Mal wieder ein wenig Wehrkunde: „Kill chain“ und Links 16 als gamechanger?

Mal wieder ein wenig Wehrkunde: „Kill chain“ und Links 16 als gamechanger?

Nachdem sich die meisten Leuten außer in Expertenkreisen jahrzehntelang während des Golden Ages der Globalisierung nicht so oder überhaupt für militärische und sicherheitspolitische Belange interessierte oder falls wie wir, dann eher mit sehr begrenzter Kompetenz und Fachwisen, zumal eher als laienhafte Zivilisten, wird die Nachkriegs- oder Vorkriegsrepublik nun ständig einem Crash-Kurs in Waffenkunde und anderen „Zeitenwende“-Grundschulwissen unterzogen, Dabei erfährt man immer wieder von neuen Wunderwaffen, die game changer sein sollen und sich dann wieder nicht als solche herausstellen, werden lauter neue Fachbegriffe in die Runde geworfen, wo man erst mal begreifen muss, was eigentlich gemeint is oder sein könnte, nicht umsonst studieren das professionelle Militärs ja in jahrelangem Militär-unis und dann auch in der Praxis. Für diese ist diese eher Routine und business as usual, was dem zivilen Laien eher als bedrohlich, angsteinflößend und unbekannt vorkommt oder eben auch ist. Zumal da auch Experten und Militärs bei ihren Lageeinschätzungen zu unterschiedlichen, auch mal ziemlich falschen Analysen kommen, die sich auch mal diametral widersprechen, was dann für weitere Verwirrung sorgt.Bestenfalls kann mn als Politologe und Experte für internationale Beziehungen eher bei der Beurteiling der Politik und geopolitschen Konstellationen, denn zum militärischne Teil beitragen- nach Clausewitz zu Tode zitierten Satz „Krieg ist die Fortsetzung von Politik mit anderen Mitteln“.

Von daher auch die Sensibiltät nicht in Singapur gegenüber Berichten wie dem Substack/Geopolitial Economy Report mit ebenso dramatisch klingenden Begrifflichkeiten wie Kill chain und Links 16 als gamechanger.

Heute morgen erhielten wir von einem besorgten Akademiker aus Singapur einen Artikel aus von Substack/ Geopolitical Economy Report zugesandt. In den ASEAN-Staaten ist man wegen der erodierenden Lage im Burmakrieg, bei dem auch ein weiterer failed state das Resultat sein könnte samt Flüchtlingswellen sowie der Möglichkeit eines sino-amerikanischen Krieges recht beunruhigt und sensibel, zumal man mehr Zaungast der Entwicklungen ist. Auch ist nach den desaströsen Resultaten des Arabischen Frühlings und der vordergründigen Demokratisierungskriege auch der Enthusiasmus der 90er Jahre ür Demokratie und werteliberale Heilsversprechen deutlich erodiert. Die Hoffnung, dass die ASEAN eine Rolle spielen könnte wie bei der Kambodschalösung in den 80ern scheint auch nicht realisierbar, da die USA, Deng-China und Gorbi damals an einem Strang zogen und Kambodscha kein multiethnischer Staat wie Burma ist .Ein Singapurer Ex-Diplomat äu0erte auch mal auf Global Review, dass sich das geopolitische Gewicht und das Schicksal der ASEAN über die Frage entscheiden würde , ob sie eine vergleichbare Rolle wie damals bei der Kambodschalösung spielen könne. Aber danach sieht es momentan nicht aus. Zudem man befürchtet , dass die weitere Zuspitzung des sino-amerikanischen Konflikts trotz aller Bemühungen keine Seite wählen zu wollen und zu balancieren doch bis zum Zerreißen der ASEAN führen könnte und im worst case eines Krieges, man als Mäuse aufpassen müsste nicht von den Elefanten zertrampelt zu werden. Daher auch erhöhte Sensibilität nicht ur in Singapur über Berichte, die konfliktträchtig klingen, zumal mit bedrohlich klingenden Begriffen wie Kill chain und Links 16 als angeblichem game changer.

Geopolitical Economy Report

After Ukraine, US readies ‚transnational kill chain‘ for Taiwan proxy war

Washington approved the sale of the Link 16 system to Taiwan. This is the final link of what the US military calls a „transnational coalition kill chain“ against China, signaling commitment to war.

02.03.2024

From BAE Systems promotional materials for Link 16

In many traditions, when you paint or sculpt a Buddha, the eyes are the very last to be painted. It’s only after the eyes have been completed that the sculpture is fully alive and empowered.

The United States has approved a $75 million weapons package to Taiwan province, involving the sale of the Link 16 communications system.

The acquisition of Link 16 is analogous to “painting the eyes on the Buddha”: a last touch, it makes Taiwan’s military systems and weapons platforms live and far-seeing.

It confers deadly powers, or more prosaically, in the words of the US military, it completes Taiwan as the final, lethal link of what the US Naval Institute calls a “transnational coalition kill chain”, for war against China.

What exactly is Link 16? Link 16 is a key system in the US military communications arsenal. Specifically, it is the jam-resistant tactical data network for coordinating NATO weapons systems for joint operations in war.

If this sale is completed, it signals serious, granular, and single-minded commitment to kinetic war. It would signal that the Biden administration is as serious and unwavering in its desire to provoke and wage large-scale war with China over Taiwan as it was with Russia over Ukraine, which also saw the implementation of this system.

More important than any single weapons platform, this system allows the Taiwan/ROC military to integrate and coordinate all its warfighting platforms with US, NATO, Japanese, Korean, Australian militaries in combined arms warfare.

The deadliest link

Link 16 would be the deadliest piece of technology yet to be transferred, because it allows sea, air, and land forces to be coordinated with others for lethal effect.

It permits, for example, strategic nuclear/stealth bombers  (US B-1B Lancers, B-2 Spirits) to coordinate with electronic warfare and surveillance platforms  (EA Growlers, Prowlers, EP-3s), fighters and bombers (F-16,F-22, F-35s) as well as conduct joint arms warfare with US, French, British carrier battle groups, Japanese SDF destroyers, South Korean Hyun Moo missile destroyers, as well as THAAD and Patriot radars and missile batteries.

It also allows coordination with low-earth orbit satellites and other Space Force assets.

In other words, Link 16 supplies a brain and nervous system to the various deadly limbs and arms that the Taiwan authorities have been acquiring and preparing on the prompting of the US. It ensures interoperability and US control.

It effectively prepares Taiwan to be used as the spear tip and trigger of a multinational war offensive against China.

To give a shoe-on-the-other-foot analogy, this would be like China giving separatists in a US territory or state (e.g. Hawaii, Guam, Puerto Rico, Texas) not just arms and training – already a belligerent act of war, which the US is currently doing – but connecting insurgent militaries directly to the PLA’s surveillance, reconnaissance, and command/control systems.

This coordinates and completes, to borrow the words of the US Naval Institute (USNI), the final link in a “transnational coalition kill chain” for war.

Offsetting peace, sowing dragon’s teeth

The current US doctrine of war against China is based on distributeddisperseddiffused, network-centric warfare to be conducted along the myriad islands of the archipelagic states encircling China in the Pacific.

These are the “island chains” upon which the US has encircled and sown dragon’s teeth: tens of thousands of troops armed with mobile attack platforms and missiles.

This is to be coordinated with subsurface warfare, automated/autonomous warfare, and longer-range stand-off weapons and attacks.

Powerful think tanks like CSBA, CNAS, CSIS, RAND and the Pentagon have been working out the doctrine, details, logistics, and appropriations for this concept intensively for over a decade while advocating intensely for it.

The sale of link 16 to Taiwan realizes and completes a key portion of this, binding the Chinese island as the keystone of this “multinational kill chain”.

This doctrine of dispersion is based on a “rock-paper-scissors” concept that networked diffusion “offsets” (Chinese) precision.

China’s capacity to defend itself and its littoral perimeter with precision missiles can be undermined with diffuse, distributed attacks from all across the island chains.

Note that this diffusion and dispersion of attack platforms across the entire Pacific gives the lie to the claim that this is some inherently deterrent strategy to defend Taiwan island. Diffusion is clearly offensive, designed to overrun and overwhelm defenses: like Ukraine, this is not to deter war, but to enable it.

This thus signals that aggressive total war against China is being prepared, in granular, lethal fashion on tactical and operational levels.

On the strategic level, currently, at the CFR, CNAS, and other influential think tanks in Washington, the talk is all about “protracted warfare” with China, about pre-positioning systems and munitions for war, about ramping up to an industrial war footing for the inescapable necessity of war with China.

This discussion includes preparations for a nuclear first strike on China.

The US senses that the clock is running rapidly down on its power. If war is inevitable, then it is anxious to start war sooner rather than later.

RAND warned in 2016 that 2025 was the outside window for the US to prevail in war with China. The “Minihan window” also hints at 2025. The “Davidson window” is 2027.

The question in Washington regarding war with China is not if, but when–and how.

Link 16 makes “how” easier, and brings “when” closer.

But the US is still engaged in Ukraine. Can it wage a two-front war? 

The current administration has hardline Russophobes who want to continue to bleed Russia out in Ukraine. It wants protracted war with Russia. It firmly believes it can wage ambidextrous, multi-front war.

Many US officials also believe that war with Ukraine and war with China are connected. They see Russia and China as a single axis of “revisionist powers” (i.e., official enemies) conspiring against the US to undermine its so-called “rules-based order” (i.e., US hegemony).

Furthermore, if the US abandons Ukraine, this could weaken the Taiwan authorities’ resolve and willingness to wage war on behalf of Washington.

Earlier in the war, when Russian gains in Ukraine were uncertain, Bi-khim Louise Hsiao (Taiwan’s current vice-president elect) gloated publicly and prominently that Ukraine’s victories were a message to China, as well as proof-of-concept of an effective doctrine for waging and winning war against China. As such, the Taiwan authorities were and are a major supporter of the Ukraine proxy war.

But the converse also holds true. Based on the same premise, if the US abandons and loses Ukraine, it sends a clear message to the people on Taiwan island that they will be the next to be used and abandoned; that their US-imposed war and war doctrine (light, distributed, asymmetrical combined arms warfare) for fighting China is a recipe for catastrophic loss.

The US plans on using proxies for war against China: Taiwan, Korea, Japan (JAKUS), Philippines, and Australia (AUKUS). Thus it cannot signal too overtly its perfidious, unreliable, and instrumental mindset.

Washington has to keep up the pretense. It cannot be seen to overtly lose in or abandon Ukraine. It needs a “decent interval”, or a plausible pretext to cut and run.

Still, the US is stretched thin. For example, it is relying on Korean munitions to Ukraine, and South Korea has provided more munitions than all of the EU combined.

Moreover, the US is currently at war with itself. The fracturing of its body politic can only be unified with a common war against a common enemy. Russia is not that enemy for the US. China is. The Republicans want war with China now.

Eli Ratner and Elbridge Colby have been fretting for years about the need to husband weaponry, arms, and munitions in order to wage war against China.

Since the outbreak of Ukraine, Ratner has been working hard to pull India into the US defense industry’s supply chain, and claims to have been successful.

South Korea’s considerable military-industrial complex is being pulled into sub-contracting for US war with China.

Since many of its major Chaebol corporations got their start as subcontractors for the war in Vietnam (for example, Hyundai was a subcontractor for Halliburton/Brown & Root), the Korean economy is simply reverting back to its corporate-martial roots.

South Korea’s economy is currently tanking due to US-forced sanctions on China. Major Korean electronic firms have lost 60 to 80% of their profits due to US-imposed chip sanctions.

Under those conditions, military manufacturing and/or subcontracting looks to be the only way forward.

In this way, the US is forcing a war economy onto its vassals.

The business of the US is war

Furthermore, US aid to Ukraine benefits its own arms industry.

The business of the US is war. Not only do existing US arms companies gain, but also the entire tech industry and supply chain benefits, and is currently re-orienting around this.

Much of the US tech industry is seeking to suckle from the government teat, now flowing copiously in preparation for war.

On the other hand, the general US economy is not doing well, with massive layoffs, especially in the consumer and business tech sector.

The backstop of military Keynesianism, with the integration of think-tank lobbying groups funded by the arms industry with close ties to the administration (such as CNAS, West Exec Advisors, and CSIS) ensure that war is always the closest ready-to-hand resort for tough economic times.

The US is simultaneously trying to decouple supply chains, which creates opportunities for US firms (both domestically and subcontracting with US vassals).

Automated, AI-enabled warfare will be a key part of this development, as will be dispersed, distributed warfare platforms using proxies such as South Korea and Japan.

This fits the existing historical pattern: the history of Western technology shows that technology and machinery have always been developed first for war.

Afterwards, they become tools of entertainment and distraction, and later productive tools for general industrial use.

The machinery of war, mystification, and repression

This pattern goes back to the earliest machines and inventions of the West: the crane, the pulley, the lever, were all military technologies – machines of war (used in sieges).

Later they became machines of illusion and distraction (used as stage machinery in Greek theater).

Only much later were they applied for general use – and exploitation – in manufacture and production.

This holds true for many other technologies, including:

  • the internet, originally designed to create redundant military communications in case of nuclear strike;
  • GPS, for precision bombing;
  • integrated circuit computer chips, a miniaturization of electronic circuits to fit inside the cone of missile guidance systems;
  • digital computers, conceived by Alan Turing while trying to break military encryption;
  • microwave ovens, originally radar technology, initially marketed as the “Radar-range”;
  • analog computers, invented for military calculations; and
  • feedback systems, for guidance systems.

Nuclear power obviously derives from nuclear weapons.

AI, too, from its inception, was conceived for automated battle management, especially to enable second strike after human life had been destroyed.

An AI war is already in the works, with US sanctions on AI-related chips and computing, along with an algorithmic race to suppress dissent and critique in the information domain.

War and business are intricately related in the west, and war is the first lever pulled when the economy stagnates critically or needs a boost.

Is there any possibility of peace?

The US needs to abandon its neoconservative fantasies of hegemonic global empire and retreat gently into that good night, for there to be peace.

Washington needs to negotiate in good faith with Russia, and begin the process of de-escalating its proxies in Ukraine, as well as in Palestine, and the Pacific.

It needs to seek win-win cooperation in a multilateral order based on international law and mutual co-existence, not its own top-down “rules-based order”.

It needs to respect the One China principle, end its interference in China’s affairs, and stop preparing and provoking war with China.

However, the US ruling class is unwilling to do so. And it has only a few levers left to pull. The military one is the closest and most ready to hand.

As Martin Luther King Jr. said, “The US is the greatest purveyor of violence in the world”.

Like a drunk at the bar after the final call – drunk with power – Washington is determined to go out with a fight.

That fight could involve a nuclear first strike. Palestine has shown what it will try to get away with: brazen genocide with the whole world watching.

The issue is no longer war or peace in Ukraine. Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell sees Ukraine as a “unified field” of war with China. He revels in the possibility of a “magnificent symphony of death” in Asia.

The coda, of course, will be a deafening fermata of silence across the entire planet. Unless we stop this insane march to war.

After Ukraine, US readies ‚transnational kill chain‘ for Taiwan proxy war (substack.com)

Vom Volumen hören sich die 75 Millionen ja recht mickrig an, aber es geht wohl um die Qualität. Die Global Times warnte unlängst die USA davor, Taiwans Militär in das System des US-Militärs zu integrieren. Dieses Links 16-System hört sich ein wenig danach an.On die Globsl Times das auch so sieht, ja gar eine Tote Llnie? Bisher hat sie noch nichts dazu geschrieben. Interessant,dass gleichzeitig die RAND-Studie herauskommt „Theories of Victory in a war with China“. Die sollte .man mal in Ruhe lesen. Von der Zusammenfassung diskutiert sie 5 Kriegsoptionen und hält davon die Denial-Option für die zielführendste., auch schon eine Diskussion seit TX Hammes Offshore Controll , Airsea Battle statt Airland Battle oder Anti Access/ Area Denial in erweiterter Form , die es auch schon seit den 2000er in den USA gab. Kill chain scheint so ein Modewort. Südkorea hat auch eine Kill chain. Nun also auch noch eine „transnational kill chain“.Ob das nur eine Namensähnlichkeit ist oder die jetzt wirklich transnational integriert werden, wäre mal zu untersuchen. Letzteres war ja auch auf der Agenda von Bidens „historischen Treffen“ mit Japan und Südkorea in Camp David. Auf den ersten Blick denkt man: Hoffentlich kommt da nicht der nächste Krieg raus.

In der Global Times kein Bericht über das Links 16 -System,auch keine alarmistischeWarnung,rote Liniendrohung oder ähnliches.Scheinbar sieht.man das nicht so als den gamechanger.Auch ist die Frage,ob eine derart angeblich allesändernde Kommknikationstechnologie schon so billig zu haben ist,eben 75 Millionen Dollar.Es siehtceher aus,dass der Substack-Artikel da,etwas sensationell dramatisiert, denn die KP China,würde sich schon laut melden  wenn das so Geschilderte in dieser  Form zutreffen würde.

Heute eher ein stolzer Artikel über den überholten Flugzeugträger Liaoning, Beschwerden über die Philipinen und dann noch viel zum Handelsstreit mit den USA und der EU, vor allem auch über die Autoindustrie. Das scheint wichtiger als die „transnational Kill chain“ und Links 16.

China’s aircraft carrier Liaoning sets out for sea trial after full year of refurbishment

By 

Liu XuanzunPublished: Mar 01, 2024 02:08 AMAssisted by several tug boats, China’s aircraft carrier Liaoning sets out from the Dalian Shipyard in Northeast China’s Liaoning Province for a voyage test on February 29, 2024. Full-scale mockups of a J-35 fighter jet and a J-15 fighter jet can be seen on the carrier’s flight deck. Photo: VCG

Assisted by several tug boats, China’s aircraft carrier Liaoning sets out from the Dalian Shipyard in Northeast China’s Liaoning Province for a voyage test on February 29, 2024. Full-scale mockups of a J-35 fighter jet and a J-15 fighter jet can be seen on the carrier’s flight deck. Photo: VCG

China’s aircraft carrier Liaoning sets out for sea trial after full year of refurbishment – Global Times

Kill chain hört sich ein wenig wie Supply chain oder Lieferkette auf militärisch an. Die darf nicht gestört oder unterbrochen werden ,da scheinbar kriegsentscheidend. Bisher in den Medien noch nicht als neuer Begriff aufgetaucht. Scheinbar eher ein geläufiger Fachbegriff in militärischen Insiderkreisen. Daher mal einen Fachartikel aus US- Magazinen, de das einmal näher erklären hier etwa im Air and Space Forces Magazine“:

Kill_Chain

Two U.S. Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcon aircraft fly over the U.S. Air Force Central Command area of responsibility during a mission supporting Combined Joint Task Force—Operation Inherent Resolve, in March 2021. 

Staff Sgt. Trevor McBride

Winning the Kill Chain Competition

By Heather Penney

July 28, 2023

Planners must think backward from the target to optimize the kill chains used to attack. 

The kill chain competition is among the foundational struggles of every military conflict. Adversaries compete in capabilities, capacity, geography, and industrial and financial resources can shift the balance of power in conflict from one side to the other, which is why these are priorities in both peace and war. No competition, however, is as central as the command and control kill chains that deliver weapons on targets. Should kill chains break at scale, it can lead to the catastrophic loss of a conflict. 

Kill chains are not just as an abstract concept, but rather is made up of physical sensors, datalinks, platforms, and weapons, each with its own tangible characteristics and limitations. Each also has specific informational, physical, and network requirements. For the U.S. Air Force to maintain its kill chain advantage, it must evolve its kill chains to counter adversary strategies to break them. 

Planners must think backward from the target to optimize the kill chains used to attack it. Target characteristics dictate which platforms, sensors, and capabilities planners use; nodes that perform similar functions but have different characteristics may not be interchangeable. The type and precision of the sensors used to locate and track a target, the type of weapon and effect, and even the bandwidth and latency of the kill chain’s datalinks must be tailored to the target and mission. 

This is why kill chains the Air Force developed over the past 20 years for operations in the Middle East are insufficient for a peer conflict in the Pacific. Many of the Air Force’s current kill chains are insufficient for the geography of the Indo-Pacific and the threats posed by China’s modernized People’s Liberation Army (PLA). 

Heather Penney is a senior resident fellow at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies. Download the entire report at http://MitchellAerospacePower.org.

In the Middle East, a flight of F-16s could loiter for hours in a kill box, waiting for a weapons release order from the joint force air component commander in the nearby air operations center (AOC) with relatively low risk. That won’t be possible over Taiwan, where communications will be contested, and aircraft will be hundreds of miles from the nearest air operations center. Loitering there would likely prove fatal. 

Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall’s Operational Imperatives aim to create the capabilities needed to conduct effective operations in that fight. 

Kill chains must also be able to withstand adversary attacks, which can be either defensive or offensive in nature. Defensive attacks consist of Area Access/Area Denial threats that force non-stealthy U.S. platforms to operate beyond useful ranges for sensing or weapons delivery; camouflage and decoys intended to cause U.S. forces to waste weapons; or “shoot-and-scoot” tactics intended to deny the U.S. the ability to gather precise target data.  

Offensive attacks include jamming or disabling space constellations in low-Earth orbit, destroying command nodes like AWACs, or jamming Link-16 and other datalinks to isolate U.S. platforms and prevent them from sharing information to progress the kill chain. 

China’s “System Destruction”

China has ardently studied how the U.S. military conducts combat operations, starting with the U.S. military’s ability to successfully close kill chains at war-winning scale, speed, and scope during Operation Desert Storm. That experience drove the PLA to change from a warfighting concept that seeks to achieve victory by attriting opposing forces to “system destruction warfare.” This warfighting concept deliberately seeks to disrupt, degrade, and destroy the system of systems that defines the U.S. operational architecture. The PLA seeks to destroy kill chains by attacking U.S. sensor networks, datalinks, and command and control (C2) architectures, and other nodes. This strategy seeks to dismantle the pillar of America’s asymmetric advantage in combat—the system of systems that U.S. forces rely on to conduct modern warfare. 

Legacy military kill chains are linear and vulnerable to China’s system destruction warfare, which put every step of  U.S. kill chains at risk—from sensors to shooters to the networks that connect them and the data they share. The very technologies that make the U.S. kill chains so efficient and effective makes them more vulnerable to system destruction warfare—especially if assets required to complete multiple kinds of kill chains are only available in limited numbers. 

For example, an airborne AWACS or future implementation of today’s JSTARS (Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System) might support multiple steps in multiple kill chains. Without enough, the loss of such high-demand, low-density nodes could cripple the U.S. military kill chains, slowing the pace and scale needed to achieve a theater commander’s objectives.  

The risk to the force from this vulnerability is amplified by the fact that the Air Force today lacks the force size needed for peer conflict. 

Ripe for Change

Since the mid-2000s, the Air Force’s combat aircraft inventory has been the smallest and oldest in its 76-year history as a separate military service. To compensate, the Air Force has made its kill chains more efficient and effective by leveraging advanced technologies, such as high-speed computer processing and datalinks. These enhancements maintain lethality even as the combat force shrinks. These new kill chains were optimized for theater contingency operations and low-intensity conflict in the permissive environments exemplified by Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, Inherent Resolve, and other similar fights involving non-peer adversaries—those without sophisticated means to systematically disrupt U.S. kill chains. The dynamic and fleeting nature of high-value targets in these conflicts drove the Air Force to develop means to initiate and close kill chains in a matter of minutes and with precision. 

In a peer conflict, however, kill chains will have to engage dynamic and fleeting targets at a scale, scope, and speed unprecedented in modern warfare.  

What is a Kill Chain?
A kill chain is the process used to put Air Force missiles or bombs on target. The Air Force breaks the kill chain down into six discrete steps: find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess. Since the late 1990s, Airmen have used this “F2T2EA” model to find and destroy targets and to understand the relationship between the sensors, platforms, and weapons employed to close those kill chains. 

Find. The first step of any kill chain is to find the target. Surveillance operations study battlespace to detect and characterize potential targets. 
Fix. Once a potential target is found, targeting data passes to one or more sensors to “fix,” or locate its position relative to the rest of the battlespace, and then to positively identify it—with sufficient fidelity to engage it with weapons—as the desired target.
Track. Targets’ location and identity must be continuously tracked—what warfighters call maintaining “positive custody.” If positive custody of a target is lost, the kill chain is broken, and the process must revert to an earlier step. 
Target. When it’s time to engage, targets are assigned based on the specific requirements for each target. A mobile target requires a different solution than a bunker buried beneath the ground, for example.

Even after a target is attacked, the kill chain continues. Sensors must be assigned to assess the damage and determine if additional munitions are necessary. 

According to one former defense official, roughly 80 percent of targets in the early phase of a Chinese fait accompli invasion of Taiwan are anticipated to be mobile or quickly relocatable. Detecting these targets and initiating the kill chain will require ISR assets to be in the right place at the right time continuously, searching for and detecting moving targets. Strike forces will have just minutes or less to complete kill chain before targets relocate or take steps to negate attacks. 

The scale of the battlespace and unprecedented volume of potential targets in a conflict with China pose complications, as thousands of kill chains must be closed against thousands of targets simultaneously across thousands of square miles of ocean and landmass. With limited resources to cover so much geography and so huge a volume of targets, every ISR asset, weapon system, and platform in the battlespace will be needed to complete those kill chains nearly simultaneously. 

Yet, it’s also clear that today’s U.S. kill chains are rigid, offering narrow and predictable options to share information with only a limited mix of sensors, aircraft, or weapons. Relationships between functional nodes are fixed, and kill chains are generally unable to adapt when elements are lost, or datalinks are disrupted. Finally, the centralized decision-making that characterized U.S. operations over the past 20 years is not scalable to the size of a peer-to-peer war in the Indo-Pacific. 

Building the Future Kill Chain Advantage 

The Air Force is developing new capabilities and operational concepts to create more flexible, resilient, and lethal kill chain options in the future. The Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS) program is specifically intended to deliver that new capability. 

ABMS seeks to increase potential kill chain pathways across operating domains. By connecting systems and rapidly sharing information across a large network of sensors and platforms, the U.S. aims to increase the resiliency of its kill chains against Chinese countermeasures. For instance, instead of separate linear kill chains, ABMS could help create “kill webs” that operate much like self-healing mesh networks. 

In this distributed or disaggregated battle network, each step in the kill chain—the find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess (F2T2EA) process—could be performed by different platforms and even, potentially, in different domains. For example, a satellite sensor might detect and find a potential target, then pass it to an airborne sensor to fix and track the target, updating and maintaining the target’s position and identification before passing it off again to a ground-based battle management node. That battle manager might then task a weapon system, perhaps an airborne bomber, to engage the target with appropriate weapons. Finally, a satellite might guide the bomber’s weapons to the designated target. Afterward, an airborne sensor conducting battle damage assessment would help battle managers determine if another engagement was required. This meshed approach makes the overall operational system less predictable and harder to counter.  

Key Attributes of a Successful Kill Chain: Scale, Scope, Speed, and Survivability 
Building a future kill chain that can prosecute targets as fluidly as possibly requires a focus on four measures of a kill chain’s effectiveness: scale, scope, speed, and survivability.
Scale. Increasing the number of nodes directly translates to the ability to engage more targets. Increasing the functions each node can execute also expands the number of kill chains U.S. forces can prosecute at once. This is one reason why Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall has expressed a nominal intent to procure at least 1,000 uninhabited Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) to complement some 200 Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) fighters. Likewise, developing and deploying proliferated low-Earth orbit satellite constellations and stockpiling stores of advanced weapons will be necessary to enable the closing of the thousands of kill chains required to take on a peer rival in conflict.

Scope. Quantity is key to increasing the scope of kill chain operations because a single kill chain system, like a single combat aircraft, cannot be in more than one place at a time. The Air Force must increase the quantity of physical kill chain platforms and expand their range to achieve greater scope. Range is crucial in the Indo-Pacific, which spans 16 time zones. 

Greater weapon range increases the area each kill chains can cover. Mitchell Institute analyses indicate that precision-guided munitions with ranges of 50 to 250 nm that can be delivered in large quantities by reusable stealthy fighters and bombers would not only extend the range of kill chains, but also compress the time to close kill chains, and achieve “affordable mass” for strikes against very large target sets. 
Speed. The Air Force should increase the speed of weapons where feasible. Higher-speed air-launched missiles and “stand-in,” penetrating combat aircraft like the F-35 and B-21 can both accelerate kill chains by reducing the time from launch to strike. 

Space-based communications, meanwhile, can also increase speed, especially when linking nodes beyond line-of-sight. The Air Force’s future low-Earth-orbit satellite transport layer will become an essential backbone for kill chains executing in highly contested battlespace. Using laser communications and native processing, LEO constellations could provide up to 350 megabits (Mbps) per second of instantaneous bandwidth to support kill chain operations, 25 times faster than today’s Link 16 terminals can deliver at a maximum of 14 Mbps. 

Digital technology can also help. Developing automated tools for air battle managers and fused, accurate, and timely common operating pictures would facilitate rapid target pairing and kill chain construction. Automating kill chain functions, such as identifying and prioritizing threats and targets, pairing targets with weapons to maximize probability of kill, and efficiently managing fuel and weapons would greatly reduce air battle managers’ task saturation.

Survivability. Radar energy, heat signatures, and other emissions must be mitigated to avoid detection by adversaries’ warning and targeting systems. Datalinks featuring low probability-of-intercept/low probability-of-detection (LPI/LPD) are essential for operating in highly contested environments. Likewise, directionally focused datalinks, power modulation, frequency hopping, or even the use of new technologies, such as laser communications quantum radio frequencies may enhance overall network survivability. 

Similarly, redundancy is another crucial requirement. When network nodes fail, systems must be able to heal themselves, operating less like a conventional point-to-point network, and more like a mesh of interconnected systems. 

There are many factors that are moving the U.S. Air Force toward developing a more disaggregated force design, but the earliest that its warfighters could expect to see nascent versions of this future force is likely to be in the early 2030s. As aggressively as the Air Force is working to develop the technologies, operational concepts, architecture, and other enablers for ABMS, they are still not mature. The Air Force needs a bridge strategy to ensure it can achieve a kill chain advantage as it migrates into this future force.

Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Charles Q. Brown Jr. describes ABMS as a joint kill chain that will take “data, put it into a cloud, and then be able to access the data through applications, and not do it service by service by service.” Rather than distinct Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps kill chains, the architecture would enable all the services to leverage sensors, platforms, and weapons from any service branch to prosecute targets with the scale, scope, speed, and survivability necessary to defeat China.  

Scale in this case is the capacity of an operational system to generate and close hundreds or thousands of kill chains simultaneously; scope refers to the ability of a kill chain to span great distances and operate persistently over time; speed is the ability to outpace adversary efforts to deny, disrupt, or break a kill chain; and survivability is the ability to sustain operational effectiveness under attack.

Enduring Kill Chain Advantages 

During and immediately following the Cold War, the Air Force consolidated its kill chains and relied more on advanced weapons systems like the B-2 Spirit bomber F-22 Raptor fighter, which were equipped with highly advanced technologies that enabled them to initiate and close kill chains independently. 

The B-2’s unique range, high payload capacity, and stealth enabled kill chains of unprecedented scope, speed, and survivability. The F-22’s supercruise, stealth, powerful sensors, and the ability to rapidly fuse sensor data gave pilots a “first look, first kill” advantage, closing kill chains against enemy fighters faster than they could respond. 

While such systems have been derided as “exquisite” by critics, it is the very characteristics that made them exquisite that gave them unrivaled ability to survive and close kill chains against enemy systems independently in contested environments. 

Air Force leaders should not abandon this approach. Rather, it should increase the number of fifth- and sixth-generation aircraft available to amplify kill chain advantages in scale, scope, speed, and survivability. The Air Force should accelerate its procurement of F-35s and B-21 bombers, while sustaining all its F-22s and B-2s. At the same time, it should develop advanced munitions suitable for fifth-generation aircraft; increase datalink interoperability among its platforms; and rapidly field Collaborative Combat Aircraft to increase the number of weapons available per combat sortie. 

To optimize kill chain scope, fifth-generation aircraft also must be able to support both organic and off-board kill chains. The F-35’s planned Block 4 upgrade includes datalink connectivity needed to support such distributed kill chains. 

Fifth-generation aircraft can finally provide survivable kill chains in high-threat and spectrum-contested battlespaces. This is an Air Force advantage that is currently unmatched by China’s PLA and other potential adversaries. To maintain this comparative advantage, the Air Force must continue to invest in improvements to its fifth-generation aircraft to offset China’s increasingly capable countermeasures.

A Chinese J-10 fighter taking off during readiness patrol and military exercises. China’s Air Force cannot yet match the survivable kill chains of U.S. fifth-generation aircraft, such as the F-35. Wang Zixiao/Xinhua via China Ministry of Defense

Fifth-generation fighters will be important to the Air Force’s overall force design in the near-term as a bridge to the service’s Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) family of systems. Strategically, fifth- and sixth-generation combat aircraft are crucial to assure kill chain dominance because of their ability to initiate and complete every step of the kill chain process on their own. 

Conclusion and Recommendations 

In the near- to mid-term, the Air Force should:

  •  Maximize F-35 and B-21 production rates. The F-35 is the only fifth-generation aircraft in production in the U.S. today that can provide a kill chain advantage now and long into the future. The B-21, now nearing first-flight, will soon provide similar advantages. To achieve kill chain scale and scope and mitigate risk in this decade, the Air Force should maximize the rate at which it procures both aircraft. 
  •  Aggressively invest in modernizing and improving the range and survivability of the F-35 and F-22.While developing NGAD, the Air Force can increase the survivability and reach of its existing kill chains while it works to mature the new technologies that will come with NGAD.
  •  Develop and produce survivable air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons suitable for fifth- and sixth-generation combat aircraft operations. Increasing the number of kill chains per sortie that fifth-generation aircraft can complete will have a direct impact on the timing and mission effectiveness of any air campaign. Enhancing survivability is key after decades of fighting in largely uncontested battlespace.
  •  Map out and connect the right sensors, platforms, and weapons, not necessarily every weapon. For kill chains to be highly effective, not everything needs to be connected to everything all the time. The Air Force should work to better understand which systems need to be connected when to increase the scale, scope, and survivability of its kill chains.
  •  Develop advanced networks and invest in connectivity across the force. Current kill chains cannot bridge most service, system, or network boundaries. Enhancing the connectivity of fifth-generation aircraft with other aircraft and strike capabilities across the force will empower both to be multifunction nodes supporting theater commanders’ kill chain operations.
  •  In the mid-to-far-term, the Air Force should:
  •  Develop automated tools to help air battle managers. Automation can enable battle managers to identify, validate, evaluate, and construct kill chains more rapidly. A disaggregated kill chain presents tremendous complexity to battle managers, especially when the physical, locational, and informational characteristics of each node are “in play.” In a highly dynamic battlespace, battle managers need automated or intelligent tools to facilitate the real-time identification of kill chain options for target pairing.
  • Accelerate development of Collaborative Combat Aircraft. CCAs in quantity have the potential to be force multipliers, increasing the reach of the Air Force’s fifth- and sixth-generation aircraft and multiplying the number of targets that can be attacked. Quantity also bolsters survivability.
  •  Develop and launch a space-based sensing and data transport layer. High-volume sensing and communication constellations can dramatically boost the scale, scope, speed, and survivability of airborne kill chains. 
  •  Accelerate development of NGAD and procure the aircraft quickly and in sufficient numbers to sustain the force. Cutting production too soon undermined the effectiveness of the F-22 fleet and, by extension, the Air Force’s ability to project power. 

 These recommendations are not “quick kill” fixes that can be achieved by simply trading off current force capacity. Yet, senior DOD leaders must consider the ultimate cost of not pursuing kill chain dominance as it develops its future force design. A defeat at the hands of a peer adversary would have devastating long-term consequences for the security of the United States and its allies and partners.

Winning the Kill Chain Competition | Air & Space Forces Magazine (airandspaceforces.com)

Und so neu ist as alles nicht, scheint eben fester Bestandteil spätestens als China von dem schnellen Sieg des US- Militärs im Golfkrieg von Bush Vater in den 90ern kalt erwischt wurde, zumal dieser auch Ausdruck der damals sogenannten „Revolution in Military Affairs“ (RMA) war. S oauch ein Artikel in „The Eurasian Times“:

Studying US Warfighting Tactics For 30 Years, China Plans To Disrupt US Air Force’s ‘Kill Chain’ & Deflate Its Military

By Parth Satam

 -May 14, 2023

In a war with China, the US Air Force (USAF) needs to “make robust” all elements of its ‘kill chains’ that guide ordnance from target identification to engagement since that is what the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will disrupt at various stages. 

This was the common consensus reached by experts and serving retired senior USAF Generals at a webinar held by the Mitchell Institute of Aerospace Studies (MIAS). 

Former USAF deputy chief of staff for operations, Lt Gen Joseph Guastella, now a senior fellow at MIAS; commander of the 57th Wing Brig Gen Richard Goodman; and MIAS senior resident fellow Heather Penny also noted a poor ratio of fifth to fourth generation fighters where the former should be available in sufficient quantities as the latter is “not survivable” in today’s high-end fight. 

What Are Kill Chains?

The kill chain is the sequence of processes from target acquisition to engagement/firing, where until the ordnance is released, it involves target identification, “fixing,” and target tracking.

They have corresponding platforms performing each of these functions. These involve intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance (ISR) drones, airborne early warning aircraft (AEW), satellites, command and control (C2) centers, and even ground troops. 

Penny writes in a separate report that China aims to destroy, deceive, or confuse this “information” gathering and decision-making architecture/network rather than solely destroying enemy forces. 

In a presentation, Penny explained how the Chinese, after having closely studied US warfighting style for three decades – would look at hitting each element in the kill chain and disable the entire system. 

Notably, China learned from Operation Desert Storm in the early 1990s how the US completely disabled the Iraqi military in a matter of days, with little to no loss to themselves. 

Attack ‘Systems’ Of Systems

China can also attack components of US military kill chains with electronic warfare, where it jams, for instance, the Link 16 data links that link nearly every US air and ground asset.https://d-12728327042338246475.ampproject.net/2402141842000/frame.html

Thus preventing the flow of this “information” between various systems is sufficient to “disrupt” the kill chain that will be preparing to fire on Chinese targets. 

For instance, shooting down large AEW&C aircraft like the E-3 Sentry will force USAF and US Navy fighters to adapt or introduce ad hoc workarounds, slowing down the “tempo” of American operations and speed of the kill chain. 

It is worrisome that China has already moved in this direction (of strengthening its own kill chain elements) with the WZ-8 high-speed strategic reconnaissance drone. China might use the fast-flying high-altitude drone to complement the existing kill chain by plotting its location and help coordinate other units to form an anti-ship raid against it.

It’s a different matter that the WZ-8 has long been concluded to be a reverse-engineered version of the Lockheed Skunk Works D-21 from the 1960s. 

Penny specifically said having large numbers of the B-21 Raider and the F-35 Lightning II was vital, given their stealth and electronic intelligence (ELINT) capabilities, and not to repeat the mistake of the B-2 Spirit and F-22 Raptor.

Despite considerable investment, the two aircraft were only built in small quantities, which are inadequate against the tens of thousands of possible targets in a Pacific air campaign. 

The EurAsian Times had previously touched upon this emerging Chinese doctrine of “intelligentized” warfare, which has significantly influenced the design of its military and, to a great extent, possible tactics and manner in which platforms like the J-20 would be employed. 

US Too Wants To Target Chinese Kill Chains

But even more interesting is that the USAF itself has been considering attacking China’s kill chains, as was admitted by Pacific Air Forces commander General Kenneth Wilsbach in a March 14, 2022, seminar at MIAS. 

This was also the same famous event where Wilsbach admitted they were “relatively impressed” with the J-20 and how it was being flown “professionally” after making the stunning revelation that the F-35 and the Chinese stealth fighter had encountered one another over the East China Sea (ECS). 

It was while expanding upon the KJ-500 Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft that can guide the 200 kilometers range PL-15 beyond visual range (BVR) missile fired from the J-20 that he revealed the USAF’s tactical thinking. 

“Some of their very long-range air-to-air missiles (PL-15) are aided by that KJ-500. Being able to interrupt that kill chain is something that interests me greatly,” Wilsbach had said. 

Parth Satam

Parth Satam is a Mumbai-based journalist who has been covering India’s defense sector for more than a decade. He maintains a keen interest in defense, aerospace and foreign affairs and can be reached at satamp@gmail.com

Latest Online Europe News at EurAsian Times

In folgendem Artikel wird die Kill chain und Links 16 konkret erwähnt und beschrieben. Scheinbar jetzt aufgrund der negativen Erfahrungen im Ukrainekrieg hat das mehr Aktualität und wird sozusagen als, das weak link wahrgenommen, das man härten und resilient auch für den Indopazifik und gegen China machen muss, da dass schon kriegsentscheidend sein kann. Hier im einem Artiel de US Naval Institutes halt als Coalition kill chain statt transantional kill chain.

Coalition Kill Chain for the Pacific: Lessons from Ukraine

By Majors Dylan Buck and Steven Stansbury, U.S. Marine Corps

July 2023

Proceedings

Vol. 149/7/1,445

Russia’s war in Ukraine offers a critical case study on why—and how—to build a more robust kill chain that leverages partners’ and allies’ capabilities. A more expansive satellite communications (SATCOM) network that enables a real-time integrated common operational picture (COP) will be necessary to generate the relative combat power advantage over the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Russia initiated combat operations in Ukraine with cyberattacks on SATCOM to disrupt Ukraine’s kill chain—the methodology for finding, fixing, targeting, tracking, engaging, and assessing (F2T2EA) an adversarial objective. The United States, alongside partners, allies, and industry, was able to blunt Russia’s invasion by reconstructing Ukraine’s SATCOM network and sharing critical intelligence. However, the kill chain architecture leveraged against Russia does not exist in the first island chain of the western Pacific.

The 2022 National Defense Strategy identified China as “the most comprehensive and serious challenge to U.S. national security,” with integrated deterrence as the primary means for responding. It also stated that “greater intelligence and information sharing, and combined planning for shared deterrence challenges” are vital to effectively implement the strategy for integrated deterrence. To achieve the capability required to deter the PLA, the Department of Defense (DOD) must further develop SATCOM architecture in the first island chain and expand partners and allies’ access to the COP to build a coalition kill chain that can mass fires.

Expand SATCOM and the COP

As the battlefield becomes more expansive across domains, it will inherently become more dependent on SATCOM to enable combatants to close kill chains. A valuable lesson observed from Russia’s invasion is that the joint force can enhance its kill chain by proliferating and diversifying SATCOM infrastructure and expanding access to intelligence. To do this, the United States had to create more permissive policy for intelligence sharing for more effective targeting. Furthermore, kill chains in the Pacific are more dependent on SATCOM as submarine internet cables are more vulnerable and likely already compromised by China.

Leading up to the Ukraine invasion, Russia disabled tens of thousands of military and civilian SATCOM terminals. Both military and civilian broadband Internet was severely degraded. In an anticipated zero-day cyberattack, the degraded SATCOM rendered Ukraine’s long-range artillery counterattack “ineffective.” In one instance, Enercon, a German energy producer, reported that 5,800 of its wind turbines were knocked offline as civilian broadband Internet service in the region was attacked. The United States and Europe were forced to rapidly revert to commercial-off-the-shelf broadband services provided by SpaceX’s Starlink to reestablish civilian and military SATCOM. Remarkably, Starlink also enabled Ukraine to better mask its electronic signature, as SATCOM wavelengths are more difficult to detect compared to those propagated via ground. Based off these lessons, there are two measures the United States could take to create a better kill chain network in the first island chain.

First, to enhance U.S. SATCOM architecture, the DoD could begin to supplement geosynchronous orbit satellites by proliferating low-earth-orbit and medium-earth-orbit satellites. This would reduce vulnerabilities related to adversarial space operations and expand SATCOM range and resiliency. SpaceX’s Starlink functions off the same principle of a mesh networks of low-earth-orbit satellites.

Second, the United States could use partner and allies’ satellite networks and make policy more permissive with intelligence sharing. In March 2022, the Department of Defense announced its Joint All-Domain Command and Control Implementation Plan with the 5th line of effort to “Modernize Mission Partner Information Sharing.” The intent is to enhance the ability to integrate partner and allies’ data for all-domain coalition operations. After all, the value in integrating systems is only as good as the real-time tracks being shared. To build a coalition kill chain, U.S. policy will have to become more permissive with intelligence sharing among partners and allies.

Structure of the Multinational Kill Chain

The United States will also need to create a methodology for building a multinational COP and integrated fires network. Tactical-level forces across the partner and ally network must evolve to contribute more to operational and strategic-level fires and effects. This effort is twofold: first, the joint force could expand partners and allies’ access to Type-1 Link-16 cryptography, so they are built into the operational tasking link; and second, it could reduce constraints on protocols and pathways for sharing information.

The first effort would integrate partners and allies into the tactical data link router used by the U.S. joint force, also known as the Joint Range Extension Applications Protocol. This would require access to the joint Link 16 architecture by assigning partners and allies a cryptographic variable logic label via an operational tasking data link (OPTASK LINK). Access to the Link 16 architecture would provide a shared COP capable of integrating national technical means for finding and fixing targets and cuing assets to track them. Target quality and the probability of successful strike are positively correlated with the number of assets that sense, track, and pass data in the OPTASK LINK architecture. For instance, the Naval Integrated Fires Element (NIFE) serves as a 24/7 watch center to process signals of immediate use to military consumers worldwide. In the proposed system, allies and partners included in the same OPTASKLINK will see the same tracks facilitated and provided by elements like the NIFE.1

After expanding SATCOM and access to a multinational COP, the United States could reduce policy barriers to expand the integrated fires network to partners and allies. There is historical precedence for this. In 1943, several months prior to the successful landing of U.S. and UK troops in Sicily during World War II, the two allies signed the British-United States Agreement (BRUSA), a constitution to “exchange completely all information concerning the detection, identification and interception of signal from, and the solution of codes and cyphers, used by the Military and Air Forces of the Axis power, including secret services.” The pact formed the foundation for what evolved into today’s Five Eyes partnership between the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.

Given the possibility of a large-scale Chinese offensive within the coming years, it is time for the joint force to increase information sharing and trust building with partners and allies to enhance awareness of the battle space in the first island chain. This would not only enhance F2T2EA but could also enhance regional awareness of China’s malign actions. That awareness would reinforce an international coalition. In response to China’s aggressive acts in the South China Sea, then–Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo stated in 2020 that:

The world will not allow Beijing to treat the South China Sea as its maritime empire. America stands with our Southeast Asian allies and partners in protecting their sovereign rights to offshore resources, consistent with their rights and obligations under international law. We stand with the international community in defense of freedom of the seas and respect for sovereignty and reject any push to impose “might makes right” in the South China Sea or the wider region.

More real-time information and intelligence sharing with partners and allies in the Pacific is required to achieve “defense of freedom of the seas and respect for sovereignty.” China is building a navy that now has more ships than the U.S. Navy, with an estimated 400 ships. “Between 2015 and 2017, Chinese shipyards launched twice as many tons worth of naval vessels as their U.S. counterparts.”2 In response, there are changes the joint force can implement today to respond to China’s growing combat power.

As the joint force continues to develop long-range ship interdiction capabilities, it can tap into capabilities already developed by allies and partners through increased information sharing, collaboration on fires planning and executing, and bilateral and multilateral rehearsals. The Japan Self-Defense Forces have a robust inventory of large and medium-scale ballistic missile capabilities with the SM-3 interceptor, the PAC-3 air defense missile, and the Type 12 ship interdiction missile that will eventually extend out to 1,500 kilometers in range. Taiwan’s Navy maintains the supersonic antiship cruise missiles Hsiung Feng II and III in its inventory, which have ranges of more than 150 kilometers. The Philippine Navy will acquire the Indian made supersonic BrahMos antiship missile by 2023. Given current trajectories for China’s naval and ground-based fires assets, the United States will not be able to unilaterally match China’s relative combat power in the Pacific. Thus, the U.S. strategy must prioritize a multilateral kill chain.

Once the multilateral kill chain is built, it must be rehearsed with common understanding of joint war-at-sea terminology among partners and allies. War-at-sea, zones of action, and zones of fire must be standardized in planning to achieve a common lexicon. The Global Area Reference System is also key to orientation and understanding the battlespace. Rehearsing multilateral plans for fire, specifically including protocols for authorities, and collaborating on battle damage assessments are necessary to achieve true integration.

Looking Forward

By building the SATCOM and COP architecture with partners and allies, the United States and partners and allies can achieve relative combat power advantage over the PLA. Trust is the coin of the realm, and the value associated with creating a more robust kill chain outweighs its risks. The two most recent iterations of the U.S. National Defense Strategy stressed the importance of allies and partners to deterring and defending against China’s expansionism. Creating an integrated coalition, however, requires more than diplomacy. True military power will come from sharing tactical intelligence and integrating allies and partners into the link architecture.

1. Space Development Agency, “Attachment 1—Performance Work Statement for SDA Tranche 0: Mission Systems Engineering and Integration,” Space Development Agency Tranche 0 Mission Systems Engineering and Integration (6 July 2020), 5.
2. Christian Brose, The Kill ChainDefending America in the Future of High-Tech Warfare (New York, NY: Hachette Books, 202

Coalition Kill Chain for the Pacific: Lessons from Ukraine | Proceedings – July 2023 Vol. 149/7/1,445 (usni.org)

Es scheint zum einen Differenzen im US- Militr zu geben, ob die Kill chain-Theorie so stimmt,wenngleich es den Anschein hat, dass man momentan nichts Bessseres mehr hat, dann zweitens ,falls sie denn so stimmen sollte, was sie jetzt eigentlich ausmachen soll und dann eben der ewige Streit zwischen den jeweiligen Abteilungen der Streitkräfte, welche Abteilung- ob nun Armee, Navy, Airforce, Space Force, Cyberforce , softpower- Media and Social Media force and Lawfare, da das entscheidende Glied sein soll , die Gewichtung und Fokusierung oder Diskussionen über Kombinationen all dessen in Sachen hybrider Kriegsführung daraus resultieren soll, zumal auch unter Bedingungen der Multipolarität und Aufweichung der traditionallen bipolaren (nuklearen) Abschreckung. Zumal die Army schon angesichts Airsea Battle und TX Hammes Offshore Controll da die Arschkarte bekam und mit wüsten Visionen von einem US- indischen Guerillakrieg der Minderheiten in China samt Rangzen-Allianz und Uiguren-Guerilla (ETIM oder ETAM oder beides- egal?) und eventuell US- indischen boots on the grounds, ventuell um eine Wssrkonflikt im Himalaya als Oberlauf für die Staaten der UNterfüsse, da eher als völlig verzweifelte Fantasy einer Waffengattung gesehen wurde, die ihren Bedeutungsverlust seit Afghanistan und dem Irakkrieg künstlich aufblasen und kompensieren will, wobei schon Gates meinte: bestenfalls noch 1 1/2 Kriege und NO boots on the ground, zumal die KP China gleich mal alle derartige Ansätze entgegen allen Jamestown-Foundation- Protesten von Adrian Zenz das mit der Masseninternierung von Uiguren samt neuem chinesischem War on Terror gleich abgestellt hat, wenngleich die KP China selbst nicht genau weiß, wie sie den Security Belt für ihre Neue Seidenstraße ohne reale Machtprojektion durchsetzen kann., da eher auf die ewige strategische Blödheit und Zerrissentheit der USA und des Westens als lachender Dritter hofft, was ja auch nicht so falsch ist. Aber o b sich daraus schon die chineische Machtprojektion ergibt bleibt fraglich, zudem es ja zuerst noch um ds Rausdrängen der USA aus Taiwan, Südchinesischem Meer und Indopazifik geht.

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