2024 could actually be the political game changer for the Ukraine war and  Europe. Now there is already talk of a second possible turning point (Zeitenwende) if Trump wins the election as an article in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) documents:

“Germany’s security:

What if Trump is elected again?

By Eckart Lohse and Matthias Wyssuwa,

 Berlin -Updated 09/11/2023-06:07

There are still quiet sounds. As if from the background, as if no one should be frightened. They are not expressed openly by the government; others have to do that. Former government members, for example, such as Sigmar Gabriel, the former foreign minister and SPD chairman, who called for the lifting of sanctions against Russia because of the Ukraine war a few years ago and then surprisingly became head of the Atlantic Bridge in June 2019. He talks about how Europe should protect itself if the United States, under the renewed leadership of President Donald Trump, distances itself from NATO, as happened during his term in office. A completely new dimension of the turning point could be imminent. In such a situation, a debate would immediately arise as to what should be done, says Gabriel. Especially if there were no clear signals from the American Congress that the United States stood by NATO. “It would then be a matter of discussing, for example, whether the French nuclear umbrella would also be extended to Germany and whether French nuclear weapons would be stationed there,” says Gabriel in an interview with the F.A.Z. He immediately adds: “But it is far too early for such a discussion at the moment.” https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/deutschlands-sicherheit-was-wenn-trump-es-wieder-wird-19164346.html

 Given the election date in the USA in 2024, which could also be the political game changer in the Ukraine war and in Europe in Putin’s calculations, the question is when this will be discussed or should be. In fact hhis is already being discussed behind doors that are no longer so closed, as the FAZ article documents this. What probably means is when to say this to the general public and how to tell it to your child. Apparently the French Force de Frappe solution is now being discussed. On the German side, especially from Sigmar Gabriel and also in the Atlantic Bridge and SPD. There is also talk of a possible second turning point(Zeitenwende) if Trump wins the election. Putin, Xi and Macron will be happy about this. Former NATO generals Domroese and Naumann believe that the force de frappe is “not a credible nuclear deterrent” like the US nuclear protection, given the quantity, quality and predictably limited willingness of the French to make sacrifices. Maybe  Poland would become a nuclear corridorfor a Force de frappe so that French don’t have to nuke Moscow or any Russian city and then risk retaliation and a second strike.At the moment only the option of deploying  french nuclear weapons in Germany ist discussed, but not yet in Poland.  It would probably be similar. with GB as an alternative, especially after Brexit. In our earlier interview, ex-NATO general Naumann reported on conversations with security policy representatives from the Trump administration and  also  the Republicans, who said that the concentration of US troops in Eastern Europe was more important than those in Germany, although so far nobody questioned Rammstein yet. But beyond such considerations, the situation can certainly arise where there is no other alternative or option left than the less credible deterrent through the force de frappe as the lesser evil according to the motto: Better than nothing. And the 2% NATO target has still not been achieved in Germany. It’s hard to believe that Trump won’t address this. Maybe he will say that the Germans now had enough time and didn’t take advantage of their last chance. Some people apparently hope that Trump won’t take things seriously, won’t withdraw US nuclear protection, and that NATO might not be considered „obsolete“ after the northern expansion, as Macron declared it to be „brain dead“, but apart from the AfD and the Union, there are none Neither the traffic light nor the Left Party and certainly not a Wagenknecht party have any willingness or intention to adopt the 2% NATO target as a fixed defense budget item, but instead they rely on the Bundeswehr’s special funds, and even hope, either the USA from Germany and Europe to push them out (“Ami go home”), to establish so-called “European sovereignty” or to orient themselves Eurasian instead of transatlantic, including a Eurasian Silk Road. So far, the traffic light coalition does not look like “special relations”, “strategic partnership in leadership” and “turning point”.

And it remains to be seen to what extent Biden will really become the last “European US President” and the USA will then turn to China and the Asian Pivot in full force. Furthermore, whether Rumsfeld’s “old and new Europe” will then become a reality and what effects this will have on NATO and the EU, perhaps a split into a Western European and an Eastern European bloc. However, many politicans still hope that Biden will be reelected and hat Europa and Germany will get another 4 years.

There are presidential elections not only in the USA, but also in Taiwan, which could also have major geopolitical consequences.

2024: The political game changer, the hard break and the real turning point?

Ex-NATO General Domroese said the following about the idea of a nuclear umbrella for Germany from the Force de Frappe:

“I don’t think it’s that easy. First of all, F35s probably don’t fly with FRA nuks. Second, nuclear sharing is difficult with FRA. Thirdly and crucially (for me) FRA philosophy is that the stakes are so great that you can only do it for your own people – not for others…“

Isn’t the Force de Frappe stationed primarily on missiles and submarines? The third point is probably particularly crucial. Nuclear participation doesn’t mean that much, does it?

Then Domroese:

“Ad 1: yes NT means a lot, nuclear planning group = participation = co-determination That’s what FRA wants in my opinion not. Big difference. You would have to negotiate.”

But many questions still remain unanswered: Co-determination, but who has the final say? Is it just about target definition and coordination or also about strategy? And does nuclear partcipation apply to all nuclear weapons in the force de frappe or only to those that would then be stationed in Germany? And how many would that be? So far there has only been talk of a possible stationing of French nuclear weapons in Germany, although that would not be taken for sure either, but not in Poland. Isn’t there a danger that we will end up with two Europes of security, perhaps a split into Western and Eastern Europe or, like Rumsfeld, an “old and new Europe”? And would the French (and Germany) agree to stationing French nuclear weapons in Poland as a nuclear tripwire or would they fear that Russia might feel too provoked? And in this context, what about the NATO-Russia Founding Act, which has not yet been officially terminated? In an emergency, would Trump ignore Germany and France and only give US nuclear protection to the Eastern Europeans? Would he grant Poland nuclear participation or even station US nuclear missiles in Poland when he intends to make a deal with Putin? Is there a possibility of maintaining a European nuclear pillar within NATO or would this mean a split or the end of NATO?

The calls from Macron and the Scholz SPD, currently officially through Sigmar Gabriel, for European sovereignty under a Force de Frappe with German participation now seem to logically result in a Polish reaction. At first, Poland relied on NATO when Trump declared it “obsolete” and Macron declared it “brain dead”. The Polish elites have at that time been talking about a “European nuclear power” including a “European nuclear deterrent”, perhaps also along an axis of the NATO French-German-Polish Weimar Triangle was then considered, although it remains uncertain to what extent this is realistic and whether France would also station nuclear weapons in Poland or protect it with them or allow nuclear participation. At the moment, there seems to be a renewed Polish focus on nuclear participation within NATO:

„Poland’s bid to participate in NATO nuclear sharing

Poland is seeking a more active role in NATO’s nuclear-sharing mission. This could happen several ways, including by hosting B61 nuclear weapons on its territory, certifying its F-35A aircraft to carry nuclear weapons, or assuming a more significant role in decision-making regarding NATO’s nuclear doctrine.

On 30 June 2023, Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki declared Poland’s interest in hosting nuclear weapons under NATO’s nuclear-sharing policy, citing the reported deployment of Russian nuclear weapons to its Kaliningrad region and to Belarus. Soon after, the head of Poland’s National Security Bureau, Jacek Siewiera, said Poland was interested in certifying its F-35A Lightning II aircraft (due to be deployed in 2024–25) to deliver B61 free-fall nuclear bombs, in preparation for possible inclusion in NATO’s arsenal of dual-capable aircraft. 

Russia’s June 2022 decision to deploy an unspecified number of short-range ballistic-missile systems and nuclear warheads to Belarus was probably an attempt to demonstrate resolve and force NATO to weaken its support for Ukraine. The proximity of Russian nuclear weapons to Poland adds urgency to its long-standing pursuit of a more active role in NATO’s nuclear-sharing mechanism. In 2014, then-deputy defence minister Tomasz Szatkowski first stated Poland’s desire to become a host nation following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine earlier that year. Although the Polish Ministry of National Defence subsequently denied interest in joining the programme, the conversation continued against the backdrop of Germany’s domestic debate regarding its own role in the nuclear-sharing mechanism. The United States, which possesses the weapons Poland is seeking to host, has so far denied that any official talks on the issue have occurred. 

Morawiecki’s announcement of Polish interest in nuclear sharing came during a significant conventional military buildup launched in reaction to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Since then, Warsaw has advocated for strengthening NATO’s deterrence posture and has remained opposed to dialogue with Russia. In April 2023, Polish Foreign Minister Zbigniew Rau said the government supported terminating the NATO–Russia Founding Act, a 1997 document stating that NATO had ‘no intention, no plan and no reason’ to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, which now include Poland given that it joined the Alliance in 1999.

Poland’s vocal pursuit of nuclear sharing has political resonance domestically, particularly since Russia’s claimed deployment of nuclear weapons to Belarus. The ruling Law and Justice party – also known as PiS, for Prawo i Sprawiedliwość – is in the midst of a re-election campaign ahead of parliamentary elections in October and believes the initiative will raise its popularity. Russia’s war in Ukraine has generated new interest in nuclear-deterrence issues among the Polish public, with an October 2022 poll suggesting more than half the population would support the deployment of the B61 nuclear-armed gravity bomb in their country. In 2016, by contrast, only one-quarter of respondents expressed similar support. 

NATO’s nuclear decision-making

NATO’s nuclear sharing originated with the 1955 deployment of nuclear weapons by the US to West Germany and the United Kingdom. By 1957, Washington had amassed a weapons stockpile and begun training Alliance members on mounting, targeting and launching nuclear artillery, rockets, missiles and air-dropped bombs in wartime. Several Alliance members currently host US B61 bombs on their territories, have aircraft capable of delivering them and train for that scenario, which would have to be authorised by the US president, the UK prime minister and the Nuclear Planning Group. 

The Nuclear Planning Group is the policy body responsible for nuclear decision-making at NATO and is chaired by the secretary general. It receives advice on nuclear issues from the High Level Group, which is chaired by the US and focuses on practical issues ‘including planning and force posture, and matters concerning … safety, security and effectiveness’. Both are open to all Alliance members, and only France does not participate. For Poland, a NATO agreement on the forward basing of nuclear weapons on its territory would require consensus from the High Level Group, usually in the form of a recommendation report. The Nuclear Planning Group would then consider the recommendation report and could approve it either explicitly or via the ‘silence’ procedure, whereby recommendations are adopted if there are no objections.

Deterrence value  

In pursuing a more active role in nuclear sharing, the Polish government probably seeks to strengthen NATO’s deterrence posture and help the US reaffirm its commitment to extended deterrence. Yet the military value of permanently stationing nuclear weapons in Poland is debatable. 

„In pursuing a more active role in nuclear sharing, the Polish government probably seeks to strengthen NATO’s deterrence posture and help the US reaffirm its commitment to extended deterrence.“

Were Poland to host dual-capable aircraft for NATO, it would probably use its soon-to-be-deployed F-35A fighters, which could be certified to deliver the upgraded B61-12 variant of the B61 bomb. It is therefore likely that any forward deployment of US B61s tasked to NATO would be located at the Polish air bases set to house the F-35As: Świdwin, Poznań-Krzesiny and Łask. NATO would view the deterrence value of stationing nuclear weapons at these locations and turning them into dual-capable-aircraft bases as a function of the vulnerability of the weapons to attack, their credibility of use and their capability to strike targets in Belarus and Russia. 

On credibility, Russia probably does not foresee a ‘bolt from the blue’ nuclear attack by NATO, so the fact that Polish air bases are closer than German ones to the borders of Belarus and Kaliningrad would not be a salient factor in assessing the strength of NATO’s nuclear deterrent. Russia probably calculates that NATO would instead use nuclear weapons as part of its ‘forward defence’ strategy (which would be used in response to a territorial attack against one or more Alliance members) or if it were losing a conventional battle. In these scenarios, NATO would probably remove nuclear weapons from air bases close to the front line, reducing their vulnerability to airstrikes, artillery or capture. Russia might initially refrain from attacking deep into Poland with ground forces, preferring first to neutralise the nuclear threat at range. 

Permanently stationing nuclear weapons closer to the Russian border would therefore incentivise Russia to strike such locations early in a conflict, attempting either to destroy them with conventional or nuclear munitions or to disrupt air-base operations, perhaps with chemical-weapon attacks. As in the Cold War, NATO commanders’ plans for the pre-kinetic phase of an acute crisis would probably include moving B61s to Dispersed Operating Bases or other airfields from which strikes could be launched unpredictably. Due to the public nature of NATO’s permanent nuclear-stationing mechanism, Russia would watch for any dispersal order from Poland. Moscow would benefit from striking these targets pre-emptively, before the B61s could be dispersed. Thus, paradoxically, permanent forward basing would increase the risk of Poland being attacked early in a conflict and limit NATO’s nuclear survivability.

To target dual-capable-aircraft bases in Poland, Russia could use assets in the Baltic and Black seas or those based on its territory. In addition to sea- and air-launched options, it could launch 9K720 Iskander-M (RS-SS-26 Stone) short-range ballistic missiles or 9M728 (RS-SSC-7 Southpaw) ground-launched cruise missiles from the deployment area of the 152nd Missile Brigade near Chernyakhovsk, Kaliningrad, from which all three potential F-35A bases in Poland would be well within range (see Figure 1). Russia now has the additional option of launching these weapons from Belarusian airbases – from which, again, Świdwin, Poznań-Krzesiny and Łask would be in range – and would be likely to move missiles forward to those locations in a military conflict with NATO. Belarus also possesses Su-25 Frogfoot dual-capable aircraft, probably stationed at the Baranovichi and Lida bases, but they are an unattractive option for striking Polish air bases due to their short fighting radius of 375 kilometres and vulnerability to being shot down by Polish fighter aircraft and air defences.

Options     Poland’s rationale for joining the nuclear-sharing club appears to have a political rather than military basis. Warsaw’s statements on the matter emphasise that a NATO decision to share nuclear weapons would send a strong signal to Moscow while also reassuring eastern-flank members of the Alliance’s commitment to their defence.    „Poland’s rationale for joining the nuclear-sharing club appears to have a political rather than military basis.“ In July, security chief Siewiera stated that, setting aside nuclear sharing and F35A certification, it was also important for Poland’s armed forces to increase their involvement in planning related to NATO’s nuclear doctrine. This could occur through participation in more aspects of NATO nuclear exercises such as SNOWCAT and Steadfast Noon. This would enable Polish policymakers to join in the full spectrum of supporting roles for such missions, including reconnaissance, air defence, suppression of enemy air defences, and integration of nuclear- and conventional-strike options. NATO could also designate several Polish airfields as potential Dispersed Operating Bases, which ordinarily do not host military aircraft earmarked for wartime use. These preparations are well known to Alliance members (as part of NATO’s Standardization Agreements) and can be conducted through a consensus decision among members or, if consensus is unachievable, bilaterally between Poland and the US. Such preparations would offer NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) additional options for dispersing dual-capable aircraft in wartime and in near-war situations, which would complicate Russian targeting and potentially increase survival and sortie rates. NATO could extend this practice to other members to increase the number of time-critical targets. Finland, for example, already conducts exercises that train military pilots to land on and take off from public roads, demonstrating that during a crisis it would be able to rapidly disperse its combat aircraft to unpredictable locations. If Poland proceeds with certifying its F-35As for dual-capable missions, as proposed by Siewiera, their subsequent participation in NATO’s nuclear mission would require a consensus among Alliance members, which any member could block by breaking ‘silence’ in the Nuclear Planning Group. Poland could certify the aircraft bilaterally with the US, which would significantly increase the number of airframes available at any given time to SACEUR, which itself would increase Allied deterrence. Despite claims about the expense and difficulty of this option, Ukrainian military experts have successfully integrated weapons systems such as the AGM-88 HARM high-speed anti-radiation missiles onto the MiG-29 Fulcrum fighter aircraft – previously thought impossible – while at war. This suggests B61 integration into Poland’s F-35As could prove to be easier and less costly than building nuclear-hardened shelters and related infrastructure in Poland.

Outlook The communiqué issued at the NATO Vilnius Summit in July acknowledged the anxiety felt by eastern-flank members regarding nuclear deterrence, stating that the Alliance would modernise its capabilities and ‘updat[e] planning to increase [the] flexibility and adaptability’ of its nuclear forces. The extent to which NATO’s secretary general and member countries are amenable to Poland’s specific requests is unknown, however, and a clear indication is unlikely to emerge from unclassified sources without a decision in Brussels or individual capitals to signal a view. It is possible that NATO will proceed in allowing additional countries to certify dual-capable aircraft or additional locations as Dispersed Operating Bases, but it is unlikely to announce this publicly. Observers may therefore notice an F-35A depart from a German air base during a Steadfast Noon exercise and land at an unexpected air base in a non-nuclear-sharing member, and wonder why.      „If Poland proceeds with certifying its F-35As for dual-capable missions, as proposed by Siewiera, their subsequent participation in NATO’s nuclear mission would require a consensus among Alliance members, which any member could block by breaking ‘silence’ in the Nuclear Planning Group.“

Options     Poland’s rationale for joining the nuclear-sharing club appears to have a political rather than military basis. Warsaw’s statements on the matter emphasise that a NATO decision to share nuclear weapons would send a strong signal to Moscow while also reassuring eastern-flank members of the Alliance’s commitment to their defence.    „Poland’s rationale for joining the nuclear-sharing club appears to have a political rather than military basis.“ In July, security chief Siewiera stated that, setting aside nuclear sharing and F35A certification, it was also important for Poland’s armed forces to increase their involvement in planning related to NATO’s nuclear doctrine. This could occur through participation in more aspects of NATO nuclear exercises such as SNOWCAT and Steadfast Noon. This would enable Polish policymakers to join in the full spectrum of supporting roles for such missions, including reconnaissance, air defence, suppression of enemy air defences, and integration of nuclear- and conventional-strike options. NATO could also designate several Polish airfields as potential Dispersed Operating Bases, which ordinarily do not host military aircraft earmarked for wartime use. These preparations are well known to Alliance members (as part of NATO’s Standardization Agreements) and can be conducted through a consensus decision among members or, if consensus is unachievable, bilaterally between Poland and the US. Such preparations would offer NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) additional options for dispersing dual-capable aircraft in wartime and in near-war situations, which would complicate Russian targeting and potentially increase survival and sortie rates. NATO could extend this practice to other members to increase the number of time-critical targets. Finland, for example, already conducts exercises that train military pilots to land on and take off from public roads, demonstrating that during a crisis it would be able to rapidly disperse its combat aircraft to unpredictable locations. If Poland proceeds with certifying its F-35As for dual-capable missions, as proposed by Siewiera, their subsequent participation in NATO’s nuclear mission would require a consensus among Alliance members, which any member could block by breaking ‘silence’ in the Nuclear Planning Group. Poland could certify the aircraft bilaterally with the US, which would significantly increase the number of airframes available at any given time to SACEUR, which itself would increase Allied deterrence. Despite claims about the expense and difficulty of this option, Ukrainian military experts have successfully integrated weapons systems such as the AGM-88 HARM high-speed anti-radiation missiles onto the MiG-29 Fulcrum fighter aircraft – previously thought impossible – while at war. This suggests B61 integration into Poland’s F-35As could prove to be easier and less costly than building nuclear-hardened shelters and related infrastructure in Poland.

Outlook The communiqué issued at the NATO Vilnius Summit in July acknowledged the anxiety felt by eastern-flank members regarding nuclear deterrence, stating that the Alliance would modernise its capabilities and ‘updat[e] planning to increase [the] flexibility and adaptability’ of its nuclear forces. The extent to which NATO’s secretary general and member countries are amenable to Poland’s specific requests is unknown, however, and a clear indication is unlikely to emerge from unclassified sources without a decision in Brussels or individual capitals to signal a view. It is possible that NATO will proceed in allowing additional countries to certify dual-capable aircraft or additional locations as Dispersed Operating Bases, but it is unlikely to announce this publicly. Observers may therefore notice an F-35A depart from a German air base during a Steadfast Noon exercise and land at an unexpected air base in a non-nuclear-sharing member, and wonder why.   „If Poland proceeds with certifying its F-35As for dual-capable missions, as proposed by Siewiera, their subsequent participation in NATO’s nuclear mission would require a consensus among Alliance members, which any member could block by breaking ‘silence’ in the Nuclear Planning Group.“ During the defence- and foreign-ministerial meetings that will take place in the run-up to the NATO Washington Summit in 2024, there may be hints on the direction of the debate within the Alliance about how it should strengthen its deterrent posture. In the meantime, Poland may choose to initiate a debate within the Nuclear Planning Group on additional options, work with the US and Lockheed Martin to make changes to their F-35As, or work unilaterally to upgrade its air bases without triggering a debate within NATO. This would provide SACEUR with additional military capabilities without engaging in what is likely to be a difficult and fraught attempt to change the geography of NATO’s nuclear storage to include permanent stationing of B61s in Poland. It remains probable, however, that Poland’s efforts to increase its contribution to NATO’s nuclear deterrent will continue regardless of the outcome of the upcoming elections. Deterring Russia remains a bipartisan issue in Poland.