2024 könnte der eigentlich politische game changer für den Ukrainekrieg du Europa werden. Nun ist auch schon von einer zweiten möglichen Zeitenwende bei einem Wahlsieg Trumps die Rede:

„Deutschlands Sicherheit : Was, wenn Trump es wieder wird?

• Von Eckart Lohse und Matthias Wyssuwa, Berlin
• -Aktualisiert am 11.09.2023-06:07  

Noch sind es leise Töne. Wie aus dem Hintergrund, als solle sich niemand erschrecken. Von Regierungsseite werden sie nicht offen ausgesprochen, das müssen andere machen. Ehemalige Regierungsmitglieder etwa, wie Sigmar Gabriel, der einstige Außenminister und SPD-Vorsitzende, der noch vor einigen Jahren die Aufhebung der Sanktionen gegen Russland wegen des Ukrainekriegs gefordert hatte und dann überraschend im Juni 2019 Chef der Atlantik-Brücke wurde. Er spricht darüber, wie Europa sich schützen sollte, wenn die Vereinigten Staaten unter der abermaligen Führung eines Präsidenten Donald Trump auf Distanz zur NATO gehen sollten, so wie während seiner Amtszeit geschehen. Eine ganz neue Dimension der Zeitenwende könnte bevorstehen.

Es käme in einer solchen Situation sofort eine Debatte auf, was zu tun wäre, sagt Gabriel. Besonders dann, wenn es keine eindeutigen Signale des amerikanischen Kongresses gäbe, dass die Vereinigten Staaten zur NATO stehen. „Es würde dann zum Beispiel darum gehen, darüber zu diskutieren, ob der französische Nuklearschirm auch auf Deutschland ausgeweitet wird und ob dort französische Nuklearwaffen stationiert werden“, sagt Gabriel im Gespräch mit der F.A.Z. Er schiebt gleich hinterher: „Aber für eine solche Diskussion ist es derzeit viel zu früh.“

https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/deutschlands-sicherheit-was-wenn-trump-es-wieder-wird-19164346.html

Angesichts des Wahltermins in den USA 2024, der auch in Putins Kalkül der politische gamechanger im Ukrainekrieg und in Europa werden könnte, fragt sich, wann das diskutiert wird oder dann werden soll. Hinter inzwischen auch nicht mehr so geschlossenen Türen wird das ja schon diskutiert, wie der FAZ- Artikel dies dokumentiert. Gemeint ist wohl, wann man des der breiten Öffentlichkeit sagt und wie man es dann seinem Kinde sagt.

Scheinbar diskutiert man jetzt die französische Force de Frappe-Lösung. Auf deutscher Seite vor allem seitens Sigmar Gabriels und auch schon in der Atlantikbrücke und SPD. Ebenso spricht man schon von einer möglichen zweiten Zeitenwende im Falle des Wahlsiegs von Trump. Putin, Xi und Macron wird das freuen. Die NATO- Ex-Generäle Domroese und Naumann meinen ,dass die Force de frappe „keine glaubwürdige nukleare Abschreckung“ ist wie der US-Atomschutz , einmal von Quantität, Qualität und voraussehbarer beschränktem Opferwillen der Franzosen.

Vielleicht würden die Polen da zur nuklearen Schneise machen, um Moskau oder irgendeine russische Stadt nicht nuken zu müssen mit dann Vergeltung und Zweitschlag zu riskieren. Ähnlich wäre das wohl. mit GB als Alternative, zumal nach dem Brexit. Ex- NATO- General Naumann berichtete in unserem früheren Interview aber von Gesprächen mit sicherheitspolitischen Vertretern der Trump-Regierung und, auch der Republikaner, die meinten,  dass die Konzentrierung von US-Truppen in Osteuropa wichtiger sei als die in Deutschland, wenngleich bisher auch noch keiner etwa Rammstein infrage gestellt hat. Aber jenseits solcher Überlegungen, kann ja durchaus die Situation eintreten, dass keine andere Alternative und Option mehr  als die weniger glaubwürdige Abschreckung durch die Force de frappe überhaupt bleibt als das kleinere Übel nach der Devise: Besser als gar nichts. Und die 2%-NATOziel ist immer noch nicht erreicht in Deutschland. Kaum zu glauben, dass Trump das nicht thematisieren wird. Vielleicht wird er sagen, die Deutschen hatten jetzt genug Zeit und haben die letzte Chance nicht wahrgenommen. Scheinbar hoffen einige, dass Trump nicht ernst macht, auch den US-Atomschutz nicht entziehen wird, die NATO vielleicht nach der Norderweiterung vielleicht doch nicht für „obsolet“ hält, wie Macron sie als „hirntot“ erklärte, aber außer AfD und Union findet sich weder bei der Ampel noch der Linkspartei und schon gar nicht bei einer Wagenknechtpartei die Bereitschaft oder Absicht das 2%- NATO-Ziel als festen Verteidigungshaushaltsposten zu beschließen, sondern man sich auf das Bundeswehrsondervermögen beruft, ja auch hofft, entweder die USA aus Deutschland und Europa rauszudrängen („Ami go home“) , sogenannte „europäische Souveränität“ nun  herzustellen oder sich eben eurasisch statt transatlantsch zu orientieren, samt dann eurasischer Seidenstraße. Nach „special relations“, „Strategischer Partnerschaft in Führerschaft“ und „Zeitenwende“ sieht es bisher seitens der Ampelkoalition nicht aus. Und bleibt abzuwarten, inwieweit Biden wirklich der letzte „europäische US- Präsident“ wird und sich die USA dann China und dem Asian Pivot nun in voller Stärke zuwenden werden. Desweiteren ob Runsfelds „altes und neues Europa“ dann coh noch Wirklichkeit wird und welche Ausirkungen dies auf NATO und EU haben wird, ja vielleicht eine Spaltung in einen westeuropäischen und einen osteuropäischen Block. Doch noch hoffen viele deutsche und euroäische Politker, dass Biden wiedergewählt wird und man noch einmal 4 Jahre „Ruhe“und „Frieden“ während des Ukrainekriegs hat.

Wobei nicht nur in den USA Präsidentschaftswahlen sind, sondern auch in Taiwan, die ebenso recht große geopolitische Auswirkungen haben könnten.

2024: Der politische game changer, der harte Bruch und die wirkliche Zeitenwende?

Ex- NATO- General Domroese meinte zu der Idee eine Atomschirms für Deutschland seitens der Force de Frappe:

„Das halte ich für NICHT so easy. Erstens fliegen F35 wohl nicht mit FRA nuks.
Zweitens ist nukleare Teilhabe mit FRA schwierig.
Drittens und ausschlaggebend ( für mich) ist FRA Philosophie, dass der Einsatz sooo groß ist, dass man es nur fürs eigene Volk machen könne – also eben nicht für andere…“

Ist die Force de frappe nicht vor allem auf Raketen und U-Booten stationiert? Ausschlaggebend wohl vor allem der dritte Punkt. Nukleare Teilhabe bedeutet ja nicht so viel, oder? 

Darauf Domroese:

„Ad 1: ja
NT bedeutet sehr viel, nukleare Planungsgruppe = Teilhaben = Mitbestimmung Das will FRA m.e. nicht. Großer Unterschied. Müsste man verhandeln.“

Aber viele Fragen bleiben noch offen: Mitbestimmung, aber wer hat da das letzte Sagen? Geht es da nur um Zielbestimmung- und Koordinierung oder auch um Strategie? Und bezieht sich die nukleare Teilhabe auf alle Atomwaffen der Force de frappe oder nur auf die, die in Deutschland dann stationiert würden? Und wieviele wären das dann?

Bisher ist nur von einer möglichen Stationierung von frz. Atomwaffen in Deutschland die Rede, obgleich auch die nicht sicher wäre, aber nicht in Polen. Besteht da nicht die Gefahr, dass man zwei Europa der Sicherheiten bekommt, also eventuell eine Spaltung in West- und Osteuropa oder ala Rumsfeld ein „altes und neues Europa“? Und würden die Franzosen (und auch Deutschland) zustimmen, dass frz. Nuklearwaffen in Polen stationiert werden als nuklearer Stolperdraht oder würden sie befürchten, dass sich Russland da zu sehr provoziert fühlen könnte? Und wie steht es in diesem Zusammenhang mit der NATO-Russland-Grundakte, die ja bisher offiziell noch nicht gekündigt wurde? Würde Trump im Ernstfall auf Deutschland und Frankreich verzichten und nur den Osteuropäern den US- Atomschutz geben? Würde er Polen nukleare Teilhabe einräumen oder gar US- Atomraketen in Polen stationieren, wo er doch mit Putin einen Deal beabsichtigt? Besteht die Möglichkeit eine europäische nukleare Säule innerhalb der NATO u unterhalten oder würde dies di Spaltung oder das Ende der NATO bedeuten?

Die Lockrufe Macrons und der Scholz-SPD , momentan offiziell noch mittels Sigmar Gabriels nach einer europäischen Souveränität unter einer Force de Frappe mit deutscher Beteiligung scheinen nun eine polnische Reaktion logischerweise nach sich zu ziehen. Zuerst setzte Polen auf die NATO, als Trump diese für „obsolet“ erklärte und Macron diese für „hirntot“ wurde seitens der polnischen Eliten auch schon mal ziwschenzeitlich über eine „europäische Atommacht“ samt „europäischer nuklearer Abschreckung“, vielleicht auch entlang einer Achse des französisch- deutsch- polnischen Weimarer Dreiecks überlegt, wenngleich unsicher bliebe inwieweit das realistisch sei und ob Frankreich auch Atomwaffen in Polen stationieren oder es damit schützen oder eine nukleare Teilhabe zugestehen würde. Momentan setzt man scheinbar wieder auf eine nukleare Teilhabe innerhalb der NATO:

„Poland’s bid to participate in NATO nuclear sharing

Poland is seeking a more active role in NATO’s nuclear-sharing mission. This could happen several ways, including by hosting B61 nuclear weapons on its territory, certifying its F-35A aircraft to carry nuclear weapons, or assuming a more significant role in decision-making regarding NATO’s nuclear doctrine.

On 30 June 2023, Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki declared Poland’s interest in hosting nuclear weapons under NATO’s nuclear-sharing policy, citing the reported deployment of Russian nuclear weapons to its Kaliningrad region and to Belarus. Soon after, the head of Poland’s National Security Bureau, Jacek Siewiera, said Poland was interested in certifying its F-35A Lightning II aircraft (due to be deployed in 2024–25) to deliver B61 free-fall nuclear bombs, in preparation for possible inclusion in NATO’s arsenal of dual-capable aircraft. 

Russia’s June 2022 decision to deploy an unspecified number of short-range ballistic-missile systems and nuclear warheads to Belarus was probably an attempt to demonstrate resolve and force NATO to weaken its support for Ukraine. The proximity of Russian nuclear weapons to Poland adds urgency to its long-standing pursuit of a more active role in NATO’s nuclear-sharing mechanism. In 2014, then-deputy defence minister Tomasz Szatkowski first stated Poland’s desire to become a host nation following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine earlier that year. Although the Polish Ministry of National Defence subsequently denied interest in joining the programme, the conversation continued against the backdrop of Germany’s domestic debate regarding its own role in the nuclear-sharing mechanism. The United States, which possesses the weapons Poland is seeking to host, has so far denied that any official talks on the issue have occurred. 

Morawiecki’s announcement of Polish interest in nuclear sharing came during a significant conventional military buildup launched in reaction to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Since then, Warsaw has advocated for strengthening NATO’s deterrence posture and has remained opposed to dialogue with Russia. In April 2023, Polish Foreign Minister Zbigniew Rau said the government supported terminating the NATO–Russia Founding Act, a 1997 document stating that NATO had ‘no intention, no plan and no reason’ to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, which now include Poland given that it joined the Alliance in 1999.

Poland’s vocal pursuit of nuclear sharing has political resonance domestically, particularly since Russia’s claimed deployment of nuclear weapons to Belarus. The ruling Law and Justice party – also known as PiS, for Prawo i Sprawiedliwość – is in the midst of a re-election campaign ahead of parliamentary elections in October and believes the initiative will raise its popularity. Russia’s war in Ukraine has generated new interest in nuclear-deterrence issues among the Polish public, with an October 2022 poll suggesting more than half the population would support the deployment of the B61 nuclear-armed gravity bomb in their country. In 2016, by contrast, only one-quarter of respondents expressed similar support. 

NATO’s nuclear decision-making

NATO’s nuclear sharing originated with the 1955 deployment of nuclear weapons by the US to West Germany and the United Kingdom. By 1957, Washington had amassed a weapons stockpile and begun training Alliance members on mounting, targeting and launching nuclear artillery, rockets, missiles and air-dropped bombs in wartime. Several Alliance members currently host US B61 bombs on their territories, have aircraft capable of delivering them and train for that scenario, which would have to be authorised by the US president, the UK prime minister and the Nuclear Planning Group. 

The Nuclear Planning Group is the policy body responsible for nuclear decision-making at NATO and is chaired by the secretary general. It receives advice on nuclear issues from the High Level Group, which is chaired by the US and focuses on practical issues ‘including planning and force posture, and matters concerning … safety, security and effectiveness’. Both are open to all Alliance members, and only France does not participate. For Poland, a NATO agreement on the forward basing of nuclear weapons on its territory would require consensus from the High Level Group, usually in the form of a recommendation report. The Nuclear Planning Group would then consider the recommendation report and could approve it either explicitly or via the ‘silence’ procedure, whereby recommendations are adopted if there are no objections.

Deterrence value  

In pursuing a more active role in nuclear sharing, the Polish government probably seeks to strengthen NATO’s deterrence posture and help the US reaffirm its commitment to extended deterrence. Yet the military value of permanently stationing nuclear weapons in Poland is debatable. 

„In pursuing a more active role in nuclear sharing, the Polish government probably seeks to strengthen NATO’s deterrence posture and help the US reaffirm its commitment to extended deterrence.“

Were Poland to host dual-capable aircraft for NATO, it would probably use its soon-to-be-deployed F-35A fighters, which could be certified to deliver the upgraded B61-12 variant of the B61 bomb. It is therefore likely that any forward deployment of US B61s tasked to NATO would be located at the Polish air bases set to house the F-35As: Świdwin, Poznań-Krzesiny and Łask. NATO would view the deterrence value of stationing nuclear weapons at these locations and turning them into dual-capable-aircraft bases as a function of the vulnerability of the weapons to attack, their credibility of use and their capability to strike targets in Belarus and Russia. 

On credibility, Russia probably does not foresee a ‘bolt from the blue’ nuclear attack by NATO, so the fact that Polish air bases are closer than German ones to the borders of Belarus and Kaliningrad would not be a salient factor in assessing the strength of NATO’s nuclear deterrent. Russia probably calculates that NATO would instead use nuclear weapons as part of its ‘forward defence’ strategy (which would be used in response to a territorial attack against one or more Alliance members) or if it were losing a conventional battle. In these scenarios, NATO would probably remove nuclear weapons from air bases close to the front line, reducing their vulnerability to airstrikes, artillery or capture. Russia might initially refrain from attacking deep into Poland with ground forces, preferring first to neutralise the nuclear threat at range. 

Permanently stationing nuclear weapons closer to the Russian border would therefore incentivise Russia to strike such locations early in a conflict, attempting either to destroy them with conventional or nuclear munitions or to disrupt air-base operations, perhaps with chemical-weapon attacks. As in the Cold War, NATO commanders’ plans for the pre-kinetic phase of an acute crisis would probably include moving B61s to Dispersed Operating Bases or other airfields from which strikes could be launched unpredictably. Due to the public nature of NATO’s permanent nuclear-stationing mechanism, Russia would watch for any dispersal order from Poland. Moscow would benefit from striking these targets pre-emptively, before the B61s could be dispersed. Thus, paradoxically, permanent forward basing would increase the risk of Poland being attacked early in a conflict and limit NATO’s nuclear survivability.

To target dual-capable-aircraft bases in Poland, Russia could use assets in the Baltic and Black seas or those based on its territory. In addition to sea- and air-launched options, it could launch 9K720 Iskander-M (RS-SS-26 Stone) short-range ballistic missiles or 9M728 (RS-SSC-7 Southpaw) ground-launched cruise missiles from the deployment area of the 152nd Missile Brigade near Chernyakhovsk, Kaliningrad, from which all three potential F-35A bases in Poland would be well within range (see Figure 1). Russia now has the additional option of launching these weapons from Belarusian airbases – from which, again, Świdwin, Poznań-Krzesiny and Łask would be in range – and would be likely to move missiles forward to those locations in a military conflict with NATO. Belarus also possesses Su-25 Frogfoot dual-capable aircraft, probably stationed at the Baranovichi and Lida bases, but they are an unattractive option for striking Polish air bases due to their short fighting radius of 375 kilometres and vulnerability to being shot down by Polish fighter aircraft and air defences.

Options     Poland’s rationale for joining the nuclear-sharing club appears to have a political rather than military basis. Warsaw’s statements on the matter emphasise that a NATO decision to share nuclear weapons would send a strong signal to Moscow while also reassuring eastern-flank members of the Alliance’s commitment to their defence.    „Poland’s rationale for joining the nuclear-sharing club appears to have a political rather than military basis.“ In July, security chief Siewiera stated that, setting aside nuclear sharing and F35A certification, it was also important for Poland’s armed forces to increase their involvement in planning related to NATO’s nuclear doctrine. This could occur through participation in more aspects of NATO nuclear exercises such as SNOWCAT and Steadfast Noon. This would enable Polish policymakers to join in the full spectrum of supporting roles for such missions, including reconnaissance, air defence, suppression of enemy air defences, and integration of nuclear- and conventional-strike options. NATO could also designate several Polish airfields as potential Dispersed Operating Bases, which ordinarily do not host military aircraft earmarked for wartime use. These preparations are well known to Alliance members (as part of NATO’s Standardization Agreements) and can be conducted through a consensus decision among members or, if consensus is unachievable, bilaterally between Poland and the US. Such preparations would offer NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) additional options for dispersing dual-capable aircraft in wartime and in near-war situations, which would complicate Russian targeting and potentially increase survival and sortie rates. NATO could extend this practice to other members to increase the number of time-critical targets. Finland, for example, already conducts exercises that train military pilots to land on and take off from public roads, demonstrating that during a crisis it would be able to rapidly disperse its combat aircraft to unpredictable locations. If Poland proceeds with certifying its F-35As for dual-capable missions, as proposed by Siewiera, their subsequent participation in NATO’s nuclear mission would require a consensus among Alliance members, which any member could block by breaking ‘silence’ in the Nuclear Planning Group. Poland could certify the aircraft bilaterally with the US, which would significantly increase the number of airframes available at any given time to SACEUR, which itself would increase Allied deterrence. Despite claims about the expense and difficulty of this option, Ukrainian military experts have successfully integrated weapons systems such as the AGM-88 HARM high-speed anti-radiation missiles onto the MiG-29 Fulcrum fighter aircraft – previously thought impossible – while at war. This suggests B61 integration into Poland’s F-35As could prove to be easier and less costly than building nuclear-hardened shelters and related infrastructure in Poland.

Outlook The communiqué issued at the NATO Vilnius Summit in July acknowledged the anxiety felt by eastern-flank members regarding nuclear deterrence, stating that the Alliance would modernise its capabilities and ‘updat[e] planning to increase [the] flexibility and adaptability’ of its nuclear forces. The extent to which NATO’s secretary general and member countries are amenable to Poland’s specific requests is unknown, however, and a clear indication is unlikely to emerge from unclassified sources without a decision in Brussels or individual capitals to signal a view. It is possible that NATO will proceed in allowing additional countries to certify dual-capable aircraft or additional locations as Dispersed Operating Bases, but it is unlikely to announce this publicly. Observers may therefore notice an F-35A depart from a German air base during a Steadfast Noon exercise and land at an unexpected air base in a non-nuclear-sharing member, and wonder why.      „If Poland proceeds with certifying its F-35As for dual-capable missions, as proposed by Siewiera, their subsequent participation in NATO’s nuclear mission would require a consensus among Alliance members, which any member could block by breaking ‘silence’ in the Nuclear Planning Group.“

Options     Poland’s rationale for joining the nuclear-sharing club appears to have a political rather than military basis. Warsaw’s statements on the matter emphasise that a NATO decision to share nuclear weapons would send a strong signal to Moscow while also reassuring eastern-flank members of the Alliance’s commitment to their defence.    „Poland’s rationale for joining the nuclear-sharing club appears to have a political rather than military basis.“ In July, security chief Siewiera stated that, setting aside nuclear sharing and F35A certification, it was also important for Poland’s armed forces to increase their involvement in planning related to NATO’s nuclear doctrine. This could occur through participation in more aspects of NATO nuclear exercises such as SNOWCAT and Steadfast Noon. This would enable Polish policymakers to join in the full spectrum of supporting roles for such missions, including reconnaissance, air defence, suppression of enemy air defences, and integration of nuclear- and conventional-strike options. NATO could also designate several Polish airfields as potential Dispersed Operating Bases, which ordinarily do not host military aircraft earmarked for wartime use. These preparations are well known to Alliance members (as part of NATO’s Standardization Agreements) and can be conducted through a consensus decision among members or, if consensus is unachievable, bilaterally between Poland and the US. Such preparations would offer NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) additional options for dispersing dual-capable aircraft in wartime and in near-war situations, which would complicate Russian targeting and potentially increase survival and sortie rates. NATO could extend this practice to other members to increase the number of time-critical targets. Finland, for example, already conducts exercises that train military pilots to land on and take off from public roads, demonstrating that during a crisis it would be able to rapidly disperse its combat aircraft to unpredictable locations. If Poland proceeds with certifying its F-35As for dual-capable missions, as proposed by Siewiera, their subsequent participation in NATO’s nuclear mission would require a consensus among Alliance members, which any member could block by breaking ‘silence’ in the Nuclear Planning Group. Poland could certify the aircraft bilaterally with the US, which would significantly increase the number of airframes available at any given time to SACEUR, which itself would increase Allied deterrence. Despite claims about the expense and difficulty of this option, Ukrainian military experts have successfully integrated weapons systems such as the AGM-88 HARM high-speed anti-radiation missiles onto the MiG-29 Fulcrum fighter aircraft – previously thought impossible – while at war. This suggests B61 integration into Poland’s F-35As could prove to be easier and less costly than building nuclear-hardened shelters and related infrastructure in Poland.

Outlook The communiqué issued at the NATO Vilnius Summit in July acknowledged the anxiety felt by eastern-flank members regarding nuclear deterrence, stating that the Alliance would modernise its capabilities and ‘updat[e] planning to increase [the] flexibility and adaptability’ of its nuclear forces. The extent to which NATO’s secretary general and member countries are amenable to Poland’s specific requests is unknown, however, and a clear indication is unlikely to emerge from unclassified sources without a decision in Brussels or individual capitals to signal a view. It is possible that NATO will proceed in allowing additional countries to certify dual-capable aircraft or additional locations as Dispersed Operating Bases, but it is unlikely to announce this publicly. Observers may therefore notice an F-35A depart from a German air base during a Steadfast Noon exercise and land at an unexpected air base in a non-nuclear-sharing member, and wonder why.   „If Poland proceeds with certifying its F-35As for dual-capable missions, as proposed by Siewiera, their subsequent participation in NATO’s nuclear mission would require a consensus among Alliance members, which any member could block by breaking ‘silence’ in the Nuclear Planning Group.“ During the defence- and foreign-ministerial meetings that will take place in the run-up to the NATO Washington Summit in 2024, there may be hints on the direction of the debate within the Alliance about how it should strengthen its deterrent posture. In the meantime, Poland may choose to initiate a debate within the Nuclear Planning Group on additional options, work with the US and Lockheed Martin to make changes to their F-35As, or work unilaterally to upgrade its air bases without triggering a debate within NATO. This would provide SACEUR with additional military capabilities without engaging in what is likely to be a difficult and fraught attempt to change the geography of NATO’s nuclear storage to include permanent stationing of B61s in Poland. It remains probable, however, that Poland’s efforts to increase its contribution to NATO’s nuclear deterrent will continue regardless of the outcome of the upcoming elections. Deterring Russia remains a bipartisan issue in Poland.