What has Eurasianism to do with the Eurasian
Economic Union?
_ Jurij C. Kofner, editor-in-chief, analytical
media “Eurasian Studies”. Munich, 18 November 2019.
When talking about the various influences on
Russia’s foreign policy and on the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union
(EAEU), Western journalists and professional kremlinologists generally mention
the philosophy or ideology of Eurasianism.
Eurasianism is a school of thought that was
incepted by a group of Russian white emigre intellectuals almost a hundred
years ago during the inter-war period in Europe. It is a complex system of
ideas, which since then has produced various theoretical renderings. Yet, in its
key message it affirms a cultural communality of the peoples of northern
Eurasia and the existence of the Eurasian civilization, which is distinct from
Europe and Asia.
However, most often the Western perception of
the sway of Eurasianist theory over contemporary Eurasian integration is
riddled with overestimation, misinterpretation and a general anti-Russian bias[1],[2].
First of all, most Western analysts
overestimate the influence that Eurasianism allegedly has on Russian president
Vladimir Putin, on Moscow’s foreign policy and on its involvement behind the
EAEU. Secondly, both intentionally and unintentionally Eurasianism has often
received negative reviews by Western scholars and reporters, who draw
similarities with European right-wing ideologies such as Italian fascism. Thirdly,
this distorted view fits perfectly into the construed narrative of “a
neo-imperialist Russian hegemon that coerces its neighbors and collaborates
with European populist nationalists in order to build its own post-Soviet
empire and undermine Western liberal order”.
Together, these arguments have become part of
the overall agenda to discredit the Eurasian Economic Union as a liberal
integration project and to dissuade European leaders from contemplating
cooperation with it in form of a common economic space “from Lisbon to
Vladivostok”.
In the following article I would like to show
that Eurasianism in its attitudes is no more “radical” than pan-Europeanism,
formulated by Coudenhove-Kalergi[3]
and the other founding fathers of the modern European Union[4].
Modern Eurasianist theory is, in fact, conservative, but not nationalist, aimed
at socially oriented market economics, and affirms equal international
cooperation based on the supremacy of national sovereignty.
Pragmatic Eurasianism
At this point it should be noted that nowadays
there actually are two intellectually dominant versions of Eurasianism:
Firstly, that of so called “classical Eurasianist” ideology incepted in the
1920’s and 1930’s and modern “pragmatic Eurasianism”, which forms the true basis
for post-Soviet integration.
It can be argued that two out of three heads of
state, which stood behind the EAEU’s inception, namely Russia’s president
Vladimir Putin and Kazakhstan’s former president Nursultan Nazarbayev, are well
acquainted with classical Eurasianism, since they referred to it several times
in their speeches and political program articles[5][6].
However, the classical version has had only a very
indirect influence on the processes of modern Eurasian integration. Not Russian
philosophical doctrine, but the pragmatic interests of the EAEU’s member states
and European integration theory have formed the wording of the EAEU Treaty and
the logic of building institutions of Eurasian integration.
Two of the most noteworthy proponents of
pragmatic Eurasianism are Nursultan Nazarbayev himself[7]
and the chief economist of the Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development
Evgeny Vinokurov.[8]
Of course, the post-Soviet space has its own
specifics and it is necessary to adapt Western integration theory and
approaches to the given conditions. Firstly, the EAEU ought to be seen not as a
new project, but rather as re-integration attempt, where the newly independent states
of a former unitary authoritarian empire, i.e. USSR, are trying to reunite in a
new format and on new principles[9].
Secondly, another important feature of Eurasian integration is the large weight
of the former Russian metropolis in the Eurasian Economic Union, making up 87%
of its GDP, 85% of its territory and 80% of its population.
At the current initial stage of modern Eurasian
integration, the emphasis is placed on economic feasibility and mutual benefit,
at least in all official documents and intentions. Of course, as with any
regional integration project, there are political issues between member states.
But even here, the key principle of cooperation is put on compromise and
pragmatism, not on abstract dogma.
Oriental Europe
Classical Eurasianism affirms the existence of
a distinct Eurasian civilization approximately on the territory of the former
Russian Empire and the former Soviet Union. Yet, this argument has its
weaknesses. Both skepticism of the post-Soviet states towards political re-integration,
as well as the weakness of this civilizational argument, are the reasons why it
is almost not used in the official rhetoric of modern Eurasian integration.
It can be argued that the cultural borders of the
Eurasian civilization to the east and to the south of the post-Soviet space, i.e.
towards China, Iran and the Arab world are relatively clearly outlined due to
the presence of mountain ranges and deserts, i.e. natural geo-climatic barriers.
However, on the western edge of the post-Soviet space, in the so-called
„Russian plain“, i.e. where modern Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova are
located, this boundary with Europe is rather blurry. Moving from west to east
along this plain, the differences between peoples and cultures from Central
along Eastern Europe and further along the western part of Russia change only
slightly and more or less smoothly at each step. The absence of any significant
geographical barriers and the blurriness of the civilizational “fault line”
between Europe and northern Eurasia in the Russian plain also could explain why
Belarus so often became an unfortunate “corridor” for European invasions into
Russia and why the territory modern Ukraine was and is so often torn by civil
war with the participation of external forces.
For this reason, perhaps it would be better to
rethink the classical concept of a distinct Eurasian civilization, although its
elements certainly exist, in favor of the image of a broader “Euro-Eurasian”
civilization.
Or, we might assume that the Eurasian civilization,
which the classical Eurasianists wrote about, is an “Oriental variety” of the
global Western super-civilization. This thought was shared by both the Russian
philosopher Alexander Zinoviev[10]
and the founder of the pan-European movement Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi[11].
If modern Europe grew out of the evolution of
Western Rome, then northern Eurasia might be considered a descendant and
successor of Eastern Rome – Byzantium. And if Belarusians, Russians and
Armenians more or less are directly connected with the Byzantine cultural heritage
– through Christian Orthodoxy, then the Muslim and Buddhist peoples of the
post-Soviet space are connected indirectly through their Europeanization, which
occurred under the influence of Russia during the periods of the Russian
Empire, the USSR and in modern times. At the same time, the steppe nomad and
Asian elements in the cultures of most of the peoples of the post-Soviet space once
again emphasize the Eurasian character of this “Byzantine” (East Roman) branch
of the global Western super-civilization[12].
This could form the cultural argument towards
the notion that the only way out of the closed cycle of confrontation between
Russia and Europe can only be the creation of a common economic space from
Lisbon to Vladivostok, i.e. between the EU and the EAEU.
In addition, this scenario is further supported
by German and Austrian research that clearly shows the potential economic
benefits that the EU and the EAEU could gain from the synergy of their factors
of production[13].
Europeans, sure. But Eurasians?
As said above, the weakness of the
civilizational approach to justify modern Eurasian integration lies in the
difficulty of clearly and unequivocally defining the western borders of the Eurasian
civilization.
But this is not the only problem. Even if one
agrees with the assertion that a distinct civilization exists in the
post-Soviet space, even if it is “Euro-Eurasian” and an Oriental variety of the
Western super-civilization, then still the larger part of the population of the
post-Soviet countries are not aware of this fact. Unlike Europe, where the
self-identification of “we are all Europeans” is in many respects the
indisputable subject of modern European integration, in the CIS countries and in
the EAEU, the identity of “we are all Eurasians” has not been fully developed
yet. Therefore the category of a “Eurasian” identity cannot yet serve as the
political subject of modern Eurasian integration.
So far, among the peoples of the post-Soviet
space, self-identification dominates either with Europe or with its own ethnic
group or nation[14].
This does not mean that the category of
“Eurasians” does not exist at all. Potentials for its final formation certainly
exist. Already, many representatives of the intelligentsia from Brest to
Tashkent are in all seriousness calling themselves Eurasians. The history of
civilizations and the evolution of cultures does not stop in the 21st century
and the longer the Eurasian Economic Union will exist and successfully work,
the wider will be the proportion of people who are likely to consider
themselves to be Eurasians.
Synthesis as an advantage
However, the blurring of the western borders of
the Eurasian civilization and the lack of the category of “Eurasians” as a
historical and political subject of modern Eurasian integration are not only a
problem, but also a competitive advantage – no matter how contradictory this
may sound.
On the one hand, the EAEU itself is trying to
provide the prerequisites in order to become an independent and competitive pole
in the world market. Moreover, as mentioned above, as the EAEU strengthens and
its importance for the economic development of its member states rises, the
number of people wishing to call themselves Eurasians will gradually increase.
The desire to develop such a Eurasian pole
(subject) in the economic, political, and, retrospectively, in the historical
dimension, should certainly be welcomed and supported.
However, at the same time, one should condemn attempts
to artificially construe an ostensibly independent or even isolated “Eurasian
civilization” by trying to dig up every implausible justification. The worst
version of such attempts to exaggerate the Eurasian “otherness” is the concept
of a “Fortress Eurasia”.
On the contrary, Eurasia is often called a
crossroads of cultures and civilizations. It is a wide and open space, where
for centuries people have been resettling and uniting, and where not only
goods, but also ideas were exchanged along the Silk Road(s). This spatial openness,
this synthesis of the ideas and principles of West and East is depicted on the
EAEU logo and is a unique feature. Neither Europe, nor Africa, nor Asia, nor
North America, nor even South America, where European, African and Native
American peoples mixed and intermingled, can boast of such a rich history of
interaction of such a large number of peoples, cultures and civilizations as
Eurasia, in particular – northern Eurasia, i.e. the post-Soviet space.
In this regard, it would be foolish not to take
advantage of this unique advantage in the further construction of the Eurasian
integration project. The key expression of this idea is the concept of a “Greater
Eurasia” or “Greater Eurasian Partnership”, which implies the creation of a complex
network of free trade zones, the integration of regional integration projects
and the connection of continental transport corridors throughout the wider Eurasian
continent. The result would be the creation of a common space „from Lisbon
to Shanghai“. The main goal would be to promote economic prosperity and
the development of the welfare of the national economies through different
formats and degrees of economic integration of the mainland[15].
At the same time, one should not think that this
Eurasian spatial openness for the perception and transmission of external
impulses is evidence that wider Eurasia in general and the EAEU in particular
are only an empty object for fertilization by external forces. Rather, spatial openness
is one of the attributes of the Eurasian subject.
Mixed economy
Previous reflections lead us to the question of
the economic model in modern Eurasianism.
Here, first of all, it ought to be stated that,
in contrast to Europe, the economies of most of the post-Soviet countries are
characterized by a market economy structure with significant government involvement.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, in
Russia, Belarus and other post-Soviet countries a dispute has arisen and is
actively going on between supporters of the Western school of liberal
capitalism, on the one hand, and a national view in favor of economic statism,
on the other.
Unfortunately, too often these liberal and
statist economists have been guided not by empirical observations, but by their
own dogmas, which either do not meet the criteria of scientificness or are true
“in principle”, but only under conditions typical for developed OECD countries.
On this background, the economic school of
modern Eurasianism complies with the above-stated principle of pragmatism. The
pragmatic approach in the Eurasianist political economy is expressed in three
aspects: firstly, that Eurasian economic policy should be based solely on the
results of empirical research and on a scientific approach.
Secondly, that it has to take into account the
conditions of post-Soviet reality in the socio-economic, legal and political
dimensions. For example, certain principles developed as part of the EU monetary
policy can be viewed as universally applicable. At the same time, one cannot
blindly copy the monetary policy of the EU and the eurozone to apply it in the
Eurasian Economic Union due to the many differences between them: higher inflation
rates, volatility of exchange rates, a less effective monetary transmission
mechanism, etc[16].
Thirdly, the Eurasianist political economy
combines the principles of economic competitiveness and social justice. Normally,
such a balance is ensured by a good combination of market liberalization with government
regulation and social transfer. This aspect, of course, is still more related
to the national economic policies of the EAEU member states rather than to the
integration agenda as a whole. This is primarily due to the fact that such
important areas of economic regulation as industrial and fiscal policy were
only partially transferred to the supranational level.
On the one hand, the history of the world
economy and most economic studies show that a liberal market economy is more
efficient than a planned economy. Moreover, the experience of countries such as
Germany and that of Scandinavia shows that only liberal market economies are
productive enough as to accumulate the necessary surplus of wealth, which then
can be redistributed among the citizens in the form of a high level of social
security. In Europe, this model of a socially oriented market economy has
worked quite successfully for the past 70 years[17].
On the other hand, in most countries with a
Soviet heritage we notice the prevalence of a developing nature of legal and
civil institutions, a dominant position of the public sector and a raw material
orientation of exports. In such conditions, moreover, in the context of
catching up with technological competition, the preservation of an important
role of the public sector and of state development programs seems appropriate[18].
It is this combination of market and statist principles that the classical
Eurasianists already proposed in their program manifestos for the time “after
the Communist regime”[19],[20],[21]
Eurasia of Nations
One of the fundamental theses of classical
Eurasianism is a call for the preservation and development of the cultural
identity of each of the peoples of the world. At the same time, this slogan has
nothing to do with some kind of separatist provincialism or narrow-national
chauvinism. Simply put, according to the “formula” developed as part of the
civilizational approach of the classical Eurasianists[22]:
a certain group of (sub-) ethnic groups is part of a certain peoples (nation)
and a certain number of peoples (nations) make up a specific civilization
(union, i,e. regional integration bloc). Like the Russian “matryoshka” doll.
For example, the Bavarians are part of the German peoples, which are the core
population of the Federal Republic of Germany, which, in turn, is part of
European civilization and the European Union. Another example: the Tatars are
part of the multi-ethnic Russian peoples forming the Russian Federation, one of
the EAEU member states.
In Eurasianism, ethnic or local patriotism does
neither contradict national patriotism nor wider civilizational patriotism. On
the contrary, as part of one civilization, patriotisms of different levels complement
each other.
Out of this call for the preservation and
development of cultural identities, as well as from this thesis of “multi-level
patriotisms”, modern Eurasianism derives two approaches to regional integration.
At the national level, Eurasianists would prefer
a federal structure in those countries where their multi-ethnic nature is
evident. That is why most of the pro-EAEU political forces in Ukraine on the
eve and during the Maidan protests in 2014 continuously called for the federalization
of the country[23]. Potentially,
if this federalization would have been realized, then the intra-Ukrainian civil
war might have been prevented and the Ukrainian state might have preserved the
territories that it had then lost.
At the supranational level, the Eurasianist
approach to regional integration presupposes the primacy of the principles of
the supremacy of national sovereignty and of non-interference in the internal
affairs of states. According to the Eurasianists, it is the states that
guarantee the preservation and development of the cultural identity of the
peoples that form them, which implies the principle of the inadmissibility of
interference by external and supranational forces in the historically
established specificities of their political and social structures.
In this regard, modern integration processes
within the framework of the Eurasian Economic Union are characterized by
another important feature, apart from the two that have been mentioned at the
beginning of the article (the re-integration nature and economic “domination”
of Russia): a rather weak supranational component and the predominant role of
intergovernmental modes of decision making[24].
In the EAEU administrative hierarchy, the supranational EEC Board is at the
lowest level, below three intergovernmental bodies (the EEC Council, the
Eurasian Intergovernmental Council and the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council),
where each member state has an equal vote and decisions are made by consensus.
On the one hand, many experts rightly see this
as a weakness that slows down integration and limits its effectiveness. On the
other hand, this property can, again, be presented as a competitive advantage
and attractive feature of the EAEU compared with other integration projects,
for example, with the EU. As a researcher at the University of Cambridge, David
Lane, writes: the Eurasian Union horizontally creates democratic conditions between
its member states, whereas the European Union from above imposes
“democratization” at its discretion within states[25].
Along with this, the Eurasian Economic Union
has not yet been assigned supranational competencies on humanitarian and
cultural cooperation. Many politicians and representatives of the
intelligentsia of the member states oppose the addition of such powers to the
agenda of exclusively economic integration within the EAEU, since they equate
cultural cooperation with the politicization of integration processes in favor
of Moscow’s alleged „hegemonic ambitions”.
However, such suspicion could be erroneous. Adding
elements of cultural cooperation to economic integration does not necessarily lead
to political unification.
Firstly, research shows that humanitarian
cooperation successfully complements economic integration, increasing its
effectiveness. For example: to complete the creation a single labor market it
is necessary to cooperate in the field of education and in order to conduct a
Union-wide industrial policy it is essential to cooperate in the scientific and
technical sphere[26].
Secondly, as already mentioned above, it is
extremely important not to force the emergence of a general Eurasian
patriotism. For the citizens of the member states, self-identification with the
concept of “being Eurasian” has to occur voluntarily and gradually based on the
success of the Eurasian integration project.
The EAEU’s role is not so much in political
unification of the post-Soviet space or imposition of a Eurasian civilizational
community, but as a tool for the preservation and development of the cultural
identities of each of the Eurasian peoples and member-states individually. And
of course, this does not contradict the above stated principle of
„multi-level patriotism“.
It is in this light that the Eurasian Economic
Union can offer an attractive alternative to the European project, where the
trends of Americanization, open border policies, multiculturalism,
deconstruction of European nation states and cultures prevail.
In 2013 Russian president Vladimir Putin
expressed this exact notion rather nicely in a famous speech held at the Valdai
think-tank:
“We can see how many of the Euro-Atlantic
countries are actually rejecting their roots, including the Christian values
that constitute the basis of Western civilization. They are denying moral
principles and all traditional identities: national, cultural, religious and
even sexual. […] In Europe and some other countries so-called multiculturalism
is in many respects a transplanted, artificial model that is now being
questioned, for understandable reasons. This is because it is based on paying
for the colonial past. It is no accident that today European politicians and
public figures are increasingly talking about the failures of multiculturalism,
and that they are not able to integrate foreign languages or foreign cultural
elements into their societies. […] The future Eurasian Economic Union, which we
have declared and which we have discussed extensively as of late, is not just a
collection of mutually beneficial agreements. The Eurasian Union is a project
for maintaining the identity of nations in the historical Eurasian space in a
new century and in a new world. […] I want to stress that Eurasian integration
will also be built on the principle of diversity. This is a union where
everyone maintains their identity, their distinctive character and their
political independence”[27].
In this sense, the EAEU could formally proclaim
the slogan of building a “Eurasia of Nations” as a futuristic eastern echo to
Charles de Gaulle’s concept of a “Europe of Nations”.
Geographic determinism
As already said, the culturological outline of
the borders of the Eurasian civilization, proposed in classical Eurasianism,
has its weaknesses. Against this background, the geographic determinism, which
is embedded in classical Eurasian theory turned out to be much more stable and
successful in framing the borders of northern Eurasia.
The main figures of the classical Eurasian
movement, such as Peter Savitsky, Nicolas Trubetskoy and George Vernadsky,
clearly showed in their works: firstly, that there are clear geographical and
climatic features that contribute to the internal unity and shape the external
borders of the northern Eurasian space, i.e. the historical territory of the
former Russian Empire and the former Soviet Union [28],[29],[30].
Secondly, that economic integration is the only
reliable way to compensate and overcome the negative aspects of the
geographical and climatic features of the northern Eurasian space.
It is this geographical determinism that is
another unique feature of Eurasian integration. Contemporary research on this
topic is being developed by the former chief economist of the Eurasian
Development Bank (EDB) and now the chief economist of the Russian Sberbank,
Yaroslav Lisovolik.
There is an unprecedented distance of Greater
Eurasia’s hinterland/heartland, where most of the EAEU’s territory lies, from
the global ocean and accordingly from international markets. Four out of five
of the EAEU’s member states are landlocked: Kazakhstan is the largest
landlocked country in the world. Belarus is the largest landlocked country in
Europe. Kyrgyzstan, apart from being landlocked, is among the countries with
one of the highest levels of elevation above sea level in the world. Armenia is
the only country of Western Asia without access to a sizeable water space.
In view of the higher transportation costs
faced by landlocked economies they are less competitive, as imports and exports
are more expensive. According to research by the World Bank, landlocked
countries have on average 30 per cent lower trade turnover than countries with
access to the sea; continentality reduces a country’s growth rate by 1.5 per
cent as compared to coastal countries. Here, the founding of the Eurasian
Economic Union can be seen as an answer to this geographic problem, since the
EAEU performs a crucial role of improving the access of its members to
international markets via reducing customs duties and non-tariff barriers, as
well as by advancing connectivity in transportation through the formation of a
common transportation space.
Golden mean
As has probably become noticeable throughout
this article that the central “spirit” of classical and pragmatic Eurasianism
is the dialectical approach, i.e. the desire in all phenomena, and especially
in its normative part, to find a synthesis and a middle ground between opposing
principles: West and East, private economy and the state, ethnic, national and
civilizational patriotisms, etc.
The dialectical approach is a fairly simple and
understandable rule on how to approach problem solving in all spheres of life
and social development. In the desire to find balance in everything there is a
certain intuitive truth, like the eastern philosophy of „yin and
yang.“
At the same time the approach of finding a
golden mean excludes extremes from both sides. In this sense it is opposed to
populism which by definition tries to give glaring and simple answers do
complex problems of the society.
Summary
So far, the classical Eurasianist theory has
had little influence on Russian foreign policy. Despite some rather superficial
references by the EAEU’s high-level policy makers, it is rarely used in the
official rhetoric on modern Eurasian integration. Classical Eurasianism focuses
on culturological, historiosophical and civilizational aspects of the northern
Eurasia. However, as so far, exactly these aspects were of little relevance to
contemporary integration in the post-Soviet space.
Firstly, the classical Eurasianist civilizational
approach is flawed by the fact that the original myth of “Eurasia” has not yet
developed, that a supranational self-identification of being “Eurasian” is just
beginning, and that it is difficult to determine the border between European
and Eurasian civilizations proper. For example, the European Union’s
self-branding often refers to the famous ancient Greek myth about „Europa“,
a young Phoenician princess that was kidnapped by the Zeus in the form of a
white bull, which subsequently gave the name to the continent. “Eurasia” has no
comparable myth. It is actually possible that the term was first used by the
German explorer Alexander von Humboldt.
Secondly, there is an internal consensus
between the EAEU heads of state not to create a political union. No significant
cooperation in the cultural dimension is envisaged as well. The EAEU Treaty
signed in 2014 puts forward a pragmatic and purely economic integration agenda
which mirrors the national interests of the Union’s member states and is based
on the logic of Western integration theory, mainly the concepts of cooperative
hegemony and liberal intergovernmentalism. At least in its intentions, the EAEU
declares the supremacy of national sovereignty and democratic relations between
member states.
In the future we might see high-level
policymakers appeal more frequently to the ideas of the classical Eurasianists,
such as: spatial openness of northern Eurasia; mixed or even socially oriented
market economy; the preservation of cultural identities and multi-level
patriotisms; geographical determinism of the development of Eurasia; and a
dialectical non-populist approach.
However, these concepts are far from the negative
interpretation currently given to them by Western scholars and journalists. Only
the notion about “the preservation of cultural identities” might be deemed problematic
in the contemporary Western discourse.
In conclusion: The modern EAEU is defined by
pragmatic Eurasianism. We might see a stronger appeal to some classical
Eurasianist concepts in the future. Yet even they are not so different from the
ideas that set the foundations of the modern European Union.
[1] E.g. Claude Forthomme (2019. The
Deadly Ideology Driving Putin: Eurasianism. // https://impakter.com/deadly-ideology-putin-eurasianism/
[2] E.g.
Andreas Umland (2018).
Post-Soviet
Neo-Eurasianism, the Putin System, and the Contemporary European Extreme Right.
// https://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2018/09/28/post-soviet-neo-eurasianism-the-putin-system-and-the-contemporary-european-extreme-right/
[3] Richard
N. Coudenhove-Kalergi (1923). Pan-Europa. (In German). // http://greater-europe.org/archives/4652
[4] European Commission (2012). The
founding fathers of the EU. // http://europa.rs/images/publikacije/osnivaci_EU_en.pdf
[5] E.g. Vladimir Putin (2014). Eurasianism
is especially significant for Russia. (In Russian). // http://eurasian-studies.org/archives/12766
[6] E.g. International news
agency “RIA Novosti” (2015). Nazarbayev: Eurasianism is a unifying idea for all
residents of Kazakhstan. (In Russian). // https://ria.ru/20150311/1051931691.html
[7] E.g. Nursultan Nazarbayev
(2011). Eurasian Union: from idea to future history. (In Russian). // https://iz.ru/news/504908
[8] Evgeny Vinokurov (2013). Pragmatic
Eurasianism. // https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Pragmatic-Eurasianism–16050
[9] Alexander Libman, Evgeny Vinokurov
(2012). Holding-Together Regionalism: Twenty Years of Post-Soviet Integration.
[10] Alexander Zinoviev (2003).
The ideology of the party of the future.
[11] Richard
N. Coudenhove-Kalergi (1923). Pan-Europa. (In German). // http://greater-europe.org/archives/4652
[12] This notion is also outlined
in the book by the British intellectual and Eurasianist Henry Norman Spalding: Henry
N. Spalding (1928). Russia in Resurrection. A summary of the views and of the
aims of a new Party in Russia.
[13] Felbermayr,
Aichele, Gröschl. (2016). Free
trade from Lisbon to Vladivostok: who benefits, who losses from a Eurasian
trade agreement? (In German). ifo Forschungsberichte No. 79. // https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/167439/1/ifo-Forschungsberichte-79.pdf
[14] Eurasian Development Bank
(2017). Integration Barometer. // https://eabr.org/en/analytics/integration-research/cii-reports/edb-integration-barometer-2017-/
[15] International Discussion Club
“Valdai” (2019). To the Great Ocean: a chronicle of a turn to the East. (In
Russian). // http://ru.valdaiclub.com/files/28988/
[16] Eurasian Development Bank
(2017). Monetary Policy of EAEU Member States: Current Status and Coordination
Prospects. // https://eabr.org/upload/iblock/3c1/edb_centre_2017_analytical_summary_report_42_eng.pdf
[17] ifo Institute (2019). 70 years of social
market economy – what future has our economic system? (In German). // https://www.ifo.de/DocDL/sd-2019-11-2019-06-13_9.pdf
[18] Oliver Falck (2019). Do we need an
active European industrial policy? (In German). // https://www.ifo.de/DocDL/sd-2019-10-falck-european-industriepolitik-2019-05-23.pdf
[19] Eurasian Organization (1932).
Eurasianism: declaration, wording, theses. (In Russian). // http://eurasian-studies.org/archives/9108
[20] Peter Savitsky (1926). On the
Question of the Economic Doctrine of Eurasianism. (In Russian). // http://eurasian-studies.org/archives/9763
[21] Svyatoskalv Malevsky-Malevich
(1972). USSR today and tomorrow.
[22] In the writings of the classical
Eurasianists, this formula is found in the form of the concept on the “symphonic
personality”. E.g. Eurasian Publishing House (1926). Eurasianism. The
experience of systematic presentation. (In Russian).
[23] Yuri Georgievsky (2015). On
the activities of Ukrainian Eurasianists in Ukraine before the Russian Spring.
// http://eurasian-movement.ru/archives/14597
[24] Yuri Kofner (2019). Pragmatic
Eurasianism. Four approaches for better understanding the Eurasian Economic
Union. //
http://neweasterneurope.eu/2019/03/15/pragmatic-eurasianism-four-approaches-for-better-understanding-the-eurasian-economic-union%EF%BB%BF/
[25] David Lane (2017). Going Forward:
The Eurasian Economic Union, The European Union And The Others. // http://greater-europe.org/archives/3110
[26] Evgeny Vinokurov (2018). Introduction
to the Eurasian Economic Union.
[27] Administration of the
President of the Russian Federation (2013). Meeting of the Valdai International
Discussion Club. // http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19243
[28] E.g.: Peter Savitsky (1933). Geographical and geopolitical
foundations of Eurasianism. (In Russian). // http://eurasian-studies.org/archives/8015
[29] Peter Savitsky (1921).
Continent-Ocean: Russia and the world market. In: Exodus to the East.
Premonitions and accomplishments. The statement of the Eurasianists. Book 1. (In
Russian). // http://eurasian-studies.org/archives/11157
[30] A brief listing of these
geographical and climatic features can be found here: Yuri Kofner (2017). The
National Identity of Russia in the 21st Century. // http://greater-europe.org/archives/3374
