Vergessene Kriege: Eskalation des Luftterrors in Burma/Myanmar

Vergessene Kriege: Eskalation des Luftterrors in Burma/Myanmar

Vor lauter Ukrainekrieg schaffen es andere Krieg und Bürgerkriege nicht mehr in die westlichen Medien. Selbst der Äthiopienkrieg mit nun 500 000 Toten, Millionen Vertriebenen, anstehender Hungersnot, bringt es nur in eine Kurznotiz, dass Bundeskanzler Scholz 5ß Millionen für ein ukrainisches Getreideschiff für Äthiopien und Somalia spendiert hat. In Fernost interessieren momentan noch die Coronaproteste , die gerade in China aufflammen, wohingegen der Bürgerkrieg in Myanmar völlig vergessen ist. Laut dem“ Irrawady“ eskaliert dieser gerade, wobei die Minderheitenguerillas scheinbar noch den Haupttteil des Kampfs führen, über etliche Angriffe und Gegenangriffe berichtet wird, jedoch ohne gamechanger, die People´s Defense Forces in der Berichterstattung kaum auftauchen, ad sie scheinbar noch nicht so mächtig und gut ausgerüstet und kampferfahren ist. Die Militärjunta hat nun auch Aung San Sui Kyi eine längere Haftstrafe gegeben, wie auch zwei Führungskader der Opposition zum Tode verurteilt und führt vielfach politische Morde durch. Die Opposition wiederum scheint sich inzwischen Drohnen zugelegt zu haben, mit denen se erste Schläge gegen das Militär und Repräsentanten der Millitäjunta führt. Umgekehrt setzt auch die Militärjunta Drohnen ein, jedoch scheint momentan der Hauptfokus auf der Intensivierung von Luftschlägen mit der Luftwaffe zu liegen, die Basen der Opposition angreift, aber auch ziviles Hinterland, um Terror und Kriegsmüdigkeit zu bewirken. Unklar bleibt, inwieweit die USA und ihre CIA da die Opposition beliefern und ausbilden, jedenfalls scheinen die USA die Opposition nicht mit Antiluftraketen wie die Ukraine zu beleifern, die die Luftüberlegenheit der Luftwaffe des Militärs neutralisieren und stark schwächen könnte. Klarstes Indiz in dieser Richtung ist ein Interview mit einer US- burmanesischen Exmilitärin und einem burmanesischen Luftwaffendeserteur, wie die burmanesische Opposition auch ohne US- Anti- Luftwaffen dem Luftterror der durch chinesische und russische Fighterjet-Lieferungen verstärkt wird, Herr werden kann:

“Death from Above: How to Combat Myanmar Junta’s Escalating Air Campaign?

Burmese-American security expert Dr. Miemie Winn Byrd, left, and Myanmar Air Force defector Zay Thu Aung.

By Khin Nadi 3 November 2022

The Myanmar junta’s campaign of deadly airstrikes in resistance strongholds has sharply escalated in recent weeks, with daily attacks inflicting heavy casualties on resistance forces, ethnic allies and civilians. In exclusive interviews with The Irrawaddy, Dr. Miemie Winn Byrd, a Burmese-American professor at Hawaii’s Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies and former US Army lieutenant colonel, and Zay Thu Aung, a Myanmar Air Force defector, talk about their expectations of the junta’s air campaign in the coming months and how resistance force can combat the increasingly deadly aerial threat.

Dr. Miemie Winn Byrd, a Burmese-American security expert / APCSS

The Irrawaddy:Myanmar resistance forces and allied ethnic armed groups are facing deadly junta airstrikes that have intensified over the last month in Kachin, Sagaing, Kayah and Karen. The air attacks are expected to escalate in the dry season. What do you foresee in the coming months?

Dr. Miemie Winn Byrd: This is the expectation – that the regime will increase airstrikes because that’s all it has now. They can no longer win on the ground, so air power is the only thing they have left. However, airstrikes are expensive. Each sortie can cost US$200,000 to $350,000 depending on the type of munition used. Given the regime’s dire financial and economic condition, a question arises as to how long it can maintain such costly attacks.

How will the junta’s escalating aerial campaign affect the people’s revolution, which is short of finances and anti-aircraft weapons to defend people? Are there any other options for defense?

The revolution is continuing despite the military’s brutal attacks and arrest of People’s Defense Forces [PDFs] and civilians. A large proportion of Myanmar’s populace continues to resist and reject the military. Increased attacks by the military have only increased the people’s commitment and resolve to resist and reject military rule. The attacks appear to be fuelling the people’s anger and motivation to reject the military. The Myanmar people will innovate ways to overcome this new development [airstrikes], just as they did with earlier attacks.

There are many ways to disrupt an airstrike, in addition to shooting aircraft out of the sky. Aircraft need pilots, fuel, parts, wheels, runways, etc, to fly. If any of these elements are disrupted, they cannot fly. Fuel and parts have to be supplied and transported from somewhere – knowing when and where offers clues to areas of vulnerability in the supply chain. The resistance coalition does not need to wait for anti-aircraft missiles. With careful planning, the resistance can disrupt and prevent these aircraft from flying. I believe in the Myanmar people’s ingenuity and capability.

What can the civilian National Unity Government, PDFs and allied ethnic forces do to overcome the junta’s escalating airstrikes?

Closer cooperation, joint operations, joint command, and good intelligence.

A growing number of unarmed civilians and children have been killed in the junta’s indiscriminate aerial attacks. What can the international community do to prevent further such atrocities?

What is happening to unarmed civilians and children is heartbreaking. These war crimes are further proof that the regime military is no longer a professional military organization but has become a militant organized crime syndicate. People both here and abroad cannot tolerate this militant organized crime syndicate in Myanmar. The NUG and Myanmar’s overseas diaspora community have to speak loud and clear to the international audience. Messages of unity and close cooperation among the resistance coalition are critical in attracting increased assistance from the international community.

The Irrawaddy also asked Zay Thu Aung, a former captain in the Myanmar Air Force who defected following the coup.

Myanmar Air Force defector Zay Thu Aung.

What people can expect from the junta’s air campaign in the coming dry season?

Zay Thu Aung: Currently, the junta is launching air attacks continuously on resistance forces. And this will only get worse. It will carry out more aerial attacks in the dry season as the skies clear for air reconnaissance missions. It will target base camps of local resistance forces and ethnic allies with aerial bombardment after reconnaissance. Ethnic allies and PDFs not in the front line could be caught off-guard. I believe the regime will bomb at unexpected times, at night or early morning.

Why do you think there has been a spike in deadly airborne attacks recently?

The junta’s air force provides either close support or conducts joint operations with infantry troops. Attacks using the air force alone are called exclusive air missions. These missions usually aim to cut support channels to the enemy’s administrative mechanism. We could see this type of attack launched on base camps of PDFs and ethnic allies. If we look at the [Oct 23] attack on the KIO anniversary concert, many thought this kind of event wouldn’t be targeted because they traditionally attract large crowds from even distant villages. Typically they feature artists, revelers and bystanders. But the regime doesn’t care about all those people. If they think the enemy is gathering, they will bomb the event. In their heads, they don’t consider whether it is a war crime or not, they only think about making the enemy suffer and gaining an advantage.

How much do you think the junta’s new focus on air power will affect the revolution?

The main factor will be the military strategy of PDF commanders and how well they prepare. No matter how threatening, any weapon is limited in its range and [target] area. We can think of whether to keep people together or separated in camps, and how we can avoid [junta] reconnaissance. We can consider what to do on the ground including precautions and safety measures. I believe that if [resistance] ground commanders think about these things and make plans, it will be difficult for the regime’s attacks to be effective. However, the main strength of the military still lies in its army. Once the army collapses, the air force and navy can do nothing.

Are there any options for defense against junta airstrikes?

We need to have awareness of the air attacks, both on the front lines and behind. Villages must also be aware of the dangers. And the precautions must cover everything from counterattacks, safety measures, and movement of weapons and ammunition to individual duties during the air attacks. And do not assume that they will not attack you. The regime will not launch ground offensives to seize bases because it is short of troops and facing land-mine attacks and ambushes. That’s why it is now focusing more on the air force. In Sagaing region, we rarely see regime troop columns marching around as before. Nowadays, they are stationed in bases and airlifted to surveilled targets, where they launch attacks before being picked up again by helicopters. This is how they raided the Pale People’s administration hub [on Oct. 25]. They don’t leave their people in the area after the attack.

What do you know about the regime’s air reconnaissance?

It deploys UAV [unmanned aerial vehicle] drones and MPU aircraft to monitor targets using EOIR [Electro-Optical and Infrared] systems for night vision and surveillance. With these, it carefully surveys the areas to estimate the number of people, ambush patrols and location. Based on this data, senior officers draft plans and report to their chief of staff, who draw up a detailed scheme of attack. That’s how they launch the [air] attacks. So, we must not think they do not know this place and will not come and attack here. We should put aside that thinking. I urge all of our NUG, ethnic allies and PDFs to be on your guard.

Many people expect the resistance to use anti-aircraft weapons against regime airstrikes. What are your thoughts?

No matter what anti-aircraft weapons we use, it won’t stop them. The regime [leadership] doesn’t care about the lives of individual pilots or troops at all, only their own lives. Regime forces will also blindly follow whatever orders they get. So, I don’t think anti-aircraft weapons shooting down regime aircraft will do anything to reduce or stop the air attacks. And since it is not easy for us to get anti-aircraft weapons, we need to think strategically about [different] ways to maximize the junta’s suffering.

Will the junta expand its capacity for aerial attacks?

Yes. Russia recently gifted four more Ka-28 submarine-hunter helicopters it had pledged to deliver some time ago. The regime also has two newly arrived Su-30SME jets. And the junta has ordered FTC-2000G midrange fighter jets from China after sending a group of air force pilots to China for training. I urge the international community to help halt delivery of new aircraft, including the FTC-2000Gd and Su-30 jet-fighters, to Myanmar.

Während klar ist, das von China, Russland und der ASEAN nichts zu erwarten ist, scheint man nun auch angesichts Indiens enttäuscht, da dieses mehr Realpolitik macht, Myanmar meint von China wegbewegen zu können und auch eigene wirtschaftliche Interessen verfolgt:

“India’s Disturbing Ties with Myanmar Junta

By Angshuman Choudhury 24 November 2022

On November 22, India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) put out a short, three-point press release announcing the working visit of foreign secretary, Vinay Mohan Kwatra, to Myanmar.

Without saying too many things, it revealed one thing very unambiguously – as far as the relationship between the Indian government and the junta is concerned, it is business as usual.

The press release notes that the two sides discussed “maintenance of security and stability in the border areas” and “bilateral development cooperation projects”. Kwatra also “raised the issue of human trafficking by international crime syndicates in the Myawaddy area of Myanmar in which many Indian nationals have been caught and reviewed”.

Going by the Indian tweets, the foreign secretary met all regime leaders, including chief Min Aung Hlaing and foreign minister Wunna Maung Lwin. There were some photo ops where hands were shaken and polite smiles exchanged. The junta mouthpiece the Global New Light of Myanmar reported Kwatra’s meeting with Min Aung Hlaing on its front page.

What is notable is that the MEA and the Indian Embassy in Yangon publicized the meetings between the visiting foreign secretary and the junta leadership on Twitter, which wasn’t the case when former Indian foreign secretary, Harsh Vardhan Shringla, visited Min Aung Hlaing in December 2021.

This suggests New Delhi is now more confident in engaging with the junta than before and doesn’t mind trumpeting it in the open. In other words, it is willing to give the regime the international legitimacy that it so desperately craves. In return, it expects fidelity and cooperation.

New language, new approach?

This time the Indian side referred to the junta as “the senior leadership of Myanmar”. The MEA press release after Shingla’s visit last year used the term State Administration Council, which is what the junta calls itself. This year’s phrase takes New Delhi one step closer to recognizing the regime as the legitimate government of Myanmar. This isn’t surprising. Since the early 1990s, India has unwaveringly maintained a policy of recognizing whoever is in effective control of Naypyitaw as the legitimate government of all of Myanmar – which may not reflect the reality on the ground.

Notably, this year’s press release was significantly shorter than last year’s, showing India’s narrowing approach towards post-coup Myanmar.

As opposed to Shringla, Kwatra only broached a very small set of issues with the junta leadership, at least publicly. These cover India’s own strategic and economic interests; initiatives that help New Delhi maintain its footprint in its eastern neighborhood.

Most prominently they relate to the resumption of work on the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project and the India-Myanmar-Thailand trilateral highway – both of which are New Delhi’s flagship connectivity projects in Myanmar. India’s engagement with the Border Area Development Programme and Rakhine State Development Programme was also brought up.

All of these were mentioned, in almost the same language, in last year’s press release.

But Shringla also raised India’s interest in seeing a democratic Myanmar, the release of political prisoners, cessation of violence, support for the ASEAN peace process and provision of humanitarian aid to the people. He also expressed hope to see Myanmar “emerge as a stable, democratic federal union in accordance with the wishes of the people of Myanmar”.

None of this was mentioned in the recent press release. Omissions are revealing.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government now seems more reluctant to publicly pressure the junta.

By dodging issues that the junta might find unpalatable, India hopes to appease the regime in return for full cooperation in securing its interests. As New Delhi’s tunnel-vision goes, poking the regime could result in India losing access in Naypyitaw and, as a result, ceding ground to China.

But one wonders what good is this “access” when it comes at the cost of losing goodwill amongst the majority in Myanmar and, ironically, ending up looking exactly like China.

Losing public goodwill

By now it should be clear that the junta is unpopular, including with the  Bamar majority from which previous regimes drew legitimacy.

To parley with this regime is to alienate mainstream civil society, political leaders and the majority of the people.

No diplomatic strategy can sustain for long without public support in the partner country and India is already losing out.

Social media responses to the MEA tweets reveal the surging anger and frustration towards India.

“We, the people of Myanmar, will never forget what India did to us during our most difficult times. India is writing a hideous history,” says one reply.

“A disgrace, India working with barbaric terrorists. If India really wishes to offer its ‘support to democratic transition in Myanmar’ then it should work with @NUGMyanmar rather than the repulsive and failing Min Aung Hlaing terror organization,” wrote one account titled Please Help Save Myanmar.

Earlier this year, the foreign minister of the National Unity Government (NUG), Daw Zin Mar Aung, told me in an interview that she feels India is not supporting the pro-democracy movement as it was expected to.

What she said reflected a broader sentiment in Myanmar that India is no longer living up to its positive image as the world’s largest democracy and a model of democratic federalism.

The people feel betrayed by India’s pro-junta diplomacy.

Short-sighted policy

India’s decision to move closer to the junta is confounding not just because of its moral vacuity but also its political and strategic myopia.

The junta is a pathologically unreliable actor that only cares about its predatory interests. It will always choose to preserve its networks of loyalty and profit over India’s interests. Recent developments have only reaffirmed this.

Over the last few months, Indian media reports have revealed how hundreds of young Indian IT specialists have been trafficked into a Chinese-run scam in the village of Shwe Kokko on the Thai border in Myawaddy Township. This mega-racket is protected by the Border Guard Force, a Karen militia led by the warlord Saw Chit Thu and allied to Myanmar’s junta.

The border force is able to operate in that area because the junta is allowing it to do so, in exchange for loyalty in the ongoing war with the Karen National Union.

The Indian press release does mention this but the story in the junta media does not.

So we don’t know whether the junta agreed to ensure the release of Indians who are still trapped in Shwe Kokko or direct the border militia to guarantee that no Indians will be trafficked into Myawaddy in the future.

One hopes that is the case but the reality is unsettling. Several Indians who have managed to escape have told horror stories of forced labor, physical deprivation and torture in Shwe Kokko.

While the Indian government has managed to rescue several of them, one escapee recently told me that the response from the Indian Embassy in facilitating their extraction had been painfully slow.

Earlier this year, several media reports indicated that the junta was recruiting anti-India militants from Assam and Manipur as mercenaries in its war against the resistance in Sagaing Region. In exchange, these militants were being given safe haven inside Myanmar and bases for attacks against Indian forces along the border.

Shringla raised this last December but there is no evidence the junta has stopped giving refuge to Indian insurgents.

A disturbing dissonance

Later this year India will officially take on the presidency of the G20. The official theme for the Indian presidency is “Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam”, Sanskrit for “one earth, one family, one future”. While revealing the official logo of the presidency earlier in November, Modi said: “The world is going through the after-effects of a disruptive once-in-a-century pandemic, conflicts and a lot of economic uncertainty… The symbol of the lotus in the G20 logo is a representation of hope at this time. No matter how adverse the circumstances, the lotus still blooms. Even if the world is in a deep crisis, we can still progress and make the world a better place.”

India’s policy on Myanmar belies these grand assertions of hope, humanity and inclusion. By backing a regime which maims, displaces and deprives its citizens, India can hardly expect to position itself as a global leader fit to “make the world a better place”.

One may argue that in realpolitik diplomacy, there is little place for human rights and moralistic idealism. But to talk about “people-centric development” on one hand and shake hands with a brutal military leader at war with the people on the other isn’t diplomatic dexterity, it is a comprehensive foreign policy own goal.

Angshuman Choudhury is an associate fellow at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi.

Wo steht Deutschland? Das bleibt unklar, doch auch dieses wird seitens der burmanesischen Opposition und Menschenrechtsgruppen kritisiert. Zwar scheinbar eine eher marginale Sache, wenn Sie denn so zutrifft, aber angeblich soll die deutsche Regierung über die Max- Planck- Gesellschaft zwei burmanesische Militärs in Workshops und anderen Aktivitäten ausbilden:

“German Govt is Funding Myanmar Junta Military Training: Rights Group

By Hein Htoo Zan 25 November 2022

Rights group Justice for Myanmar (JFM) says Germany is funding the training of Myanmar junta military personnel in a potential violation of European Union sanctions.

Germany’s Foreign Office is funding the training via a project run by the Max Planck Foundation to promote maritime peace and security in Southeast Asia.

Myanmar has faced violent political repression by the junta since the coup in February last year, as the majority of people reject military rule. Facing a widespread armed uprising, the junta has been unable to gain control over the country. It has so far killed more than 2,500 people.

The Max Planck Foundation has invited three representatives of the junta to join a workshop in Singapore from November 28 to December 2, the JFM statement said.

Topics to be covered in the workshop include military operations at sea, maritime terrorism, and ways to respond to unilateral sanctions.

Germany’s funding enables a sanctioned entity to reward loyalty, gain legitimacy and acquire skills and knowledge that supports the junta’s illegal attempted coup, JFM spokesperson Ma Yadanar Maung said.

“By providing support and legitimacy to the Myanmar military junta, the German government and the Max Planck Foundation are emboldening its atrocity crimes, undermining democracy and potentially breaching EU sanctions,” she remarked.

JFM pointed out that Germany’s funding appears to breach Article 4a(2) of EU Sanctions, which read, “No funds or economic resources shall be made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex IV.”

Earlier this month, the EU imposed a fifth package of sanctions on Myanmar’s junta, having previously sanctioned regime leader Min Aung Hlaing, defense minister Mya Tun Oo and other junta ministers.

At least two EU-sanctioned individuals are participating in the Max Planck Foundation project, which also legitimizes the junta as the government of Myanmar, JFM said.

The project is strategically important to the military regime given it only has stable control of 17 percent of Myanmar territory, and capacity-building may help increase that control as it intensifies a war of terror against its people. The foundation’s project provides specific skills to assist the junta’s illegal attempt to take control of Myanmar’s coastline and maritime borders, JFM said.

The Max Planck Foundation website states that all 10 ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) member states have nominated representatives for the Singapore workshop – the fifth in a series of six planned activities.

Two in-person workshops have been held since Myanmar’s military seized power last year, in the Philippines in July this year and in Vietnam in September. Junta representatives participated in the Vietnam workshop funded by the German government.

Interessant, was  das Max Planck Gesellschaft so alles an Aktivitäten und Workshops hat. Man hatte immer gedacht, das sei eine rein naturwissenschaftliche Institution, die sich nur mit Physik beschäftigt. Das Rätsel löst sich, da es sich um die Max- Plack- Stiftung handelt.

Global Review hat dann nochmals bei der Max- Planck- Gesellschaft selbst nachgefragt und darauf folgende recht klare Antwort bekommen:

„Sehr geehrter Herr Ostner,

uns ist diese Meldung bekannt, die leider Fehler und irreführende Formulierungen enthält. So haben die angesprochenen Seminare keine militärischen Inhalte oder militärische Ausbildung zum Gegenstand. Keine/r der Teilnehmenden an dem von der Max-Planck-Stiftung durchgeführten Projekt sind von EU-Sanktionen betroffen. Bei dem Projekt handelt es sich um einen Expertenaustausch zum Seevölkerrecht, insbesondere zum Seerechtsübereinkommen der Vereinten Nationen (UNCLOS). Das Ziel ist es, einen Austausch zwischen Vertreter*innen des ASEAN-Sekretariats und der ASEAN-Mitgliedstaaten mit internationalen Expert*innen zu Fragen der regelbasierten internationalen Ordnung, insbesondere zur Auslegung und Anwendung von UNCLOS, zu ermöglichen. Die Auswahl und Einladung der Teilnehmenden aus den ASEAN-Mitgliedstaaten erfolgt durch das ASEAN-Sekretariat als institutionellem Projektpartner der Max-Planck-Stiftung.

Sofern Sie weitere Fragen haben, die sich nicht auf die Workshops als solches beziehen, verweise ich auf das Auswärtige Amt, das in der Kommunikation dazu federführend ist. Auf der Website der Max-Planck-Stiftung wird das Projekt transparent dargestellt, sodass Sie sich von den Workshop-Themen selber ein Bild machen können:

(…) Bei der Max-Planck-Stiftung für Internationalen Frieden und Rechtstaatlichkeit handelt es ich nicht (!) um ein Institut der Max-Planck-Gesellschaft, sondern um eine gemeinnützige GmbH, die juristische Beratung und Fortbildungen in Konfliktgebieten und Transformationsstaaten durchführt. Sie wurde im Januar 2013 als hundertprozentige Tochter der Max-Planck-Gesellschaft mit Sitz in Heidelberg gegründet. Sie wird daher auch nicht aus Mitteln der Max-Planck-Gesellschaft gefördert.“

Mit freundlichen Grüßen

Christina Beck

­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­Dr. Christina Beck

Leiterin Abteilung Kommunikation



Hofgartenstr. 8

80539 München

Tel.: +49 89 2108 1275

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Sehr geehrte/r Ralf Ostner,

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Summa summarum: An den Vorwürfen der Menschenrechtsgruppen und der burmanesischen Opposition scheint nichts substantiell Wahres dran zu sein.

Professor van Ess meinte dazu noch:

„Ja, wundert mich nicht. Diese Anschuldigungen wegen Bruch von Sanktionen sind oft doch sehr politisch motiviert und inhaltlich fragwürdig.“

Auffällig ist jedoch, dass gar nicht die möglcihe Teilnahme von 2 burmesischen Militärs abgestritten wird , man sich da auf das ASEAN- Generalsekretariat beruft und an das AA verweist. Aber selbst, wenn das der Fall wäre, so weiss man doch nicht, was die deutsche Motivation dahinter ist, am allerwenigsten wahrscheinlich eine Legitimation der burmesische Militärjunta. Genauso möglich ist, dass man ihnen die europäische oder deutche Indo- Pazifikstratgie nahebringt und da für eine internationale Seerechtsordnung im Südchinesischen Meer als internationalen Gewässern und eben auch den Gewässern vor Burma gegen Chinas Ansprüche eintritt, Informationsgewinnung betreibt oder einfach Kontakte herstellen möchte, die sich eventuell in der Zukunft auch wieder vorteilhaft für die Opposition auswirken könnten.

Eine Freundin meiner Mutter war mit einem US- Militär verheiratet, der im Zeiten Weltkrieg, Korea und Vienam kämpfte, um dann in Äthiopien als Enwicklungs- und MIlitärberater eingesetzt zu werden. In seinem Ausbildungsjahrgang war ein junger aufstrebender Offizier namens Mengistu Haile Meriam, den man schon auf der US- Seite als Zugewinn und möglichen Nachfolger des damals durch eine Hungersnot kritisierten Kaiser Haile Selaisse sah. Aber nicht nur die USA hatten Kontakt zu ihm, sondern auch die Sowjets und so wechselte er die Seiten und wurde ein Moskautreuer Diktator. Dies ist in Krisenfällen in beiden Richtunge möglich, aber nur wenn man Kontakte zuvor hat und auch zu nutzen weiss. Deswegen überrascht es auch nicht, dass die CIA jetzt offen verkündet, Oligarchen. Silowiki und Funktionäre Putins rekrutieren zu wollen. Das dümmste, was man machen kann ist völlige puritanische Askese in Sachen Kontakte zur Gegenseite. Damit belassen wir es einmal bei unseren Nachfragen, da wir der deutschen Regierung auch keine bewusste Unterstützung der burmesischen Militärjunta zutrauen– mit Ausnahme als Frontstellung gegen Chinas Seeansprüche, zumal auch innerhalb der ASEAN und gegebenenfalls eben gegen ein noch totalitäreres Regime.

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