Guter Kommentar. Nach dem ewigen Streit, dass BRICS sich nun auf BRICS plus und es sich deswegen zu einem großen gigantischen antiwestlichen Block samt Dedollarization vereinigt hätte, man Xi Jinpings Triade von Global Security Initiative, Global Development Initiative samt BRI und Global Civilization Initiative unter den Xi Jinping- Gedanken nichts gegenstellen könnte, bricht Indien mit Modi wiederum aus dieser Front aus und stellt klar, dass die BRICS plus keine neue Nichtpaktgebundenenbewegung ist, sondern China das dominieeren will, auch wenn man mit Russland etliche Geschäfte nicht in Dollar abschließt und mit der OPEC plus da mhr zu erhoffen will, dies noch kein Argument für eine Yuanhegemonie sein will, wie auch die von Lulas damlas antimameriknische Rouseff.-Exguerllaikämpferin die New Development Bank unter ihrem Vorsitz auch nur mit lächerlichen 50 Millrarden Dollar ausgerüstet sieht, die BRICS nicht mak ein Generalsekretariat hat noch Hoffnung haben kann, ganz abegsehen von Chinas Aisa Infrastructure InvestmentBank (AIIB) dass sich außer der von China erhofften marginalen Ausweitung des Yuans noch eine Gemeinsamswährung ergeben könnte. Xi und Putin haben den G20- Gipfel Modis geschwänzt und gemieden, nicht aus irgendwelchen Ängsten vor einem Baerbockschen Strafbefehls beim ICC verhaftet zu werden, sondern um Indiens mögliche beanspruchte eigene Weltrollerunterzubringen, zumal Putin lieber Kims Nordkorea trifft als Modi. , die Global Times redet. Modi und den G 20 klein, ja Xi hat gerade mit seiner New Map vom Indopazifik und gegenüber Indien gerade wieder eine aus seiner Sicht zu verhandelnde Grenzfrage und weitere Gebietssansprüche eines chinesischen Südtibets gegenüber Indien lanciert: Da ist eben BRICS plus eher BRICS minus. Auch wenn 6 Staaten beigetreten sind: Dennoch hat Modi beim G 20 Gipfel, eine gemeinsame Schlusserklärung hinbekommen, auch wen n Selensky protestiert, die Afrikanische Union als neues Mitglied des Global South nebst schon der EU  aufgenommen, wobei nun auch die G 7 darüber diskutiert, ob man das auch machen sollte. Der wesentliche Hammer aber ist die Verkündung einer westlich-asiatischen eigenen Seidenstraße von Europa über den Greater Middle East,  vor allem Italiens, das unter einer italienischen „Postfaschistin“ Meloni gerade Chinas Seidenstraße in Europa abwürgt, ja auch ein europäisches Bahn- und Infrastrukturnetzwerk wie den damalig unter dem Neoliberalismus gecancelten Delorsplan innerhalb der EU vorantreiben will,  und Israel bis zu Saudiarabien, den VAE und eben Indien unter strikter Umgehung eurasischer,ja unzuverlässiger europäischer, türkisch- syrischer oder Iran- Afghanistanrouten nach China pder unter dem Einfluss von Russland oder irgendwelchen Ausgängen des Ukrainekriegs realisieren will- auch unter Berufung auf Global Gateway der EU und Bidens B3Ws.. Auch noch weiter gedacht, wenn der japanisch- indische Asia- Africa Economic Corridor, das bisher noch keinen Match darstellt noch darum verlängert werden sollte. Also zwei große geostrategische Achsen, In folgendem Artikel angedeutet:

“G20 in Delhi: Israel, India, US, Italy are the big winners – opinion

The focus of this G20 was the Global South and eventually a surprise alliance: The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC).

By VAS SHENOY Published: SEPTEMBER 13, 2023 01:35

The 2023 G20 New Delhi Summit was historic and nail-biting. There was no agreement on the joint statement until the last minute. As Indian Sherpa Amitabh Kant would eventually brief reporters, the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi had to step in personally to get a unanimous agreement from Russia and China for the statement. The summit was also historic because this is the last G20 (Group of 20) summit.

Thanks to India’s efforts, the African Union (AU) is now a permanent member of the group, bringing the number to 21 and including the Global South. Politically, this is a very important achievement because it brings Africa, as a continent, to the table and gives the AU the same political stature as the European Union. In the current battle between democracies and autocracies, it was necessary to give Africa its voice in the G20 grouping, with the hope that it is invited to the G7 grouping as a permanent member shortly. 

The New Delhi Leaders Declaration also brought India’s leadership of the Global South to the fore. India’s focus had been an inclusive declaration, and while there was no condemnation of Russia in the final declaration, there was language that condemned aggression by countries with the objective of capturing territories of other countries. There was also solidarity and concern expressed for the war in Ukraine – even though this was strongly criticized by the Ukrainian government.

The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor

The focus of this G20 was the Global South and eventually a surprise alliance was announced which counters China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) was announced on the margins of a larger Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) co-chaired by US President Joe Biden and by Modi.

The IMEC creates a data, rail, and pipeline corridor between India and Europe through the Middle East with the support of Israel, UAE, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Leaders of the EU, France, Germany, Italy, Mauritius, UAE, Saudi Arabia, the US, and India signed the memorandum of understanding announcing the historic project. 

“The Indian-Middle Eastern economic corridor will revive the ancient Red Sea route which once linked Roman Egypt with Kerala and Gujarat,” said William Dalrymple, an eminent historian.

While Israel was not present at the G20 summit, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held a detailed press conference explaining and supporting the IMEC. 

“Israel is at the focus of an unprecedented international project that will link infrastructure from Asia to Europe,” he said.

Italy was also the only European country to sign as the founding member of the Global Biofuels Alliance launched during the G20. Singapore, Bangladesh, Italy, the US, Brazil, Argentina, Mauritius, and UAE, all founding members with India will focus on the promotion of biofuels as a means to a carbon-neutral economy.

Leaders of India, Brazil, South Africa, and the US held a joint announcement as the leaders of the current and next three G20 summits, committing to build on the historic progress of India’s G20 Presidency to address global challenges. The optics of this joint declaration enforced the existing India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) trilateral with the presence of the US and hinted at cracks in BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa).

At the recent BRICS summit in Johannesburg, India had to negotiate hard to contain the expansion of BRICS, for which China was strongly lobbying. China’s intentions were to develop BRICS as an alternative to G7, where it is not invited.

IN THE final declaration, India also achieved language against terrorism, money laundering, and any form of racial and religious discrimination. Such language was important for it to deal with cross-border terrorism from Pakistan. 

While Modi’s India was the biggest victor, finally demonstrating its foreign policy acumen despite the absence of China’s Xi Jinping and Russia’s Vladimir Putin, Biden and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni made significant gains via the summit. Biden had a long-awaited rapprochement with Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman (MBS), who led the initial announcement of the India-Middle East corridor.

As this corridor passes through Jordan and Israel (Haifa), this was also a silent acknowledgment of Saudi-Israeli ties on the brink of normalization, an objective that Biden has been working towards.

With the launch of the PGII, Biden also concretely counters China’s BRI, bringing together allies of the enlarged Indo-Mediterranean under one umbrella. The IMEC brings the US’s strongest allies in Asia, the Middle East, and Europe under a single, US-led trade alliance.

For Meloni, the bilateral with China’s Prime Minister Li Qiang was the occasion to inform him of Italy’s intention to withdraw from its Belt and Road Initiative MoU. Italian participation in the IMEC is therefore a victory. The European termination of the IMEC – previously foreseen in Greece – will now probably move to Italy. With Italy and India already sharing the Blue-Raman high-speed data cable and MSC’s short cargo sea route – which takes 19 days – Italy will play a key role not only in the biofuels development but also in hydrogen pipelines and energy security, carbon transitioning, and potentially in the development of transcontinental railways.

Apart from the economic significance of these various programs, this extends Meloni’s Mattei Plan to the shores of India. Italy becomes the European crossroad like Israel becomes the Middle Eastern crossroad of data, energy, and trade from India to Europe.

The inclusion of the African Union (AU) in the G20 also creates the opportunity for Meloni’s agenda for the next G7 in 2024 to continue with India’s efforts. 

Meloni has put Africa at the center of her international agenda. The language on migration in the G20 declaration was in line with the conclusions of the International Conference on Development and Migration which Meloni hosted in July 2023. Italy was one of the initial supporters of the initiative to permanently include the AU in the G20.

Leaders who attended the G20 summit concluded their visit to Delhi by paying their respects at Mahatma Gandhi’s memorial in Raj Ghat. This was the most solemn moment of India’s leadership and its commitment to peace and non-violence. 

This G20 summit India stood true to its Sanskrit motto, Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam. (The World is One Family). The world, for those two days, was one family.

The writer is the president of Glocal Cities. He has been a political researcher, consultant, and entrepreneur in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa for two decades, interacting with leaders and decision-makers, and working with people from all walks of life across the Middle East.

Chinas Neue Seidenstraße bekommt Konkurrenz: Indien und der Westen planen Handelskorridor nach Europa

Stand: 18.09.2023, 07:08 Uhr

Von: Christiane Kühl

Der G20-Gipfel in Neu-Delhi war überraschend erfolgreich. Die Staaten einigten sich auf den Ausbau erneuerbarer Energien. Und am Rande wurde eine neue Handelsroute von Indien nach Europa beschlossen.

Neu-Delhi/Frankfurt – Gipfeltreffen sind in aller Regel streng durchchoreographiert, Unerwartetes geschieht äußert selten. Doch der gerade zu Ende gegangene G20-Gipfel in Neu-Delhi war voller Überraschungen. Nicht nur gelang es dem Gastgeber, Indiens Premierminister Narendra Modi, die zerstrittenen Staaten zu einem gemeinsamen Abschlusskommuniqué zu bewegen. Der Gipfel lieferte zudem den Beleg, wie sich das Umfeld von Großveranstaltungen für separate Abkommen nutzen lässt, wenn es gute Ideen gibt.

So unterschrieb Indien am Rande des Treffens mit der EU, den USA, Saudi-Arabien und den Vereinigten Arabischen Emiraten eine Absichtserklärung für ein riesiges Schienen- und Schifffahrtsprojekt. Zwei Transportkorridore wollen die Partner für den Handel zwischen Indien und Europa schaffen. Das Infrastrukturprojekt mit Namen „India – Middle East – Europe Economic Corridor“ (IMEC) soll der US-Regierung zufolge das Wirtschaftswachstum ankurbeln, Anreize für neue Investitionen schaffen und damit eine „transformative Integration von Asien, Europa und dem Nahen Osten“ bewirken. Beteiligte bezeichneten das Abkommen als „historisch“. Die Absichtserklärung ist auch ein Signal dafür, dass der Westen und der aufstrebende globale Süden durchaus miteinander zusammenarbeiten können, wenn es die richtigen Ansätze dafür gibt.

Handelskorridore von Indien nach Europa: Antwort auf Chinas Seidenstraße

Pünktlich zum zehnten Geburtstag bekommt Chinas Neue Seidenstraße damit erstmals ein wirkliches Konkurrenzprogramm. Zwar hatte die EU schon Anfang 2022 ihr Vernetzungs- und Infrastrukturprojekt Global Gateway angekündigt und erklärt, bis 2027 rund 300 Milliarden Euro aus staatlichen und privaten Quellen mobilisieren zu wollen. 87 Projekte stehen bisher in der Pipeline oder sind bereits realisiert. Doch das sind bisher vor allem Einzelprojekte, etwa Unterseekabel, Straßen oder Brücken. So eine richtige Konkurrenz für die Neue Seidenstraße ist Global Gateway bisher nicht.

Gerade erst unterschrieben, ist IMEC bereits überraschend konkret, auch wenn es noch keine Ziffer für die Kosten gibt. Der östliche Korridor soll Indien und den Persischen Golf verbinden, unter anderem durch bessere Häfen in den Vereinigten Arabischen Emiraten und neue Unterseekabel für Internet und Strom. Die Verbindung vom Mittleren Osten nach Europa bildet den nördlichen Korridor, unter anderem mittels einer neuen Eisenbahnstrecke von den Emiraten quer durch Saudi-Arabien über Jordanien bis nach Israel. Sie verbindet damit Staaten, die noch vor nicht allzu langer Zeit verfeindet waren, was im besten Fall wirklich integrative Wirkung haben kann. 

Modi: Neues Programm fördert Integration Indiens mit Europa

Entlang der Gleise wollen die Partner Kabel für Strom und Internet verlegen, ebenso wie Leitungen für den Transport von Wasserstoff. Von der israelischen Hafenstadt Haifa geht die Fracht dann per Schiff weiter, etwa zu Häfen am Mittelmeer. Sinnvoll ist, dass Global Gateway mit IMEC verzahnt wird und einige der Projekte finanzieren soll. Die neue Verbindung werde den Handel zwischen Indien und Europa um 40 Prozent beschleunigen, sagte EU-Kommissionschefin Ursula von der Leyen. Derzeit geht der Handel mit dem Schiff durch den ägyptischen Suezkanal.

„Das IMEC kann dazu beitragen, die wirtschaftliche Integration zwischen Indien und Europa zu fördern“, sagte der indische Premierminister Narendra Modi, während US-Präsident Joe Biden es als „eine große Sache, eine wirklich große Sache“ bezeichnete. Er hatte das Projekt maßgeblich gepuscht, auch wenn es gar nicht um Handelsströme in die USA geht. Washington sieht die Dinge vor allem im großen geopolitischen Kontext. Und da ist es eines der wichtigsten Ziele, Indien enger an den Westen zu binden, als Gegengewicht zur Volksrepublik China.

China in Neu-Delhi nur als Zuschauer

Chinas Staatschef Xi Jinping nun war gar nicht zugegen in Neu-Delhi. Und so konnte er sein großes politisches Gewicht dieses Mal nicht in die Waagschale werfen. Stattdessen musste sein Ministerpräsident Li Qiang das neue Projekt in Neu-Delhi zur Kenntnis nehmen. Li warb sogleich am Rande des G20-Treffens für mehr Zusammenarbeit mit der EU. China und Europa als zwei Haupttreiber der globalen Entwicklung sollten noch enger kooperieren, sagte Li Qiang laut der staatlichen Nachrichtenagentur Xinhua in einem Gespräch mit EU-Kommissionspräsidentin Ursula von der Leyen. Die Volksrepublik stehe bereit, mit Europa zusammenzuarbeiten, um in diesem Jahr einen EU-China-Gipfel auszurichten und das gegenseitige Vertrauen zu stärken.

Noch ist völlig unklar, ob die IMEC-Pläne so umgesetzt werden wie beschlossen. Immerhin aber soll es schon in 60 Tagen mehr Details geben. Als Xi Jinping 2013 mit einer Rede die Neue Seidenstraße startete, wollte auch er die Staaten Zentralasiens besser mit China vernetzen und neue Handelswege durch neue Infrastruktur schaffen. Anfangs war die Resonanz gering. Inzwischen ist aus der Seidenstraße ein milliardenschweres globales Programm geworden. Dem ambitionierten Modi ist das sicher ein Ansporn.

G20 für Indiens Modi ein großer Erfolg

Generell ist der G20-Gipfel ein großer Erfolg für Indiens Premier. Vor dem Gipfel waren die Erwartungen sehr gering gewesen. Um überhaupt einen gemeinsamen Abschlusstext zu bekommen, wurde darin die Kritik am russischen Angriffskrieg gegen die Ukraine stark verallgemeinert. Daran gibt es Kritik, auch aus Kiew – und doch es ist ein Erfolg, dass man sich überhaupt zu einer Einigung durchringen konnte. Das hatten viele Modi nicht zugetraut.

In dem knapp 30 Seiten starken Dokument steht auch der Plan, bis 2030 die Stromerzeugung aus erneuerbaren Energien zu verdreifachen. Die Idee stammte aus Kenia, aber auch in diesem Punkt gab es anfangs viel Streit. Die G20-Abschlusserklärung betone nun „die erheblichen Investitionen, die für die Energiewende erforderlich sind“, schreibt Linda Kalcher, Direktorin des EU-Klimathinktanks Strategic Perspectives auf X. „Das ist ein großer Erfolg der indischen Präsidentschaft, insbesondere in schwierigen geopolitischen Zeiten.“

Auf Betreiben Indiens wurde zudem die Afrikanische Union (AU) in die G20 aufgenommen. Modi konnte sein Land damit als Fürsprecher des globalen Südens positionieren. Diese Rolle nimmt sonst gerne China ein. Und damit ist der G20-Gipfel für Modi insgesamt ein klarer Punktgewinn gegen den Rivalen in Peking.

https://www.merkur.de/politik/seidenstrasse-konkurrenz-g20-handelsweg-china-indien-zr-92513724.html

Lassen wir mal unsere Victory oder Friedenspriester gegenüber Russland und China aus geostrategischen und aktuellen Ukraineüberlegungen raus, entscheidend ist jetzt auch das historische Projekt dieser eigenen „westlich-asiatischen“ Seidenstasse in der Tradition der alten Handelsroute von Römisch- Ägypten bis nach Kerala/Gufarat ( Modis Heumatprovinz), die als Hauptlinie Italien ,Saudiarabien, Israel  bis Indien , ja auch einer Verlängerung nach Afrika bis Japan haben könnte.

Noch eine verlängerte Achse des von Indian-Japanese Africa-Asia Economic Corridor. Interessanterweise sagen da die Deutschen von Scholz aber eben die provinziellen Grünen samt der feministischen Baerbock nichts dazu, obgleich die eine Frage zwischen Tranatlantismus oder westlichen Eurasiertums ohne die von China ud Russland beabsichtiget eurasische Seidenstraße ist. Und dann auch noch unkar,  wie das in  Israel ausgeht; Sind ja zwei Ideen; Netanjahus Auslassen vo  Syrien, Erdogangtürkei und direkten Pipelines als Nordstream wie es seine Gegner wollen,  sondern eher Umgehung dessen mittels Pompeos LNG, East Mediterrean Gas Forum und zugleich auch gemeinsame Manöver mit Griechenlands gegen Iran, seiner Proxy und der Erdogantürkei.

Abgesehen  noch von  Libanon und Hisbollah samt Ägypten und den neuentdeckten LNGfeldern vor ihren Küsten wie auch eben Zypern.   Wenngleich die Global Times Borell gegen Van Leyen logischerweise lobt. Die Deutschen  mal wieder zögerlich und können ala Baerbock nur in deutschem Sozialkundeidealismus von  Kinderchen und Frauenbezug dies bestenfall intuitiv erkennen und sich bei ihrem Duzfreudn Tony Blinken gutstellen zu wollen. .Aber die Weltgemeinschaft muss die  die Realitäten abwarten, obgleich ob das Bidenprojekt unter Trump weiter vorangetrieben würde. Wie es auch eine Frage der angespannten Finanzen und auch der Frage ist, b man nicht erst europäische Infrastruktur zivil , wie aber eben auch militärisch für Landesverteidigung- und Bündnisfragen konsolidieren sollte bevor man sich in weitere kostspielige Projekte reinbegeben sollte. Aber noch interessanter ist, dass die KP- Zeitung Global Times die westliche Seidenstraße gar nicht erwähnt und gegen  Modi und dessen angeblicher Rolle als Führer des Global South du einer neuen Weltordnung  schießt, der Chinas Ambitionen samt eigener Beteiligung bei BRICS plus wieder zu einem BRICS minus macht und sich mehr auf die G 20verlässt.

Der G20- Gipfel sei ein Versagen Indiens und Modis in Sachen Weltführungsanspruch der nur Chia eigentlich zustünde. .Naja,  eben die Global Times und die KP China will das jedenfalls so klar sehen..

 Zumindestens die Meinungen und die Diskussionen in den zwei wichtigen Ländern Israel und Saudiarabien darüber, wie auch bezüglich ihrer internationalen Roll, zuaml SA erwartet, dss Biden einen Verteidigunggspakt und US- Atomschutz gegen Iran trotz SA- Irandeal unter chinésischer Vermittlung ihm gewährt und dann unetr USv-Vemittlung einen neuen Abrahams Record samt SA- Isrealdeal hinbekommt. Vielleicht auch unter Benny Gantz und Amnestie für Netanjahu :

“Israel hypes India-Saudi-EU trade corridor, but it’s a bit player in US-China bout

Netanyahu sees Haifa as a hub of the infrastructure network announced by Biden, Modi, and others, but that doesn’t mean a Saudi deal, or anything else, is in the offing

By Lazar Berman 13 September 2023, 6:59 am 5

There was much excitement among Israel’s leadership after Saturday’s announcement at the G20 summit that India, Saudi Arabia, the United States, the European Union and others would create an ambitious rail and shipping corridor that will link the subcontinent with the Middle East and Europe.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu hailed it as nothing less than “a cooperation project that is the greatest in our history.”

Not surprisingly, he portrayed Israel as the hub of the ambitious system: “Our country Israel will be a central junction in this economic corridor, our railways and our ports will open a new gateway from India through the Middle East to Europe, and back.”

Netanyahu’s National Security Adviser Tzachi Hanegbi called the plan “the most meaningful evidence” that Saudi-Israel normalization was advancing from “a shot in the dark” to a realistic opportunity with tangible goals.

But the initiative, which would rival China’s Belt and Road scheme, if it happens at all, is much less about normalization — or about Israel — than Jerusalem is letting on.

“It’s significant, but not for the reasons Israelis might think,” said Yoel Guzansky, senior research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv.

Switching tracks

Regional experts emphasized that the project is a direct result of the growing US-China rivalry.

“It’s part of  President Biden’s efforts to bring the Indians into the US camp,” said Efraim Inbar, president of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.

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Guzansky said that the project should be understood as a sign of Washington’s ambitions in the region, after it appeared to cede some influence in the Middle East to China.

“The bigger picture is the US signaling that it’s coming back to the Indian Ocean and to the Middle East, or that it never left,” Guzansky explained. “This is vis-a-vis China. This is the game. I think something happened in March when the Chinese sponsored the Saudi-Iranian agreement.”

That month, Riyadh and Tehran surprised Washington by announcing the reestablishment of diplomatic ties in China’s capital, a major diplomatic win for Beijing.

“There was a wake-up call in the White House,” Guzansky argued. “Since then, you see attempts to dust off all kinds of initiatives and programs around normalization with Israel and all kinds of things with Iran, with Saudi Arabia.”

But the proposed network doesn’t serve only US interests. It also answers pressing Indian concerns.

One of India’s biggest challenges comes from its neighbor China, which has been investing heavily in a series of roads, rails and seaports across the globe as part of its Belt and Road Initiative, which is designed to give Beijing more control over trade flowing through Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia and Europe.

New Delhi, which sees China’s modern Silk Road scheme as a curb on its own growth and international trade, initially sought to avoid being hemmed in, creating its own corridor linking Mumbai to Moscow via Central Asia and Iran.

But the project — known as the International North-South Transit Corridor — has largely failed to get off the ground.

With the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020, India was presented with a new opportunity to challenge Chinese designs on regional and global trade.

Proposed rail networks between Israel and the UAE would allow India to ship goods to the Emirates, which would then be spirited by train across Saudi Arabia and Jordan before crossing into Israel at Beit Shean and chugging into seaside Haifa.

From there, goods would be shipped to Greece’s Piraeus port, one of the largest in Europe, giving India access to the entire continent.

Oshrit Birvadker, senior fellow at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, said that the economic corridor is an integral part of the national rebranding that the Narendra Modi administration is pursuing, part of which is showing that India can compete with the Chinese in manufacturing.

“The western route of the corridor will shorten the time the goods arrive in Europe and even lower their prices,” Birdavker explained. The route will make use of the massive port complex in Mundra, on the Arabian Sea, which she described as among the most advanced in the world.

“This new connectivity constitutes a strategic paradigm shift of enormous geopolitical consequence that could reshape [India’s] role in the Eurasian economic order,” according to Michael Tanchum of the University of Navarra in Spain, who researches strategic connectivity networks between Asia, Europe and Africa.

Missing links

In 2021, the Transportation Ministry announced that it had given the green light for a rail line connecting Haifa to Beit She’an to be extended east by several kilometers to the Jordanian border, where a new goods depot would also be built.

However, that link has yet to move forward, and 300 kilometers (186 miles) of rail remain to be built in Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

Plans for the regional rail link, an idea dating back to the Ottoman era, have been bandied about for years, and were highlighted again by Netanyahu in July, but there is no guarantee that the political will and the funding will materialize. Despite a recent thaw, Jordan is still extremely wary of cooperating too closely with Israel on public projects, and the Saudis still do not officially recognize Israel.

Jordan’s existing Ottoman-era rail network is woefully underdeveloped, and is of a different gauge than tracks in Saudi Arabia and Israel.

“The railroads that are being built between the Gulf states have so many problems, and it’s still not there yet after so many years,” Guzansky explained. “And there’s political and personal and tribal and all kinds of obstacles in its way. And you have so many countries, Israel, Arab countries. It won’t be easy. ”

Inbar pointed at Indian bureaucracy as the biggest obstacle.

“It’s good for everyone,” said Inbar. “The question is the implementation.”

In May, the US-based Moody’s Investors Service released a report contending that India’s “higher bureaucracy in decision-making” would reduce its attractiveness to investors.

“I think it will be a long time until we’ll see something,” said Guzansky. “I’m not sure who will finance it, who will give the money to build this infrastructure.”

China, the world leader in funding and carrying out infrastructure mega-projects, would be a natural choice, but Beijing is unlikely to cooperate with a US-backed initiative meant to undermine its own priorities.

“It’s hard for me to see it materialize,” said Guzansky. “I think it’s more of a statement or intention that the US is investing in India.”

Connectivity

Jerusalem might wish that the project was a firm signal that normalization with Saudi Arabia was in the offing, but it doesn’t hinge on that deal. Saudi rail lines will connect with Jordan, not Israel, and Riyadh has implemented other transportation agreements affecting Israel while making it clear they have nothing to do with recognition.

Last summer, Saudi Arabia opened its airspace to Israeli aircraft, saying in a statement that it was announcing “the decision to open the Kingdom’s airspace for all air carriers that meet the requirements of the authority for overflying.”

https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-hypes-india-saudi-eu-trade-corridor-but-its-a-bit-player-in-us-china-bout/

Aus der Sicht Israels eine glückliche Nachricht und bei alem vertraut man eden Saudis auch nicht so ganz. Ein möglicherweise nuklearer Iran  und SA samt Ägyoten und Erdogan wünscht man sich auch nicht atomar:

Saudi nuclear program can be secretly managed – top Israeli sources

Covert methods can prevent Saudis from switching civilian nuke program to military.

By YONAH JEREMY BOB Published: SEPTEMBER 14, 2023 20:33
Updated: SEPTEMBER 14, 2023 21:10

https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-759141

Israel, Greece hold joint air force exercise, drill long-range flights

Story by By JERUSALEM POST STAFF • 2d

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/israel-greece-hold-joint-air-force-exercise-drill-long-range-flights/ar-AA1gIv3w

How Saudi Arabia Sees the World

MBS’s Vision of a New Nonaligned Movement

By Karen E. Young

November 1, 2022

On October 5, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and its ten partner states agreed to slash oil production by two million barrels per day. The decision was at once predictable and shocking. It was predictable because OPEC+, under the leadership of Saudi Arabia, had previously telegraphed plans to reduce oil production. But it was shocking because Saudi Arabia and the United States are close security partners, and top U.S. officials had made repeated personal pleas for the Saudis to keep production up. Many of these officials had hoped that the Saudi government would cooperate, especially in light of rising gasoline prices and broader inflationary pressures. Indeed, according to a recent New York Times report, top aides to U.S. President Joe Biden even thought Washington had reached a private deal for Saudi Arabia to increase supply. When the Saudi energy minister instead gathered with U.S.-sanctioned Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak to announce cuts, the White House was stunned.

U.S. policymakers and analysts have responded to the Saudi decision by criticizing Riyadh for its surprising independence—and Biden for his inelegant attempt at dealmaking. During his campaign for president, Biden often denounced Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, known as MBS, for his poor human rights record, only to meet with him in July. To some American analysts, Saudi Arabia’s decision to cut production after the president’s about-face was evidence that Riyadh was never going to be a reliable (or pliant) partner and that it was a political mistake for Biden to visit MBS. Other analysts, by contrast, argued that Riyadh’s move was, in fact, Biden’s fault: the predictable byproduct of the administration’s hubris in asking Saudi Arabia to put U.S. interests ahead of its own.

U.S. observers are right that Washington has made decisions irritating to the Saudis. But there is also a lack of understanding inside Washington about how Saudi Arabia formulates its economic and foreign policy. Put simply, Saudi Arabia, under the direction of MBS, is preparing for a global political economy that is markedly different from the one the Biden administration envisions. In its newly released National Security Strategy, the White House focused on how to win a managed competition with China and outlined a preference for dividing economic and political partnerships into two tracks: one with democracies and one with nondemocracies carried out through a framework of international institutions. Given the dearth of enthusiasm in the United States for international frameworks, membership in the second track will likely entail a downgrade for authoritarian states, and governments like Saudi Arabia have already noticed.

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Although both Democrats and Republicans have been growing less supportive of the U.S.-Saudi bilateral partnership, U.S. foreign policy may not be the main reason that relations are fracturing. They are fracturing because of changes in Saudi Arabia’s own domestic and foreign policy. MBS doesn’t envision his country as a second-tier player in a bifurcated international system akin to the one that existed during the Cold War; he sees the emerging geopolitical order as malleable, made up of a set of interlocking parts, and he believes Riyadh has the right to work with a shifting constellation of partners to move markets and shape political outcomes. He believes that Saudi Arabia will have to vigorously protect its own economy as the world’s energy and oil demands fluctuate but that if it succeeds, no one can stop it from carving an independent path and pioneering a different kind of economic development. This vision is a 1970s dream Non-Aligned Movement, except the unifying feature is nationalist opportunism rather than a postcolonial awakening.

MBS may be right. The world is entering a period of energy insecurity, and hydrocarbons will consistently be in demand for at least the next 20 years, a situation that could give Saudi Arabia more power. The international system is becoming more fluid. Emerging market economies in general, and Saudi Arabia in particular, could develop a more substantive role in global affairs.

THE WORLD IS YOURS

In Riyadh’s view, the future belongs to emerging markets. From 2011 to 2021, these economies accounted for 67 percent of global GDP growth, and today they account for 49 percent of overall global GDP. Over the next four years, emerging economies are projected to grow at an average of 3.9 percent annually—faster than those in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development—and make up an increasing share of global trade volume.

This bloc of states includes Saudi Arabia. Indeed, according to its leaders, Saudi Arabia is one the world’s most important emerging markets. The country is home to a large economy with a high GDP per capita, and it exports enough oil to influence global energy prices. It hosted the G-20 in 2020 (albeit virtually) and, four years before that event, unveiled its Vision 2030, which offers an aspirational future in which the country stops relying on carbon fuels and builds futuristic cities that can survive all climate risks.

This plan has filled Saudi citizens and government officials alike with newfound confidence. The country—and other Gulf states—now see themselves as models of growth and development. And they sense a need to reorient their alliances to prepare for a less stable global order, perhaps even a post-American era. Riyadh’s 2016 decision to have OPEC coordinate with non-OPEC states, forming OPEC+, is exactly this kind of policy planning. OPEC+ is neither ideological nor treaty bound. Rather, it is an alliance of countries that are willing to do business with each other when it suits their shared interests. They are even willing to challenge the United States to achieve their goals.

The Russian-Saudi partnership, launched as part of OPEC+, is especially emblematic of Riyadh’s new view of foreign policy. For Saudi Arabia, it was not just a matter of business; it was also an act of self-preservation. In the 2010s, the United States began producing larger and larger quantities of oil from its shale, flooding global markets and causing prices to drop. This challenged Saudi Arabia’s traditional role as the dominant source of spare capacity in oil markets and undermined Riyadh’s ability to control global supply. But by partnering with Russia, Saudi Arabia could create a more controlled lever to force oil prices lower, starving its American competition of investment by making it hard for U.S. companies to make a profit. (National oil companies under state control can more easily afford to operate at a loss). The Russian-Saudi partnership was less natural in March 2020, when the Asian market for oil collapsed under the weight of the pandemic, putting both states in fierce competition. Yet Moscow and Riyadh still saw coordination as the best way to navigate a global economy that needs oil but—thanks to the energy transition—is increasingly reluctant to invest in it. As a result, they have stuck together.

The United States is not the security partner that it was in the past.

From a business perspective, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has given the Saudis more reason to keep up the partnership. Riyadh sees the West’s coordinated actions to control and suppress Russian energy imports, including a planned price cap on Russian oil, as a buyers’ cartel that threatens the Saudi economy. In the views of Saudi Arabia and other members of OPEC+, this cartel could eventually brand crude oil by point of origin, method of extraction, and degree of carbon intensity—and then price it accordingly. This practice would seriously undermine their control over global supply.

Washington, of course, has little patience for Riyadh’s business calculations. It views the Saudi government’s oil cuts as a slap in the face and a rejection of the U.S.-Saudi partnership. But in MBS’s worldview, with its moving constellations, what the United States thinks is not determinative. Riyadh can work with anyone when it is convenient, and that means Saudi Arabia can balance its business partnerships—including with Russia— alongside its security needs, for which it relies heavily on the United States.

Many U.S. policymakers have called on the White House to show MBS that his balancing can’t work by threatening to end or reduce U.S. arms sales. But although Riyadh would certainly rather keep purchasing U.S. weapons, MBS may not see this threat as especially concerning. The defense industry is influential in Congress, in part because it has production lines that support thousands of American jobs. Its long-term service contracts for weapons and equipment are not impulse purchases, and the industry would likely lobby aggressively to prevent any pause in manufacturing for the Saudis.

More important, the Gulf is already recalibrating its security relationship with Washington. This move is not about declining weapons sales, but rather about waning U.S. willingness to use its own forces to protect Gulf states. The United States is not the security partner that it was in the past. U.S. President Barack Obama made this clear when he stated that Saudi Arabia would have to “share the neighborhood” with Iran. President Donald Trump cozied up to the Saudis rhetorically, but he, too, made Washington’s disinterest apparent by refusing to respond to the 2019 attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure. Biden’s downgrading of the partnership is only the latest in a broader U.S. foreign policy trend.

Saudi Arabia knows that it has no single alternative if the United States cuts off weapons supplies. (Russia is certainly incapable of providing what Riyadh needs.) It is therefore trying to accelerate an economic transformation that connects its economy more closely to key markets, an effort that has already shown some success. Washington has accused the Gulf states of being too friendly with Putin, but their behavior hasn’t stopped European governments from flocking to the region’s energy markets—including Saudi Arabia’s. Since Russia’s invasion began, energy-desperate European states have signed long-term liquified natural gas, hydrogen, and energy cooperation agreements with Riyadh and other Gulf state governments. Critically, European governments have also agreed to export new weapons to the Saudis. Even Germany, which had banned arms sales to Saudi Arabia in 2018, is embracing the kingdom and selling it defense equipment. For all the handwringing in Washington, Riyadh could be correct: the international order is fluid enough, and the kingdom is important enough, that it doesn’t have to pick one side.

BRACING FOR IMPACT

Saudi Arabia’s oil decisions aren’t driven by international affairs alone. Just as the Biden administration wanted the Saudis to move the OPEC+ production cuts away from the U.S. midterm elections (a request that now seems transactional and ill advised), Saudi oil policy is also driven by domestic calculations. MBS likes to set targets and then exceed them, including when it comes to OPEC+ decisions. His government had indicated that there would be a production cut in the range of one million to 1.5 million barrels per day. The eventual, higher target seemed almost tailored to showcase MBS’s power: an illustration to his people that, despite external pressure to keep production high, he could cut production to levels even below those that were expected.

The West’s uproar over the announcement of a two million barrel per day cut was unwarranted. Most OPEC+ states were already producing oil at daily rates below the new reduced quotas, and so the cut announcement was in some sense symbolic. Despite the outrage, the OPEC+ decision has so far had a small impact on oil supply to markets. Prices were back to their early October averages within two weeks. (The embargo and price cap on Russian oil exports is a much more significant threat to market supply.)

But the OPEC+ decision does serve a tangible purpose for the Saudi economy. A cut in production creates spare production capacity for Saudi Arabia, giving it room to temporarily increase output should the global economy see a sudden decrease from another supply source, such as Russia. It also signals to investors that the Saudi government is committed to keeping oil profitable or at least to creating a floor for prices, encouraging firms to spend more on the petroleum sector.

Most important, the decision was intended to help prevent wild volatility in oil prices. Despite high present demand, the Saudi government is worried that the world’s desire for oil could drop steeply if the global economy were to dive into a deeper and more widespread recession. Saudi Arabia’s fiscal policy has been cautious for the same reason. The country’s pre-budget report for 2023 is likely based on oil prices of $76 to $78 per barrel, with average oil production hovering at roughly 10.6 million barrels per day. The price is just a slight increase from 2022, during which oil has been conservatively priced at closer to $70 per barrel. The windfall Saudi Arabia has received this year has not translated into a spending spree, at least not yet.

For Saudi Arabia, less power over oil means less power in general.

Instead, Saudi Arabia is bracing for impact, either from collapsing demand or from an unexpected need for new oil supplies. It has reasons to get ready. As the war in Ukraine continues and Russia targets civilian and energy infrastructure, the threats to global energy security will grow. As sanctions on Russia increase, the world may have less spare oil capacity and pressure on refined oil product supply. The energy policies under consideration in the White House for export bans on U.S. oil and congressional legislation (called “NOPEC”) that would allow the Justice Department to sue sovereigns over price fixing will have a chilling effect on any new investment in the oil and gas sector and will further disrupt oil refining and product deliveries. Saudi Arabia’s most important export market, China, has increased its imports of Russian oil, threatening Riyadh’s market share. And China is now buying in smaller volumes, thanks to both the country’s sluggish growth outlook and Beijing’s continued commitment to its zero-COVID policy. All these signs are worrying for the Saudis, threatening oil revenues as well as Riyadh’s legitimacy as a force for global oil market stability.

For Saudi Arabia, of course, less power over oil means less power in general; oil is a key tool the country uses to influence international affairs and command global attention. Responding to these threats has therefore become a defining moment for Saudi Arabia’s young leadership and technocratic elite. By working with Russia and deprioritizing the United States, they hope to protect their country’s power over oil prices and, with it, their plans for and vision of the future.

It is unclear whether these elites will succeed. But it is clear that their country and the United States are preparing for two different global economies. One sees a more powerful role in international politics and trade for emerging markets. The other sees states taking something of an inward turn and focusing on its domestic energy independence, while emphasizing values-based engagement when interacting with the international system. Oil will continue to be a part of foreign policy for both countries. But they are certainly headed in different directions. Riyadh and Washington may soon find that they are more often competitors—in oil markets and models of economic development—than partners.

• KAREN E. YOUNG is Senior Research Scholar at the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University.

How Saudi Arabia Sees the World: MBS’ Vision of a New Nonaligned Movement (foreignaffairs.com)