In den USA bereitet man sich gedanklich und materiell immer mehr auf einen sinoamerikanischen Krieg vor. Offshore Controll, Airseabattle, RAND-Studie „War with China“ waren da so die ersten Erzeugnisse, inzwischen ist die Diskussion schon weiter und stellt man sich die Frage, was man mit einem besiegten China nach einem Krieg anstellen soll. Die Frage nach dem Danach wird heute schon gestellt. Zum Teil als Argument gegen einen solchen Krieg, zum anderen ernst gemeint die Frage nach einer Nachkriegsordnung: Ob jenes Make America great again zu einer neuen pax american führt, bei der China und Rußland untergeordnet werden und es keine multipolare Welt gibt. Mein Bauchgefühlk sagt mir jedoch, dass die Möglichkeit eines sinoamerikanischen Kriegs in der zweiten Amtszeit Trumps recht groß ist, sollte Trump mit alleinigem Handelskrieg nicht weiterkommen.Da bietet sich TX Hammes Strategie der Offshore Controll, als militärische Weiterführung des Handelskrieges mittels einer Seeblockade und Strangulierung der Wirtschaft Chinas geradezu an. Die RAND-Studie, die China vor einem langen Krieg warnt und dessen desaströsen Folgen, betont aber auch, dass die USA eine bessere Kriegsposition hätten je früher sie diesen Krieg beginnen. Hier noch aus der Diskussion des Themas in der US-amerikanischen Zeitung „The Diplomat“:

The Day After: China Edition

Say the U.S. emerges as the victor in a war with China. What comes next?

By Amitai Etzioni

May 11, 2017

The U.S. is involved in a slow, Cuban-like missile crisis in dealing with North Korea, according to Harvard’s Graham Allison. The U.S. and North Korea are threatening each other with military strikes, including nuclear ones. Such a war is likely to draw in China. True, Allison stresses, no one seeks war; however, history shows that when we face the kinds of heated rhetoric and mutual threats we see now, war may well ensue. Remember how we got into WWI; note how close the U.S. and Soviet Union came to nuclear blows during the missile crisis.

This possibility led me to review the various strategies American planners have laid out for how such a war might be fought. Some argue that the U.S. should build up its military forces to such a point that China would be so discouraged, it would seek to avoid even the risk of conflict with the U.S. Military strategist Andrew Krepinevich describes this as deterrence through denial, “designed to convince a would-be aggressor that he cannot achieve his objective, so there is no point in trying.” The problem with such an approach is that whatever level of armaments a nation builds up, one can always find ways to show that it still insufficient. What if the other side uses cyber warfare? What if they knock out our satellites? And so on. In effect, this position amounts to an open invitation to the military services and defense contractors to seek funds for all their dream projects and to think up new ones. And war may still follow.

Looming over any discussion of possible conflict between the U.S. and China must necessarily be the specter of nuclear war. The Union of Concerned Scientists warned in May 2016 that “The possibility that the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) could become involved in a nuclear war is increasing.” The factors contributing to the increased risk of nuclear war between the two states include mutual mistrust, the continuing preparations for war on both sides (including Washington’s trillion dollar investment in upgrades to its nuclear forces), inadequacy of strategic dialogue between the two sides, and differing perceptions of risk and understanding of the role of nuclear weapons. Regarding the final point, China has a No-First-Use policy with regard to its nuclear weapons, while the U.S. has until now refused to adopt such a policy, signaling that it is willing to use nuclear weapons first in a conflict. This refusal, combined with the continuing American interest in ballistic missile defense systems, just positioned in South Korea, has prompted Chinese leadership to discuss putting the country’s nuclear missiles on high alert – a particular risky situation for both sides.

Thomas J. Christensen notes that China’s No-First-Use nuclear doctrine is already much more elastic than its name suggests, citing a book written for officers in the PLA’s Second Artillery which discusses the conditions under which the nuclear deterrence threshold might be lowered. In times when a nuclear power that also possesses superior high-tech conventional weapons conducts high-level air strikes which China has no other way to ward off, the nuclear missile corps is instructed to “adjust our nuclear deterrence policy without delay.” Hugh White warns ominously that “Those who assume that those costs [of conflict with China] must be worth paying might not have thought carefully enough about just how high the price could go.”

Many often cited American plans for how to defeat China simply assume that nuclear war can be avoided. The most often cited of these is the Pentagon’s Air-Sea Battle (ASB) plan. A report by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) gives a detailed account of how an ASB-style war with China would unfold. In the opening “blinding campaign,” the U.S. attacks China’s reconnaissance and command-and-control networks to degrade the PLA’s ability to target U.S. and allied forces. Next, the military takes the fight to the Chinese mainland, striking long-range anti-ship missile launchers. Given that this is where the anti-ship missiles are located, it is only logical that the U.S. would target land-based platforms. And to go after them, one needs to take out China’s air defense systems, command control centers, and other anti-access weapons. In short, ASB requires a total war with China. This often cited and influential document does not speak to the question about what is to follow victory.

A study by RAND Corporation, sponsored by the U.S. Army, examined four possible scenarios for a U.S.-China War. The two variables which generate the four scenarios are length of conflict (brief vs. long) and intensity (mild vs. severe). The authors of the study predict that, in any of the four scenarios, the war would be much less damaging to the U.S. than to China in military, political, and economic terms.

Others call for the U.S. to plan for a conflict that stops short of the full-scale conventional war envisaged by ASB. Jeffrey Kline and Wayne Hughes of the Naval Postgraduate School have proposed a war-at-sea strategy that would consist of submarine attacks, mining inside the first island chain (a conceptual line stretching from Japan and Taiwan to the Philippines), and patrol boats to intercept Chinese shipping, “with no intention of putting ground forces on China’s mainland.” They argue that avoiding a mainland attack would increase the possibilities for negotiation and carry a lower risk of escalation. They also argue that a war-at-sea strategy would be a more credible deterrent than ASB, as Chinese leadership might perceive the U.S. as being more willing to employ strictly maritime options than the more drastic capabilities of ASB.

In a similar vein, T.X. Hammes of the National Defense University has proposed “Offshore Control,” a strategy that would enforce a “distant blockade on China” to cripple trade and thus, China’s export-dependent economy. Hammes argues that the assets needed to enact Offshore Control would be much less expensive to maintain during peacetime, and that, by avoiding passion-inducing attacks, an Offshore Control strategy would allow Chinese leadership to end the conflict while saving face.

By far the most carefully laid out and scholarly treatment of these issues is found in Beyond Air-Sea Battle, by Professor Aaron Friedberg of Princeton. Friedberg sees two approaches to implementing ASB: One is a linear approach that scales up existing resources and technology and the second is a discontinuous approach that would rely more heavily on new technologies and as yet untested weapons systems. Friedberg compares ASB with two alternatives: a distant blockade and “maritime denial,” which is essentially ASB minus any strikes on the Chinese mainland. Friedberg suggests that the US needs to assemble the forces and military assets needed for all these strategies because different circumstances may call for applying one or the other, or for moving from one to the other.

All these war plans share one major defect: There is no discussion, none, of what happens after the U.S. wins. Will the U.S. leave, the way it left Germany after WWI? How does the U.S. expect the billion surviving Chinese to respond? Will they rebuild a nation focused on revenge, the same way the humiliated Germans did, leading to a regime like that of North Korea only 400 times larger? Or does the U.S. plan to follow Colin Powell’s rule that “if you broke you own it,” and return to the neocon agenda? That is, would the U.S. occupy China and seek to turn it into a liberal democracy – the way it tried in Iraq and Afghanistan? Given America’s record in nation building over the last 15 years – in much smaller territories – nation building in China is a difficult idea to entertain. However, if both postwar options are dismal – to put it mildly – what is the exit strategy? It is a question the war planners ignore, making one worry that even if the U.S. won the war handily, it would again lose the peace.

One reason planning for peace was avoided in the past was that it was assumed that once oppressed people were liberated by the U.S., they would take to building a liberal democracy like ducks to water, like sunflowers to the sun. “What else would a free people want?” The neocons assumed, on the eve of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, that U.S. troops would be met with cheering crowds that would strew rose petals in front of them and set a model of democracy not just for Iraq but for the entire Middle East. Firing all the Baath party civil servants and sending the army home (two major reasons Iraq is still engaged in a ruinous civil war and very far from a liberal democracy) were based on the assumption that it is enough to abolish the old regime; building the new one was going to be easy street. No one can seriously believe this anymore.

One may argue that there is a division of labor; military planners will plan wars, someone else – maybe the State Department – will plan for the day after. However, I am hard put to find that someone else. Above all, one cannot separate the way one fights from the plans for the period that follows victory (assuming it is ours). One fights differently according to what end state one seeks. To give but one example, though a rather telling one: if the attacker seeks to punish a nation for great abuses, one may not hesitate to devastate its infrastructure. However, if one plans to rebuild it, one may limit strikes on the infrastructure as much as possible.

In the case of China, I suggest an examination of the postwar options will reveal that they are all highly unattractive. This will urge the policymakers to whom the military planners report to redouble their efforts to seek ways to resolve differences with China, especially regarding North Korea, in ways that do not risk a war with China.

Amitai Etzioni is a University Professor and Professor of International Relations at George Washington University. His latest book, Avoiding War With China, was just published by the University of Virginia Press.

https://thediplomat.com/2017/05/the-day-after-china-edition/

The US Is Pushing Back Against China. What Happens If We Succeed?

Those hoping for the collapse of China’s communist government need to think seriously about what the consequences would be.

By Chi Wang

April 19, 2019

(…)

Today’s leaders, in both the United States and China, do not truly understand what’s at stake. I do. I will never forget the hardships of the Sino-Japanese War and the civil war that followed. American policymakers and scholars are not wrong to wonder what an ever-stronger China would mean or to demand that China adjust its policies and practices that are harmful to the United States. At the same time, however, it is just as important to ask what would happen if China collapsed and what that would mean not just for the United States, but for the world. I hope the U.S. and China will learn from the past and strive for a peaceful future.

Dr. Chi Wang is President of the U.S.-China Policy Foundation and previously served as the head of the Chinese section at the Library of Congress.

https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/the-us-is-pushing-back-against-china-what-happens-if-we-succeed/

Ein befreundeter Exdiplomat schrieb mir noch:

„Lieber Herr Ostner,

Ihre Einschätzung ist mir etwas zu düster. Ich sehe die Dinge so:

– Richtig ist, dass die USA sich auf „Great Power competition“ vorbereiten und sich an Szenarien orientieren, die wir aus dem Wettbewerb der Großmächte zwischen 1884 und 1914 kennen.

– Richtig ist auch, dass China als der künftige Hauptgegner gesehen wird.

– Den Zeithorizont sehe ich anders. Ein möglicher Konflikt mit der VR China wird erst in einer späteren Phase, sagen wir zwischen 2025 und 2050 erwartet.

– Im Augenblick gilt das Hauptaugenmerk dem Iran.

– Russland unter Putin wird ebenfalls als Gegner ins Kalkül gezogen, übrigens auf der Prioritätenliste zur Zeit noch vor China. Aber: Die USA gehen davon aus, dass Russland auf dem absteigenden Ast ist und nach Putin Szenarien möglich sind, wie wir sie aus den Jelzin-Jahren kennen. Also: Eher Chancen als Risiken ab ca. 2025.

– Fazit: Mit Blick auf Peking und Moskau ist Washington grundsätzlich noch in einer Warteposition. Das gilt nicht für den Iran.“

Mein Gegenargument:

„Ihr Wort in Gottes Ohren. Zuerst kommt der Iran dran. Dass Iran nun ein Ultimatum in Sachen Ausstieg aus dem Irandeal stellt, macht eine Konfrontation scheinbar unausweichlich.Gut möglich, dass die USA nun die iranischen Nuklearanlage ausschalten werden, da sie nun darauf verweisen können, dass Iran sich Atomwaffen zulegen will und es dies zu verhindern gilt. Was den Zeithoriziont eines sinoamerikanischen Kriegs anbetrifft, so wird der sich danach bemessen, wie die Sache mit dem Iran verläuft, ob dieser sich zu einem regionalen Krieg auswächst. Aber ihren Zeithorizont teile ich nicht: Trump will schnelle Ergebnisse mittels maximalen Drucks.Er hat bestenfalls noch eine Amtszeit. Bei ihrem Szenario gehen sie von einem langfristig denkenden und nicht impulsiv handelnden Politiker und Strategen aus. Natürlich versucht Trump es zuerst mittels eines Handelskrieges in der Hoffnung, dass die Chinesen einlenken. Aber was wenn sie das nicht tun? Da liegt dann  Offshore Controll in der Logik besser als Airseabattle. Der Wirtschaftskrieg mit militärischen Mitteln durch Seeblockade und Strangulierung der chinesischen Wirtschaft. Zudem betont TX Hammes, dass Offshore Controll heute schon mit den verfügbaren Militärgerät- und mitteln gewinnbar ist und es keine Phase der Aufrüstung bräuchte.Warten wir mal ab–ich lasse mich auch gerne vom Gegenteil überraschen, aber glaube nicht so recht an den Mythos vom kriegsunwilligen Geschäftsmann. Ich rede auch nicht von Unausweichlichkeit eines Krieges, aber einer relativ großen Wahrscheinlichkeit. Zudem: 2025 ist ja auch nicht so weit entfernt ,gerade 1 Jahr nach Trumps zweiter Amtszeit. Warum also nicht 2023 oder 2024 und Fakten schaffen, die seinen Nachfolgern Sachzwänge auferlegt?“

Jedenfalls fällt auf: Trump erklärt China den Handelskrieg, droht gleichzeitig der EU damit, lässt Kriegsschiffe in dem Persischen Golf gegen Iran und im Südchinesischen Meer gegen China zum Höhepunkt der Venezuelakrise, bei der er auch mit allen Optionen droht auffahren. Nicht das klassische Divide et impera oder sukkzessive Abarbeiten von Konflikten, sondern eher ala Mussolini Multo nemeci, multi honore-viel Feind, viel Ehr. Hatten die USA in den 90er Jahren aufgegeben als Doktrin zu haben, zwei regionale Kriege zur selben Zeit führen zu können, um dies dann auf einen zu begrenzen, zumal auch ohne boots on the ground, so scheint sich dies nu zu ändern. Die USA wollen wohl zeigen, dass sie bereit und in der Lage sind 2 Handelskriege und zwei Kriege gleichzeitig zu riskisieren , zudem auch gleichzeitig noch die Krise in Venezuela gleichzeitig schultern zu können. Das ist sehr risikoreich und Pokern am Abgrund, in der Hoffnung, dass alle anderen schon rechtzeitig einlenken. Bestenfalls bleibt es im Falle Irans bei Drohgebärden wie im Falle Nordkoreas. Aber Iran hat keine Atomwaffen zur Abschreckung und falls es das Atomabkommen ganz kündigt, wie nun in dem Ultiamtum angedroht, dann würde es zeigen, dass es sich welche zulegen wollte und die USA dies wohl als Vorwand nehmen, es dazu gar nicht dazu kommen zu lassen. Zumal haben die USA die Hemmschwelle für einen Krieg so weit heruntergesetzt, dass schon ein Scharmützel von iranischen Stellvertretern als Vorwand für einen amerikanischen Militärschlag dienen kann. Ob dieser dann begrenzt bleibt, wäre abzuwarten. Die Sperrung der Strasse von Hormuz bleibt dem Iran eigentlich auch nicht als reales Mittel, da er dann seine eigenen Erdöleinnahmen strangulieren würde.Ihm bleiben eigentlich nur Angriffe oder Raketenschläge gegen Saudiarabien, Israel, US-Truppen, was dann aber entsprechend beantwortet würde. Fraglich aber, ob die Iraner nun einknicken und nachgeben werden, indem sie etwa Truppen aus Syrien abziehen oder ein anderes Deeskalationszeichen geben.