Kurznotizen für die Post-INF-Welt

Kurznotizen für die Post-INF-Welt

Lesenswerter Beitrag The end of an era? The INF Treaty, New START, and the future of strategic stability von Frank A. Rose, Brookings Institution, wie die Welt nach dem INF-Vertrag aussehen sollte. Zum einen wird analysiert, dass es sich nicht um mehrere kleine oder grössere Krisen handelt, sondern um eine grundlegende Umschichtung der internationalen Weltordnung. Zum anderen wird herausgearbeitet, dass Russland schon 2004 und 2005 den USA vorgeschlagen hat, den INF-Vertrag zu kündigen, da weltweit neue Waffensyteme entwickelt wüden, die das strategische Gleichgewicht ändern. Bisher ging man ja immer davon aus, dass die Russen alles heimlich gemacht hätten. Als Schlussfolgerung zieht Rose, dass die Kohäsion unter den US-Verbündeten erhalten werden müsse, man aufpassen müsse, dass nun nicht noch New START beerdigt würde und man zum Dritten andere Mächte wie China in neue Rüstungsbegrenzungsverträge einbeziehen müsse. Letzteres dürfte wohl die schwierigste Übung sein.Interessant, dass die NATO jetzt erkläre, sie wolle keine neuen Mittelstreckenwaffen in Europa stationieren. Kann man das ernst nehmen?


The end of an era? The INF Treaty, New START, and the future of strategic stability

Frank A. Rose Tuesday, February 12, 2019



Desweiteren diskutierten 8 Experten der Brookings Institution Madelyn Creedon, Robert Einhorn, Bonnie Jenkins, Suzanne Maloney, Michael O’Hanlon, Jung Pak, Frank Rose, and Strobe Talbott in ihrem Beitrag „Managing risk: Nuclear weapons in the new geopolitics“ allgemeiner die Rüstungskontrollverträge und sind der Anischt, dass die vielen neuen Waffentechnologien sowie die neue internationale Lage von vermehrter Groß- und Regionalmachtkonfrontation dies schwieriger macht und multilateraler , mit Einbeziehung etwa Chinas angelegt werden müsste. Dennoch spricht sie sich für eine Verlängerung von New START um 5 Jahre aus.

The discussion found that:

  • The classic model of arms control (based on bilateral U.S.-Russia agreements like New START and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty) has come under immense strain given the current security climate, the return of great power competition, and the advent of new technologies. Despite that strain, the role of arms control continues to be paramount in reducing the risk of nuclear war, which should remain the priority of U.S. nuclear policy.
  • The security environment for a successful non-proliferation regime is deteriorating. The major challenges are Russia using the threat of its nuclear weapons to achieve a broader geopolitical strategy, China’s resurgence as a great power, the United States’ unilateral withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, and a North Korea unlikely to accept complete denuclearization in the near to medium term.
  • Despite that deterioration, Russia, China, and the United States have continued to find areas of cooperation in order to maintain the integrity of the non-proliferation regime, such as with Iran and North Korea. However, even those areas are now under strain.
  • Nuclear proliferation to U.S. allies remains unlikely but if allies begin to seriously question U.S. security assurances at the same time that external threats mount, some countries may reconsider what was once a non-starter. Moving forward, executive policy and language needs to affirm U.S. extended deterrence commitments to our allies and partners.
  • The context surrounding U.S. nuclear weapons has shifted drastically in the last decade, amplified by the resurgence of great power competition with China and Russia, escalated proliferation by North Korea, and development of new technologies. The U.S. nuclear modernization debate necessitates a recognition of major shifts in recent years to reflect clearly the changes of the geopolitical situation.
  • Policymakers must rethink how best to restore stability by considering new technologies in non-nuclear strategic domains (cyber, space, bio, etc.) and methods for discussions, not just bilaterally with Russia but multilaterally with China and others. The United States needs to begin strategic stability dialogues with both Moscow and Beijing.
  • The Trump administration should extend New START for five years, as allowed by the terms of the treaty, in a demonstration of confidence-building for U.S.-Russia relations and U.S. support for arms control and non-proliferation commitments.
  • In an effort to strengthen nuclear weapons policies that will re-establish global stability and reduce the risk of nuclear war by including emerging technologies and utilizing innovative approaches, the United States must consciously engage the next generation. This effort should be concentrated in schools, but will require collaboration with national labs and government to ensure successful pathways of entry for generational overlap and replacement.


Das Transkript der Diskussion ist nachlesbar unter:


Ob diese Vorschläge jedoch von der Trumpadminsitration gehört werden, ist zweifelhaft, zumal die Brookings Institution im Ruf steht, den Demokraten nahezustehen, Trump kein Freund von Multilaterialismus ist, sondern bilaterale Mann-zu -Mann-Deals bevorzugt und sein Sicherheitsberater John Bolton ein ausgesprochener Gegner von Rüstungskontrollbegrenzungen ist, da sie die USA nur unnötig einschränken würden.

Gleichzeitig lehnt China die Multilateralisierung des INF-Vertrags ab. Der Vorschlag Merkels auf der Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz, auch China in den INF-Vertrag einzubeziehen, wurde von Yang Jiechi, Politbüromitglied der KP China klar und offen abgelehnt. In der Global Times wird Merkel scharf kritisiert,da er nur deutsche und europäische Interessen im Auge habe und Chinas Ambitionen weiter aufzurüsten, um in Asien-Pazifik und darüberhinaus agieren zu können Fesseln anlegen würde, die auch die bisherige US-Übermacht ignorieren würden:

„Germany wrong to involve China in INF

Source:Global Times Published: 2019/2/17 19:43:39


German Chancellor Angela Merkel expressed the hope on February 16 that China should be involved in international disarmament efforts. „We would of course be glad if such talks were held not just between the United States, Europe and Russia but also with China,“ said Merkel at the 55th Munich Security Conference.

Her remarks were clearly directed against Washington and Moscow’s withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.

Yang Jiechi, a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, who was also present at the conference, reiterated that „we [China] are opposed to the multilateralization of INF.“

The INF treaty concerns Europe and Germany’s interests. The US took the lead in abandoning INF, resulting in the collapse of the arms control system.

It is understandable that Berlin is anxious, but Merkel’s hasty call for Beijing is rather inappropriate. Her words disrespect China’s interests and wishes, and objectively encourage Washington to quit irresponsibly.

Washington alleged that INF failed because Moscow did not comply with INF and Beijing was not bound by the treaty. These were its main excuses for the withdrawal.

Germany believes that the more countries involved in INF, the better. However, many European countries can never understand the security risks and the urgency to strengthen national defense in other regions.

The INF Treaty was signed by the US and the Soviet Union. It was a compromise between the two superpowers with the same level of military power to ease their confrontations.

Although China is now much stronger than it was in the past, its nuclear power and comprehensive military strength are far from being equal to those of the US and conducting negotiations on an equal footing.

The Europeans are clear that the US withdrawal from the INF Treaty is part of its America First agenda and an abandonment of its international obligations.

At the Munich security conference, Merkel and European countries criticized recent US security policies. But on the issue of the INF treaty, Merkel snubbed China to serve US interests, reflecting the selfishness of Germans and some Europeans.

It is natural that Europeans consider more of their own interests, but they should stick to justice in major affairs otherwise double standards will prevail.

Europe does not feel any threat from China’s missiles. In security, Europe is caught in the middle of Moscow and Washington.

Europe is not the source of China’s security pressure. But Germany has dragged China into its own security plight, which not only damages China’s interests, but also leads Europeans in the wrong direction for their security concerns.

Globalization has remolded the existing power pattern and will also change the world’s political landscape. The era that Europe’s interests are tied with the Western camp is ending. America First will become the dominant principle in trans-Atlantic ties. Europe is destined to fall behind the US and needs to recalculate its orientation.

As the world’s second largest economy, China needs defense capabilities which should be more powerful than it has now so as to build peace in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. A peaceful and stable Asia-Pacific region will benefit Europe.

The Asia-Pacific is far from reaching a balance of power. Germans are clear about the wide gap between the Chinese and US militaries. Merkel’s words are nothing but a bubble in thin air.“


Kommentare sind geschlossen.