) aircraft carriers, 19 surface vessels – including four guided-missile cruisers and eight guided-missile destroyers – more than 200 aircraft, and approximately 18,000 personnel from the US Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. The ‚Valiant Shield‘ exercise series focusses on refining the joint capabilities between the four services.

Noch ist das US-Cybercommand nicht als eigene Streitkraft angesehen, weswegen es seine Rolle unterschätzt fühlt und da auch eine zentrale Rolle fordert:

Will Air-Sea Battle Be “Sunk” By Cyber Warriors?
December 8, 2014 •
Tragically, the Air-Sea Battle Concept fails to recognize the critical and independent role cyber power should (indeed, will) play in any Air-Sea Battle confrontation with U.S. adversaries. While the concept acknowledges that the air, sea and cyber domains will play important roles as sources of vulnerability and offensive platforms, the Air-Sea Battle Concept relegates cyber power to a supporting role-for example, using cyber capabilities to defeat integrated air-defense systems or disrupt adversary command and control to enable air and sea supremacy. It is important to note that we are leaving aside broader political and strategic considerations of when the Air-Sea Battle Concept may be employed.
Will Air-Sea Battle Be “Sunk” by Cyber Warriors?

Zumindestens wird das ganze operative Konzept nun zunehmend integrativer gesehen und die Konkurrenz zwischen den Streitkräften zugunsten eines übergeordneten Konzepts aufgegeben. Wobei es auch noch zu AirseaBattle und Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC), eine neue Alternative gibt, die nicht die driekte militärische Konfrontation mit China sieht, sondern eher eine abgestimmte Seeblockade innerhalb der Ersten Inselkette vorsieht, die China ökonomisch strangulieren soll—kurz genannt: Offshore Controll, wobei diese sich mehr auf China bezieht als eben Russland und den IS oder gar Iran–von daher nur ein Unterpunkt sein kann:

China Threat: Air-Sea Battle vs. Offshore Control?
Jun. 23, 2014 – 04:08PM   |
TAIPEI — There are doubts in Washington that a US president would ever approve the bombing of China. This notion demonstrates that the Pentagon’s Air-Sea Battle operational concept is seriously flawed, said T.X. Hammes, a senior researcher in strategy and future conflict at the department’s National Defense University.
Hammes told Defense News that no president has ever authorized the bombing of China, including during the Korean and Vietnam wars. Yet one of Air-Sea Battle’s basic tenets is aerial bombing of command-and-control hubs, mobile missile launchers, air bases, and port facilities.
Hammes has written about an alternative strategy, Offshore Control, in several articles and papers since 2012. In his latest article, co-authored with Richard Hooker, National Defense University’s director for research and strategic support in the Institute for National Strategic Studies, they argue that Offshore Control offers a less provocative military option.
First, it is provocative in that China’s Second Artillery Corps controls its land-based ballistic missiles and nuclear arsenal. Attacking these facilities, while China has not or cannot attack comparable US facilities, could escalate the conflict uncontrollably.
Second, Air-Sea Battle is ineffective against China’s dense and capable air defense network. It also casts doubts on whether the US military could locate and destroy China’s mobile missile-launch systems. China has an abundance of man-made caves and hidden facilities. China is also not comparable to Iraq’s flat desert landscape, where the US Air Force had difficulties locating Iraq’s Scud missile launchers.
Third, Air-Sea Battle lacks deterrent value. China will, no doubt, attempt to cripple US space and cyber systems. China has developed and practiced anti-satellite exercises that include lasers and missiles. China’s cyber capabilities are already well established, if not obvious, as well as inexpensive compared to many of the systems Air-Sea Battle would field during a war with China.
Offshore Control, Hammes said, offers an alternative to Air-Sea Battle that is based on affordability with no kinetic operations against mainland China. The dominant phase of fighting would be outside the range of China’s assets. Offshore Control would establish concentric rings that deny China the use of the sea inside the first island chain, defend the sea and air space of the first island chain nations, and dominate the air and maritime space outside the chain.
Offshore Control would take advantage of geography to enforce a naval blockade of China’s key imports and exports. All Chinese military assets outside China’s 12-mile limit would be subject to attack. “This area will be declared a maritime exclusion zone with the warning that ships in the zone will be seized or sunk.” The article further states that the US cannot hope to stop all maritime traffic, but can prevent the passage of large cargo ships and tankers, “severely disrupting China’s economy relatively quickly.”

Während Airseabattle also eine Bombadierung des chinesischen Festlandes vorsieht mit aller Eskalationsgefahr, versucht Offshore Controll dies zu verhindern. Den Off-Shore-Controll-Protagonisten wird wiederum umgekehrt vorgehalten, dass ihre Blockade durch festlandstationierte Raketen- und Angriffswaffen neutralisiert werden könnte, weswegen eine Ausnahme des chinesischen Festlands von US-Militärschlägen die Abschreckung, wie auch den beabsichtigten Effekt konterkarieren würden.Zumindestens sieht man, dass in den USA eine höchst notwendige Klärung—momentan noch auf operativer Ebene, demnächst vielleicht auf strategischer Ebene—vorankommt.

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