France has been trying for some time to advance its own agenda in the Greater Middle East and the Indo-Pacific, as well as in NATO and the EU, and to be perceived as a leading power. Be it that Macron announced that NATO was “brain dead”, demanded “European sovereignty” under the Grand Nation France and its Force de Frappe, is considering detente with Russia and a European security area, wants to get Russia away from China and at the same time in the Indo -Pacific wants to get involved as the avantgarde of the remaining European EU-Indo-Pacific strategy after Brexit. To this end, it has already taken on Beijing via Taiwan, deployed its own warships to the Indo-Pacific, agreed a military agreement with Australia and also the delivery of submarines.

Now that the USA, Australia and the UK have launched the AUKUS defense pact, Australia has simply terminated the submarine treaties with France, since it sees its security primarily guaranteed in the alliance with the Anglo-Saxons USA and UK and France as well EU is seen as for  a secondary accompanying role, the French are angry. On the one hand, actions about the recall of ambassadors, open protest notes, Yves Drian speaks of treason and questions the reliability of the United States in the alliance within NATO and claims  that the EU now should strenghen  itself after the experiences after the Afghanistan withdrawal and the terminated submarinedeal. So more EU, less NATO, because the US is unreliable and only thinks of itself and ignore the European allies and do not even consider them in the calculations. The CDU politician and German Gaullist Wadepuhl agrees with Drian, who sees AUKUS as a challenge for the EU and NATO, while the transatlantic Röttgen wants the whole thing to be associated with NATO and the EU only as an economic matter and not in terms of security policy In the Greater Middle East, France tried to reorganize Lebanon, which failed miserably and, in view of the US withdrawal, was now able to gain influence in Iraq as part of the Baghdad Conference, but as the only European power; also in cooperation with Iran, Turkey and Russia. In Africa, too, things are not going as France would like, the Sahel zone and Mali coud become a European Afghanistan and France, like Germany, wants to reduce its military engagement there, while Russia fils the vacuum  by means of its Wagner group and the first Russia- Africa Summit and wants to institutionalize its presence.

It remains to be seen how the AUKUSpact and the submarine deal will affect the relationship between the EU and NATO and to what extent France will feel that it is still part of the future NATO 2030 strategy. It does not yet seem to the point that France, like De Gaulle, will leave NATO again as in 1966, but nothing can be ruled out if the USA continues to snub with France and the EU. In the following we want to repost an older article on the subject of the then „brain death“ -NATO- Macron in the German magazine Gegenstandpunkt, which analyzes France’s claims quite well, although one has to distinguish between what European claims to sovereignty are verbally piled up and what is actually feasible, especially since there is no EU Army with a European nuclear power that can counter Russia’s nuclear capacities with a credible deterrent. Especially since France under Macron does not want to subordinate nuclear decision-making power to any European command, but wants to leave it under national control. Here again the analysis of France´s amobitions in the German magazine Gegenstandpunkt No. 3/2020:

Macron’s announcement: NATO is “brain dead” – long live Europe’s security policy autonomy under France’s leadership!

Emmanuel Macron’s interview with the “Economist” on October 21, 2019 in the Élysée Palace about the state of the NATO alliance caused a sensation. Especially thanks to his statement: “I would like to add that at some point we will have to take stock of NATO. In my opinion, we are currently experiencing NATO´s  brain death. We have to say that clearly. “ The President of France not only surprised his interviewees at the time, who saw this statement as an almost existential remark about the future of Europe. With his statements about the transatlantic alliance, Macron has also caused a lot of excitement among his European partners, especially Germany. Macron acknowledges the American President’s disdain for this alliance – in striking contrast to his German counterparts – by no means with dismay at the loss of security policy reliability or with deep regret or reproaches because of this hopefully not final wrong decision by the erratic leader at the head of the most powerful military alliance in the world how to apply Trump’s America first! principle in Berlin. to comment on NATO. Instead of falling into defensive whining about the new general line of the USA, like his German colleagues, the current administrator of French imperialism sees the new position of the USA on NATO as a wake-up call (interview), namely for the European alliance: “The instability of our American partner and the growing tensions have meant that the idea of ​​European defense is gradually gaining ground. It is the aggiornamento for a powerful and strategic Europe. „(Interview) Macron leaves no doubt as to what his critical remarks about the instability of our partner are aimed at and what not: at any rate, he does not intend to influence the American “partner” in the sense of correcting his line; Macron ticks it off as a reality that can no longer be changed and that, strictly speaking, he cannot even blame his American presidential colleague. Macron’s summary comment on Trump’s rejection of America’s traditional alliance commitments is simply: He states a fact (interview); yes, he even concedes his US counterpart’s national selfishness as his right: That is perfectly legitimate from the standpoint of a President of the United States. (Ibid.) No matter how honest or hypocritical Macron means the concessionary gesture in the direction of Trump, which approves of what he expresses and undertakes anyway powerfully and without any consideration of French or European judgments as „legitimate“ – the actual addressees of Macron’s complaints about the state of NATO and the policies of its ruling power are France’s European allies. He comes to them with a balance sheet of NATO – which goes far beyond the very current US American policy – in which one thing stands out above all: According to the matter, it gives a lot of information about the standpoint of French imperialism – its scope, its self-image, its to -do list and his view of the European partners.

I. Macron’s Critique of NATO: A Document of France’s Imperialist Ambitions

1. NATO as an agent of American war planning against Russia: an attack on the security sovereignty of France and Europe

a) Macron is not only dissatisfied with the fact that we have an American ally who is so quick to turn our back on strategic issues (interview). Precisely when he finds that, conversely, the current US strategists are seizing the apparatus and the European territory of the NATO alliance for their unilaterally decided war planning against their strategic rival Russia, he sees this as an intolerable danger and incapacitation of the European nations : “Since the early 2000s, the entire security architecture in Europe, which was difficult to erect after 1945 during the Cold War, has gradually been broken and then deliberately dismantled stone by stone. After the standstill of negotiations on conventional weapons, the end of the INF Treaty in 2019 is a symbol of this disintegration. The Europeans must now collectively realize that in the absence of a legal framework they could quickly find themselves exposed to the resumption of a conventional or even nuclear arms race on their soil. You cannot limit yourself to a spectator role now. It would be unacceptable to again become the scene of a confrontation between non-European nuclear powers. ”“ We are faced with the choice of whether we want to take our fate into our own hands or abandon our own strategy to some other power. „(Macron, speech at the ‚École de Guerre‘, 7.2.20) In the US war planning against Russia, including the American termination of the various armaments agreements with Russia – from the INF Treaty to the Open Skies Treaty to the expected termination of the New Start Agreement [1] – Macron sees an existential attack on the States of Europe.

It is interesting what exactly Macron presents to his military and the rest of the world as unacceptable: In the perspective of becoming the scene of a confrontation with nuclear annihilation potential again, Macron finds the circumstance decisive and decidedly catastrophic that it is a scenario whose subjects are non-European nuclear powers, so that the Europeans are relegated to a mere spectator role. This characterization of the new and old confrontations between the USA and Soviet or post-Soviet Russia – which, from the point of view of German loyalty to the West Alliance, includes a downright shocking equidistance to the said non-European nuclear powers – then automatically leads to the consequence from which it originates The idea is: The fact that European (front) states are affected by their instrumentalisation by non-European powers, which may even be threatened with nuclear warfare including possible nuclear devastation by foreign opponents, speaks for the EU nations‘ awareness of their sovereignty, also and especially in the decisive questions warfare, especially at the highest nuclear level. As the commander-in-chief of the autonomous French nuclear force, Macron is not bothered by any nuclear war scenarios in general, but by the foreign control that he has in mind in this regard. From this point of view, the Europeans‘ own strategy is the only and almost natural consequence that the head of the French nuclear power presents to his EU partners, which they, as states that are also keen to assert themselves, would have to learn from the current situation: Europe must meet its fate take it into your own hands and determine the security architecture in Europe yourself, with the French nuclear power finally playing its appropriate role in the balance of power of all other great powers.

b) This perspective on the confrontation between the Americans and Russians, who are equally threatening for Europe’s powerful self-determination – Americans and Russians, then also opens a view of the differences that arise between these two powers If you consistently examine them from the point of view of Europe, which Macron claims for himself and France: From this point of view, the USA does not appear as a powerful ally that it needs to endure and avert the danger emanating from Russia, but as the power which in the first place brings about this state of danger, which is unbearable for Europe, through its policy of confrontation. Because from Europe, according to Macron, today, after the victory of NATO over the Warsaw Pact, there is absolutely no good, strategically valid reason for such a confrontation: “NATO was designed in response to an enemy: the Warsaw Pact. In 1990 we didn’t reevaluate this geopolitical project in the slightest when our original enemy disappeared. The unspoken assumption is that the enemy is still Russia … I look at Russia and wonder what strategic choices it has … A country with the same GDP as Spain. That is arming in leaps and bounds, more than any other European country … And from my point of view, this model is not sustainable. Russia is mired in overmilitarization, conflict multiplication, but has its own internal problems: demographics, economy, etc. So what are its strategic options? One way is to rebuild yourself as a superpower. This is going to be extremely difficult … I don’t believe in this standalone option much. A second path that Russia could have taken is the Eurasian model. Only that there is already a dominant country there, namely China, and I don’t think that this model would ever be balanced … What other options does he [Putin] have? Restoring a policy of equilibrium with Europe. To be respected. He is determined to think, ‚Europe was the vassal of the United States, the European Union is kind of a Trojan horse for NATO, NATO was about expanding to my borders.‘ … His conservatism led him to to develop an anti-European project, but I don’t see that his project can become anything other than a partnership project with Europe in the long term. „(Interview) Macron puts himself, so to speak, from great power leader to great power leader, into the imperialist calculations of the head of the Eastern great power and weighs up their strategic options on behalf of Putin. What he then comes up with reveals nothing about the position and calculations of Russian power, but all the more about the French view of it: treating it as an enemy has long since become obsolete! A Russia that has no more to offer economically than Spain, which, according to Macron’s expertise, is actually not capable of an arms race with the superpower USA due to the lack of an economic foundation, which – he certainly concedes that much aspiration to the Russians – certainly not either would like to become China’s junior partner: from the point of view of a proven expert on imperialist power relations, that has no choice but to enter into a partnership project with Europe. With this aperçu about Russian calculation and action options, Macron is primarily addressing its European partners. The European security politicians should be told by their strategic mastermind Macron: Instead of being arrested by the USA for dangerous hostility with Russia, Europe must and can take the freedom to deal with Russia according to its own calculations.

“NATO was designed in response to an enemy: the Warsaw Pact. In 1990 we didn’t reevaluate this geopolitical project in the slightest when our original enemy disappeared. The unspoken assumption is that the enemy is still Russia … I look at Russia and wonder what strategic choices it has … A country with the same GDP as Spain. That is arming in leaps and bounds, more than any other European country … And from my point of view, this model is not sustainable. Russia is mired in overmilitarization, conflict multiplication, but has its own internal problems: demographics, economy, etc. So what are its strategic options? One way is to rebuild yourself as a superpower. This is going to be extremely difficult … I don’t believe in this standalone option much. A second path that Russia could have taken is the Eurasian model. Only that there is already a dominant country there, namely China, and I don’t think that this model would ever be balanced … What other options does he [Putin] have? Restoring a policy of equilibrium with Europe. To be respected. He is determined to think, ‚Europe was the vassal of the United States, the European Union is kind of a Trojan horse for NATO, NATO was about expanding to my borders.‘ … His conservatism led him to to develop an anti-European project, but I don’t see that his project can become anything other than a partnership project with Europe in the long term. „(Interview) Macron puts himself, so to speak, from great power leader to great power leader, into the imperialist calculations of the head of the Eastern great power and weighs up their strategic options on behalf of Putin. What he then comes up with reveals nothing about the position and calculations of Russian power, but all the more about the French view of it: treating it as an enemy has long since become obsolete! A Russia that has no more to offer economically than Spain, which, according to Macron’s expertise, is actually not capable of an arms race with the superpower USA due to the lack of an economic foundation, which – he certainly concedes that much aspiration to the Russians – certainly not either would like to become China’s junior partner: from the point of view of a proven expert on imperialist power relations, that has no choice but to enter into a partnership project with Europe. With this aperçu about Russian calculation and action options, Macron is primarily addressing its European partners. The European security politicians should be told by their strategic mastermind Macron: Instead of being arrested by the USA for dangerous hostility with Russia, Europe must and can take the freedom to deal with Russia according to its own calculations.

c) According to Macron’s definition, these calculations require, on the one hand, a dialogue with Russia in order to calculate the security situation in Europe on Russia’s point of view and contain its military capabilities through arms diplomacy; not to give up diplomatic forms of communication: “But has the lack of dialogue with Russia made the European continent safer? Is it in the interests of European stability if the problem of stalled conflicts is not tackled directly or if the situation in Ukraine is not allowed to stall? I do not believe that. For that matter, it is in the interests of peace and stability in Europe that we and the Chancellor will hold a Normandy-style summit here on December 9th, in order to make concrete progress in the implementation of the Minsk Agreement. „(Introductory words by the French President at the press conference with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, November 28, 2019) From this perspective, the hostility towards Russia, newly launched by the USA and imposed on NATO, endangers the success of the symbiosis that the EU has cultivated for decades between the permanent expansion of the EU to the east and its support and protection by NATO’s apparatus of violence. Which means that Macron’s rejection of the American line of confrontation has nothing to do with a distancing from the Franco-European legal claims, which he for his part insists on being recognized by Russia; The most important of these: Russia has to accept the EU’s eastward enlargement at its own expense as an acquis communautaire. The condemnation of the countermeasures taken by Russia (Crimea, eastern Ukraine), which France also supported, is not up for discussion. Even more: For the practical containment of the Russian initiatives concerning eastern Ukraine, Macron also knows what to do with the US-led policy, with which the Ukrainian front is being strengthened against the forces sponsored by Russia. The relevant diplomacy operated by Paris and Berlin, to which Macron refers with the keywords Normandy format and the Minsk Agreement, is based on this. Macron sees this European policy, with its mixture of blackmailing and appeasing Russia, being endangered or undermined by the efforts of the USA to turn Ukraine into a war front against Russia. [2]

The strategic content of what he praises and urges as a dialogue in the interests of peace and stability in Europe is to compete with the USA on the basis of the conflict that the USA is continuing to pursue over who controls this conflict over Ukraine , its course forms and its escalation levels are determined. This is what the French President presents as the right to autonomy in our neighborhood: “It is our neighborhood, we have the right to autonomy, a right not to simply obey American sanctions, but to reconsider strategic relations with Russia without any naivety, while we remain tough on the Minsk Process and with regard to Ukraine . „To the address of Russia:“ I proposed to explain how we see the world, what common risks we have, what common interests we could have and how we can restore what I have called the architecture of trust and security. “ (Interview) In his self-imposed mandate as an advocate for European interests, Macron makes himself the mouthpiece of the two European leading powers, who have long since institutionalized a modus vivendi with the Normandy format, the four-party negotiations between Germany and France and Russia and the Ukraine diplomatic way of maintaining their sovereignty over the conflict between the EU and Russia. The dual strategy practiced here of remaining tough on Russia, but also – without any naivety, i.e. always with reservation – showing some concession towards Russia’s security interests, curbing Russia’s power and letting it work for its own interests: this is what Macron Europe recommends as a blueprint for strategic relations with Russia in general.

This includes relying on the military competence of the NATO alliance. Macron never gets tired of emphasizing that France will continue to treat NATO as a cornerstone of French security policy. From the standpoint of an established world power, he takes the liberty of examining NATO in a completely undogmatic manner as to what it is good for policies that he considers necessary and useful for France and Europe in relation to Russia. He does not see his nation in the position of first having to step free from a practical appropriation and subordination within the framework of the alliance, but calculates and acts from the position of freedom to make contributions to NATO solely in accordance with French interests, or indeed not. France practices and demonstrates this freedom through its alliance-based actions in the Baltic States as well as through the expressly special French security guarantees that it promises to the Eastern Europeans vis-à-vis Russia. [3]

 His rejection applies to the occupation of NATO for American interests to the detriment of France or Europe, as he defines it, or rather: it applies to the forgotten submission of European NATO members to a US-defined alliance discipline that is of no use to them which only harms them and which they – above all – would not need at all if they only take the standpoint of strategic autonomy presented to them by France.

 2. NATO today: useless or obstructive for France’s appearance in its widely defined backyard

The second section of Macron’s record of NATO is based on the same measure of usefulness for French interests. This applies to the assessment of the benefit of the alliance for the away games of France’s military, which always go well beyond the European home front and its possible threat. The relevant interests of France include in the first instance the opposite coast of Europe: the Mediterranean in its capacity as ‚Mare Nostrum‘ with all of its near and middle eastern hinterland. Macron spoke to the US President about this in order to sound out the usefulness of America for French power projection. He reports the following result: “In my conversations with President Trump, he said, ‚It’s your neighborhood, not mine.‘ It’s their problem, not mine, ‚we need to understand what he’s saying. He mentions a fact: It simply means: I am no longer willing to do what was at the bottom of NATO until then, namely to pay for and guarantee a security system for it; it’s a wake-up call. „(Interview) The wake-up call that Macron claims to have heard confirms for him the need for an autonomous security policy, also in the area of the very broadly defined Franco-European sphere of interest around the Mare Nostrum, which Trump is transferring to the neighborhood of his colleague from Paris.

 Again, Macron grants himself a lawsuit over powers for his own influence that have been lost thanks to Trump. After all, France has already shown, not only with arms deliveries, but also with the independent opening of and active participation in the many bloody slaughters from Syria to deep into Africa that it is a military power that is willing to support the states there with its powers to commit to its function as a means of French power. And where France misses something in this regard, it blames the objects of its claim to be a lack of subordination; a verdict that has what it takes to be treated by France as a cause and case of war. And these actions have always stood for the strategic program that France wants to align its valued European partners to: It is the vested power to open up the enlarged Mediterranean area as a European backyard and, with the backing of the entire EU, to become the leading regulatory power there to fix. For the position he already has as an imperialist activist, Macron relies on his colleague in the White House, from whom he allows himself to be pointed out what is on the imperialist agenda: instead of the alliance supremacy, which has always been unreliable to build its own strength and to increase this strength by accessing the means that France’s European allies are supposed to deliver.

Macron lists several cases that have pushed him to make this sort of judgment. – Macron noticed in the case of Syria: „President Obama … withdrew from the Middle East and said, ‚This is no longer my neighborhood policy.‘ But that then created a problem and a weakness: the 2013-2014 crisis, the failure to respond to intervene in the use of chemical weapons in Syria, which was already the first phase of the collapse of the Western bloc. Because at this point in time the major regional powers said to each other: ‚The West is weak.‘ „(Interview) The ‚Syria question‘, namely the question of whether Assad can and should remain in power, had made France the subject of its Mediterranean policy since 2011 and was the first western state to officially issue the slogan: ‚Assad must go!‘ , and since then has tried to have a decisive influence on the internationally sponsored slaughter for the disempowerment of Assad and thus on the perspective of a ‚Syria after Assad‘. France then found an appropriate special opportunity for this ambition in the meanwhile climax of an extra massacre: on the occasion of the use of poison gas, it tried to aggravate the USA, which was operating from behind, namely to press for the incriminated violation of the “red line” officially drawn by Obama “- ‚Use of weapons of mass destruction against their own people‘ – to be punished by a joint action by France, Great Britain and America. Obama did not follow suit; the US made it clear that if it had punitive action it was guilty of it, not its allies. [4] For Macron, this case of the snubber rejection of a French initiative to expand the war is much more than just a setback in the competition between the powers of order that France has suffered, namely nothing less than the first phase of the collapse of the western bloc.

He stylized the failure to achieve stronger militarily into a major case of damage for this imperialist collective, to which he obviously assigned himself in this case specifically for the purpose of doubting its usefulness for his French power projection: He wants the Western bloc – to the disadvantage of France – one of claim that his leading power is responsible for momentous weakness that extends far beyond the Syrian arena, namely, acts like a general request to the major regional powers to find the real supervisory powers of the region to be weak and to challenge them. – The NATO partner Turkey is the most prominent among these major regional powers who, according to Macron, find the West weak. For him this means something like: The power actually responsible for the region there is France with the EU behind; it also assigns Turkey the subordinate status to which it is entitled in the hierarchy of local powers. For this, France claims NATO, which assigns the task of defining Turkey to its lower status within its hierarchy. But what does Macron have to register? For this, too, NATO proves to be useless at the moment when it matters. Because when Turkey under Erdoğan challenged France in its own sphere of interest as a regulatory power over the south-eastern Mediterranean region, the NATO supremacy did not put any reins on this NATO sub-batch when it penetrated France’s acquis, so it turned out to be counterproductive for maintaining the French status of the usher for the states on site:

“Just look at what’s going on right now. In the same part of the world there are common partners and there is no coordination of strategic decisions between the United States and its NATO allies. No. There is uncoordinated aggressive action by another NATO ally, Turkey, in an area where our interests are at stake. There was no NATO planning or coordination. There hasn’t even been a NATO conflict resolution. ”“ What we saw, which is why I talked about ‚brain death‘, is that NATO as a system does not regulate its members. So as soon as there is a member who feels they have the right granted by the United States to advance alone, it does. And that is exactly what happened. „(Interview) Erdoğan takes the fact that Trump is declaring ISIS over and withdrawing his troops from Syria as a signal that the opportunity now is there to finally militantly solve the Kurdish problem in Turkey – as far beyond its own borders as its leader this one Problem and in general Turkey’s rights to a safe, i.e. controlled, legitimate neighborhood are defined. To this end, the Turkish army is fighting, among other things, a militia dominated by Syrian Kurds, which was allowed to play the role of useful idiot for the western war powers and which was actively supported by France, thus sabotaging France’s warfare there. That is the only interesting and decisive thing about the Turkish action: it is taking place in an area where our interests are at stake. The French President relates the Turkish war measures in Syria to France and defines them as a clear case of insubordination of an upstart against the legitimate supervisory powers over this region – the aggressive action is ready.

At the time of his “Economist” interview, Macron could not yet know the sequels that the Turkish regional power offensive has taken since then. What is clear, however, is that his judgment confirms that Turkey deserves the rejection of its robbers in the French-European backyard. In competition with France, Turkey interferes in the power struggle over Libya: It supports the officially recognized government there, but the wrong government in French terms; it concludes with this agreement on the exploitation of natural gas reserves in the Mediterranean, to which the EU members Cyprus and Greece, together with Israel, are claiming; In this context, it intensifies its ongoing conflict with NATO and EU member Greece over sovereign rights in the Aegean. And the leading power of NATO declares this kind of violent competition for the Mare Nostrum to be a European matter first and foremost, and consequently refuses to support France for its imperialist claims. So the French President is listening to the US policy on Turkey again what he takes from all US world politics anyway: The US is almost telling France that it finally has to take care of its own interests. He can’t be said twice. * For Macron, the whole of US and other world politics is tantamount to a call for autonomous strategic development of power because, firstly, he looks at everything from this point of view and, secondly, he can refer to the military powers and the long-established strategic practice of France. The French Defense Minister Parly expressed this imperialist self-confidence in a speech at the US University in Harvard on January 28th, 2020: “You will find us on the most challenging missions.

How many other nations do you find for the delicate task of tracking down nuclear submarines – like the frigate ‚Normandie‘ which is anchored in Boston just today? Who else is by your side in space and in cyberspace? Who was there for bombing Assad after the chemical attacks? Who was with you in Iraq after rockets started raining down? Who exactly this month sent an aircraft carrier task force to the Mediterranean and hunted Daesh together with you? Who is there to uphold the rights of the high seas in the Indo-Pacific? “ In it, to the address of the US elite, she emphasizes the indispensable services France provides for the violent undertakings in the USA. Parly Macron’s lessons on the inevitability of saying goodbye to outdated alliance premises and the apparently no alternative perspective of autonomy vis-à-vis the traditional alliance supremacy with the complementary doctrine: Correctly – namely from Paris – France for its part may be viewed with reference to its many appearances as an independent military power With a global reach, demand to be perceived, also and especially by the great America in its well-understood self-interest, for what it is: autonomous power and therein an ‚indispensable nation‘ – without or against which the world cannot be strategically ordered and managed. In view of so much imperialist self-confidence, it is clear what France, which is here on par with the USA in terms of militancy, needs Europe: to use it for France’s globally oriented imperialism.

II. France defines and directs the emergence of Europe as a world military power

For its global political claim, for its instrumental reference to NATO owed to this claim, which is essentially a rejection of both the old alliance doctrine and the attempt by the USA, after its rejection of the old alliance, its remaining elements at its own discretion for At the same time, France needs more to occupy and exploit itself than it represents on its own: a Europe under France’s leadership that acts autonomously in terms of security policy and militarily. His goal is to finally complete Europe as a globally effective subject of power, towards a collective power that is more than “just” an economic power: “Europe has forgotten that it is a community by increasingly looking at itself as a market that aims to expand. This is a fundamental mistake as it has reduced the project’s policy space, especially since the 1990s. A market is not a community. „(Interview)

 As much as Macron noted the same national instrumentalism in relation to NATO with the US leader, as noted at the beginning, that he proclaimed for France, he misses it with his European partners and therefore takes the leaders of the nations united in the EU to prayer : On every occasion that arises or is specially staged, he calculates that they – not just the French ambition with regard to Europe, but – do not meet their purpose. With the in and of itself silly accusation of having forgotten what Europe is all about, i.e. what everyone involved is actually about, he makes two things clear: he equates the community, which Europe claims to be internally, with the political leeway that is to be able to conquer and defend the project for itself, whereby it is no secret that the European potential for competition between monopoly of violence is meant, who always want to increase, defend and consolidate the range of their power against each other and must have the decisive means of violence at their disposal.

For him, this is the decisive reason for the existence of the European community of states, and from this point of view he diagnoses the satisfaction of his partners with the economic rise of Europe as a fundamental mistake – as a self-limitation that fails the imperialist purpose of the EU: to be a project that itself the violent potencies to create the desired political leeway out of one’s own power and to forge its members – beyond economic calculations and beyond the ongoing competition among each other – into an indissoluble fighting community.

If the purpose of Europe as a community is to establish and secure its strategic freedom of action, which in turn has its decisive means and therefore a valid measure of military strength, then it is also clear to Macron that any real progress for Europe can be achieved with the understanding of all Europeans It stands and falls that military sovereignty is at the core of European community building: “I think the first thing to do is regain military sovereignty. I brought the European defense issues to the fore as soon as I took office at the European and Franco-German level … It is very difficult, but we are making progress, it is possible. „(Interview) Because Macron assumes this equation between military sovereignty towards the outside world and community as a self-evident foundation and purpose in life for Europe, he wants his advance to be understood as the opposite, namely as a return to what the other European leaders have apparently forgotten and which is why it is not now about to be completely re-conquered, but merely to be regained. The standards for what Europe needs in terms of military sovereignty in order to create the political leeway it owes itself as a community, Macron takes from the ongoing imperialist competition and the role that he envisages for France and Europe in this. It is important to be able to resist the unreasonable demands of all foreign powers and to be able to enforce foreign policy unreasonable ones – from the smaller and larger powers around the Mediterranean to the non-European nuclear powers USA, Russia and China. The means for this awakening of Europe to its real greatness, which Macron spelled out to his European colleagues as their task to be finally done after long neglect, exist – entirely in accordance with the logic of a world power that finally has to act as what it actually is – firstly in the continuity of their potential for violence and secondly in their use.

1. France promotes European arms cooperation

Establishing, expanding and refining the continuum of the means of war, from the ‚infantrymen of the future‘ to all possible weapons and their carriers to cyber warfare and the militarization of space: the French President invites all Europeans to take part in this effort – in their own self-interest.

a. The decisive ‚argument‘ in favor of accepting this invitation is appropriately that the French military power already has the full scale in the field of conventional weapons: on land, sea and in the air, offensive and defensive. Cooperation with other European nations is therefore not superfluous – the ever-increasing demands ultimately require ever more sophisticated means of servicing them – but it is given the perspective from the French point of view. The armaments cooperation, which French politicians and military are pushing, aims to ensure that France – for example under the heading of interoperability, to which the allies must pay attention – defines what is important in the cooperation: that France is in the crucial areas under the wonderful The technical and administrative title of the framework nation reserves the central development and manufacturing tasks so that it organizes cross-national military-industrial ‚champions‘ – especially with its German neighbors – and assigns the desired auxiliary and supplementary functions to those states and armaments companies that want to participate. [5] A step further up in the continuum of the means of violence, France is making a contribution to the independence of Europe in the field of weapon systems of the future, which are regarded as decisive in the war, based on the level of development of the destructive forces achieved today. Based on its autonomous capabilities, which it never loses sight of, especially with regard to international cooperation, [6] France is advancing the institutionalization of arms cooperation, especially in the arms sectors, which in fact only bring the best militarists through: FCAS [7] for aerial combat and its counterpart MGCS [8] for ground combat.

In accordance with their strategic purpose, these two decisive air and ground combat weapons projects are based on the technical level of weapons that is set above all by the two military powers, the USA and Russia. Which makes it clear what kind of cooperation the claimed military ‚eye level‘ does not go well with at all: By definition, the armaments projects favored, launched and promoted by France aim to make themselves as independent as possible of supplies from non-EU countries. [9] The fact that the leading German and French armaments manufacturers are working together to realize these major projects proves both the irrevocability that France’s defense politicians are striving for in the project of a ‚European defense identity‘ and the great importance that a military-industrial complex independent of the USA has on the Takes on the agenda of French security experts. In any case, France does not allow itself to be irritated by the annoyance that on the one hand German colleagues see it the same way, but on the other hand thwart this purpose by continuing to insist on arms relations with the USA. [10] The opposition to promoting a supranationalism in matters of the military and its suppliers, which goes to the bottom of every national sovereignty, is persistently carried out by France’s security officers; Just like the competition with Germany to integrate and use the other power in the sense of one’s own claim to leadership over Europe with these joint projects [11] – according to the guideline, the stubborn partner, with whose political-economic power one for the creation of an autonomous EU -Imperialism is calculated as a reminder of its actual, well-understood self-interest, which can only benefit from France’s military strategic strength and the strengthening of the common military potential.

2. The Force de Frappe: France gives the prospect of the final guarantee of its military assertiveness as a protective shield for Europe France, in spite of all the competition for individual questions and projects, especially with Germany, assumes the military leadership role primarily on the basis that it autonomously also has the equipment at the upper end of the continuum of violence: nuclear weapons. Here France has an imperialist unique selling point within the EU – in two respects. The strategic war purpose of the Force de Frappe In military terms, France has the Force de Frappe, in contrast to all other EU states – after Britain’s exit – the ultimate assurance of its sovereignty. The French commander-in-chief makes no secret of how offensively this assurance is meant: “Should a head of state underestimate France’s deeply rooted commitment to freedom and intend to attack our vital interests, whatever, he should be prepared for our nuclear forces to be capable of reaching his centers of power, that is, his main political and economic centers and military centers to cause considerable damage … In this strategy, our nuclear deterrent remains as a last resort the cornerstone of our security and guarantor of our vital interests.

Then as now, it guarantees our independence, our scope for discretion, decision-making and action. It prevents the opponent from betting on the success of escalation, intimidation or blackmail. „(Macron, speech at the ‚École de Guerre‘) For this „360 ° deterrent concept“ France currently does not need to know an enemy who threatens it with nuclear power or who it in turn threatens with nuclear power. The capacity of his Force de Frappe does not have to be measured or embarrassed by the disproportionately greater destructive power of American and Russian arsenals; rather, France relies on ‚dissuasion‘, the deterrent effect of the ability of French nuclear weapons as a last resort to destroy important or vital targets in an attacker and thus spoil the benefit of a victory over France. In this respect, every power in its relationship with France, regardless of all the contradictions it enters into with France, must always consider and politically take into account its nuclear capabilities. And the fact that France is willing to deal with opposites in this way is clear how ambitiously and comprehensively it defines its freedom: Its vital interests extend far beyond its borders, in accordance with its global claim to power and order, deep into a Mediterranean and Eastern European environment And much further, where there have long been louder current and potential threats to these interests, whatever, where France has accordingly established a number of military interventions and already tackled or is preparing for potential others. For France, its nuclear deterrent has the task of safeguarding the freedom of its appearance as an autonomous world power, including the associated freedom to wage war, for which France is preparing itself as best it can on the lower levels of the continuum of violence. This freedom is the military purpose of the Force de Frappe, for the fulfillment of which it is therefore crucial to be able to deploy it in a scalable manner.

The strategic war purpose of the Force de Frappe

 In military terms, France has the Force de Frappe, in contrast to all other EU states – after Britain’s exit – the ultimate assurance of its sovereignty. The French commander-in-chief makes no secret of how offensively this assurance is meant: “Should a head of state underestimate France’s deeply rooted commitment to freedom and intend to attack our vital interests, whatever, he should be prepared for our nuclear forces to be capable of reaching his centers of power, that is, his main political and economic centers and military centers to cause considerable damage … In this strategy, our nuclear deterrent remains as a last resort the cornerstone of our security and guarantor of our vital interests. Then as now, it guarantees our independence, our scope for discretion, decision-making and action. It prevents the opponent from betting on the success of escalation, intimidation or blackmail. „(Macron, speech at the ‚École de Guerre‘) For this „360 ° deterrent concept“ France currently does not need to know an enemy who threatens it with nuclear power or who it in turn threatens with nuclear power. The capacity of his Force de Frappe does not have to be measured or embarrassed by the disproportionately greater destructive power of American and Russian arsenals; rather, France relies on ‚dissuasion‘, the deterrent effect of the ability of French nuclear weapons as a last resort to destroy important or vital targets in an attacker and thus spoil the benefit of a victory over France.

In this respect, every power in its relationship with France, regardless of all the contradictions it enters into with France, must always consider and politically take into account its nuclear capabilities. And the fact that France is willing to deal with opposites in this way is clear how ambitiously and comprehensively it defines its freedom: Its vital interests extend far beyond its borders, in accordance with its global claim to power and order, deep into a Mediterranean and Eastern European environment And much further, where there have long been louder current and potential threats to these interests, whatever, where France has accordingly established a number of military interventions and already tackled or is preparing for potential others. For France, its nuclear deterrent has the task of safeguarding the freedom of its appearance as an autonomous world power, including the associated freedom to wage war, for which France is preparing itself as best it can on the lower levels of the continuum of violence. This freedom is the military purpose of the Force de Frappe, for the fulfillment of which it is therefore crucial to be able to deploy it in a scalable manner.

The global political significance of the Force de Frappe

 In this way, the nuclear weaponry secures and certifies the French power a special imperialist status within the global competition between states and thus within Europe: “In this context, France’s responsibility rests on an objective strategic special role. As the only permanent member of the European Union in the UN Security Council (after Brexit) and as a nuclear power, a founding member of the EU and NATO and in possession of armed forces for the entire spectrum of operations, France must pursue a twofold objective: to maintain its strategic autonomy and at the same time to contribute to it to build a stronger Europe in the face of the multiplication of common challenges. “ This strategic special role – which is based on the agreement of the traditional nuclear powers to mutually recognize each other as holders of their ultimate destructive potential and, in their capacity as permanent UN Security Council members with the right to veto, translate this destructive potential quite directly into the right to judge the legitimacy or non-legitimacy of the worldwide violent affairs translate – Macron converts it into a forward-looking diagnosis: Without France’s military strength, the EU states are atomic have-nots that can be blackmailed – but with France, its European partners in matters of global governance are entering the competition for supervision of the world of states. In fact, Macron is offering its EU partners the opportunity to share France’s special status of being the holder of the right to participate in global violent affairs – but without sharing the military basis and substance of this special status with them. The European political component of the Force de Frappe With this in mind,

Macron recently proposed a strategic dialogue with interested EU powers about France’s nuclear weapons. He made it clear from the start that this should not be a palaver with an open outcome. First, he emphasizes what is by no means up for grabs: France’s autonomous disposition over its Force de Frappe: “In order for France to live up to its European aspirations and its history, it must remain sovereign or decide for itself on the transfers of sovereignty to which it agrees instead of having to submit to them; also about the mandatory collaborations that it would enter into. And this is the fourth pillar of the strategy I am striving for for our country: real French sovereignty … As the basis of any political community, defense is at the heart of our sovereignty. ”(Macron, speech at the ‚École de Guerre‘, from this also the next quotes) And what about Europe’s autonomy now? Will the EU partners then only have the subordination and subordination to France’s security and foreign policy directives? According to Macron, there is no conflict, the Force de Frappe is rather a single service to Europe: “This desire for national sovereignty is in no way incompatible with our desire to develop European capabilities … In addition, our nuclear weapons play their own deterrent role, especially in Europe. They strengthen the security of Europe by their very existence and in this respect they have a truly European dimension.

On this point, our freedom of choice is fully compatible with an unshakable solidarity with our European partners. Our commitment to their security and defense is a natural expression of our growing solidarity. To be clear: France’s vital interests now have a European component. “ According to this logic, the French nuclear power does not need to be communitized in Europe; its very existence is sufficient to strengthen not only the security of France but also the security of Europe. Macron manages to insist on France’s freedom of choice in the same breath and ascribe a truly European dimension to it. According to this logic, France’s national autonomy is congruent with the development of European capabilities. For the credibility of the daring equation of France and Europe’s autonomy, Macron argues that not only the EU partners need France’s deterrent capacity. Rather, France’s unshakable solidarity with our European partners is guaranteed by the fact that France’s vital interests now have a European component.

The European political component of the Force de Frappe

 With this in mind, Macron recently proposed a strategic dialogue with interested EU powers about France’s nuclear weapons. He made it clear from the start that this should not be a palaver with an open outcome. First, he emphasizes what is by no means up for grabs: France’s autonomous disposition over its Force de Frappe: “In order for France to live up to its European aspirations and its history, it must remain sovereign or decide for itself on the transfers of sovereignty to which it agrees instead of having to submit to them; also about the mandatory collaborations that it would enter into. And this is the fourth pillar of the strategy I am striving for for our country: real French sovereignty … As the basis of any political community, defense is at the heart of our sovereignty. ”(Macron, speech at the ‚École de Guerre‘, from this also the next quotes) And what about Europe’s autonomy now? Will the EU partners then only have the subordination and subordination to France’s security and foreign policy directives?

According to Macron, there is no conflict, the Force de Frappe is rather a single service to Europe: “This desire for national sovereignty is in no way incompatible with our desire to develop European capabilities … In addition, our nuclear weapons play their own deterrent role, especially in Europe. They strengthen the security of Europe by their very existence and in this respect they have a truly European dimension. On this point, our freedom of choice is fully compatible with an unshakable solidarity with our European partners. Our commitment to their security and defense is a natural expression of our growing solidarity. To be clear: France’s vital interests now have a European component. “ According to this logic, the French nuclear power does not need to be communitized in Europe; its very existence is sufficient to strengthen not only the security of France but also the security of Europe. Macron manages to insist on France’s freedom of choice in the same breath and ascribe a truly European dimension to it. According to this logic, France’s national autonomy is congruent with the development of European capabilities. For the credibility of the daring equation of France and Europe’s autonomy, Macron argues that not only the EU partners need France’s deterrent capacity. Rather, France’s unshakable solidarity with our European partners is guaranteed by the fact that France’s vital interests now have a European component.

The plain imperialist text of the pathetic evocation of the solidarity of France, of which the European partners can be sure, is: France translates its special position as the only nuclear power – recognized as such by the imperialist rivals of the world – into the claim, without being asked and without asking, everyone to make other European powers and their vital questions of sovereignty and security the object of protection for the French nuclear deterrent. The fact that the vital interests of France now have a European component means in connection with the French nuclear force, in which Macron puts these interests, nothing other than that France dares to define for the others and in relation to their vital interests that these very fundamentally, including to what extent, in a special case, are part of the autonomously French-defined threat and thus operational facts for the Force de Frappe. The proclaimed identity of French nuclear autonomy and European security is not only based on the existing French nuclear monopoly in Europe, but also means, at the same time and forward-looking, that there is no national autonomy in Europe from the French nuclear power and its claimed authority to define its fields of application and cases needs to give. Conversely: The French supremacy is an opportunity for the rest of Europe to grow into the strategic role that France has always stood for; that is France’s service to Europe

. On the basis and with this content given by France, if Macron has its way, Europe’s approval and participation in it is only reasonable and all together a contribution to the world power Europe: “With this in mind, I would like to develop a strategic dialogue with our European partners who are ready to discuss the role of French nuclear deterrence for our collective security. The European partners who wish to go this way can participate in deterrence exercises carried out by the French armed forces. This strategic dialogue and exchange will of course contribute to the development of a real strategic culture between Europeans. “ The inclusion of the EU partners in the French nuclear deterrent does not come as a requirement of subordination, but as an offer: namely for a kind of educational program with which the dear partners are instructed in the upcoming imperialist agenda. They should finally become aware of their global strategic importance and act accordingly. They should soar into a real strategic culture and take seriously what constitutes their imperialist destiny, i.e. understand what their French avant-garde has long known and practiced: France’s European partners should, as it were, grow strategically through their assignment to French military power. What is needed for this is in principle available from your French tutor; Its European participants just have to see themselves and France as France sees themselves and therefore all of Europe, and act accordingly. That is the essence of the strategic dialogue through which European sovereignty comes to itself. * France has long been practicing this principle, which has been proclaimed for nuclear strategy, at the underlying levels of military-strategic disputes on a couple of fairly decisive fronts.

France acts worldwide as the subject of European security interests – and offers Europe its participation in them

For Macron, there is no question that the military skills that France is acquiring are there to impressively demonstrate France’s will to power politics, which coincides with practicing it in a militant manner. This imperialist logic is by no means alien to his European partners, after all, their national apparatus of force is there for the threat of war – although this threat, from the French point of view, has the decisive flaw of a lack of credibility, because above all Germany, which is potentially decisive, is too involved in the operation very reluctant. This reluctance needs to be broken. The creation of an autonomous European power is therefore not the end of the process for France’s strategists to build up an apparatus of force. There must be a common, militarily actively practiced security policy – and that does not exist in a communitized Europe because the various EU partners have very different ideas of their imperialist future for very different reasons. From this only one thing follows for France: in continuation of its practice of always acting as a European regulatory authority in its imperialist away games, it is doing everything to aggressively establish the military and security-political unity of a world power Europe.

Any use of French military force for the wide-ranging French strategic interests is the execution of European security interests: on this basis, France offers its partners the opportunity to participate in the global expansion of its imperialism – provided they make themselves useful as contributors to the French missions. And it goes without saying that Macron is driving Europe’s global political mission forward – not just first – in the awareness that the French military force deployed is always the appropriate means to make an impression on the Europeans he wants to win over, i.e. harness, for his departure.

In Africa and in the Mare Nostrum In Africa,

France is promoting its project of a “European special unit” for the fight against terrorism: [13] Interested nations can gain combat experience against “international terrorism” under French command and participate in the French project, in the so-called G5 countries, Mali, Niger, Chad, Burkina Faso and Mauritania, with the help of the training and instruction of soldiers, to reliably establish the use of the apparatus of force in these states in line with the interests of Franco-European order in the African backyard. In the southeastern Mediterranean, France fights the regional power Turkey and positions itself with warships. [14]

 In order to defend the territorial integrity of Europe, and in particular Greece and Cyprus, France sees itself empowered to threaten war against the violation of European sovereign rights. The questions ‚Who owns the gas?‘ And ‚Who owns the Mediterranean?‘ Coincide for France – which is why the answer for France, as the vested power that stands for the unity of economy, law and violence, is clear: Turkey understands only the language of violence, so tough sanctions and, if necessary, warlike actions are the order of the day. Macron wants to compel the EU to take this stance against Turkey with his provocative actions: As the highest French warlord, he drives Europe both in the form of his institutions and his member states by his military setting facts. They should get his European partners to give up their other calculations with Turkey – e.g. Germany’s „refugee deal“ – and their consideration for them in favor of intervening or at least taking political sides against Turkey on the side of France. [15] Part of the European will-building effectiveness of French activism in the military confrontation with Turkey is that France definitely and expressly does not make itself dependent on an affirmative answer from the European capitals, but acts independently and bilaterally as the protector of affected European partners: „‚We have decided to significantly increase bilateral defense and security cooperation between our countries,“ said the French minister. Her Greek counterpart pointed out that ‚the main points of the agreement are regular political consultations at ministerial level, the increased presence of the French navy in the region, joint military exercises of the naval and land forces and the strengthening of industrial cooperation‘

The French defense minister has long been busy expanding the French military presence as a guarantor of European sovereignty in Greece [16] and Cyprus against Turkey – and against the non-European nuclear powers USA and Russia, who claim the Mare Nostrum and its south-eastern neighboring states as a military deployment area .

 On the Eastern Front

For the time being, Macron sees the security policy interests of France and Europe in relation to Russia in good hands in the permanent event, which is run together with Germany, to restore peace in Ukraine. He sees an urgent need for action to win over particularly unruly countries like Poland for a European defense community, which is practically a counterprogram to the US planning these states as stooges for its anti-Russian encirclement and escalation strategy. “France is striving for a strategic defense partnership with Poland and is considering Poland’s participation in the planned Franco-German Main Ground Combat System … Both presidents also announced that they would hold a summit with Chancellor Angela Merkel immediately after the Polish presidential elections in May of the Weimar Triangle. Duda spoke of a ‚turning point‘ in the Franco-Polish relationship. After Great Britain leaves the EU, it is ‚in the common interest to open a new chapter in cooperation‘. „(FAZ, 4.2.20) A chapter that at least holds the prospect of Poland participating in the prestigious Franco-German project and cooperation on issues of “cyber and energy security”. In return, Poland should allow itself to be protected less by the USA than by France and the EU in the long term against Russia – which is why Macron feels obliged to make some clarifications regarding Polish security interests.

He expresses understanding for the security interests of the Poles and Balts against Russia and their criticism of „Nord Stream 2“, refers to the French contributions to NATO missions [17] and emphasizes, “That he did not become ‚pro-Russian‘. But it is not ‚anti-Russian‘ either. Europe needs a new disarmament agreement that takes into account the security interests of Poland and the Baltic states. The EU cannot remain inactive after the INF Treaty has been terminated. Macron said he hoped that one day Poles would be convinced that they could rely on EU partners on defense issues. The French President also announced that in future the security interests of the European partners would also be given greater consideration in the French nuclear strategy. „(FAZ, 4.2.20) With his offers of military cooperation to the consideration of Polish security interests in the French nuclear strategy, Macron underpins France’s will and ability as a true military power – Duda pays him this compliment – to protect the sovereignty of Poland as an important border state of the EU. So steered in the right direction, namely as a contribution to a European defense, Macron can gain something from the Polish security interests against Russia for France’s competition against the USA. Expressed in the typical pathos of French diplomacy: “[France] had made the security interests of all its European partners‘ completely its own ‚,‘ our allies can count on France, on its commitment and on its armed forces, to defend their security. Always. ‘“ (Foreign Minister Le Drian, FAZ, 9.12.19)

In the Indo-Pacific

France puts all of its strategic claims, all activities aimed at it in the immediate or no longer so close environment in the global context in which it classifies itself as a world power. His ambitious project to let Europe grow into the status that it attributes to itself per se does not stop with the offensive protection of the eastern border of Europe against the nuclear power Russia and the aggressive appearance as a supreme power in Africa and the Middle East. France proves and practices its global aspirations by choosing the Indo-Pacific as the scene of global strategic disputes, from which it should by no means be absent. The French armed forces consider the Indo-Pacific to be … an area that stretches from the east coast of Africa to French Polynesia (France’s defense strategy in the Indo-Pacific, abridged version, 2019; hereafter: abridged version). When in this „region“ – which according to the cited definition makes up more than half of the globe – a long-standing and active military power, and as a nuclear power anyway, France declares itself responsible for the whole world in 2019 with a specially created „security strategy“:

 The European power with global responsibility and nation of the Indo-Pacific region (France’s defense strategy in the Indo-Pacific, long version, 2019, p. 15; in the following: long version) asserts its legal claims to an appropriate exercise of power over the states assembled in the Indo-Pacific, including the world powers acting on site. As a power that defends its national sovereignty – physically anchored in the form of New Caledonia and Co. [18] – in the vast area of ​​the two oceans, as a military guarantee power of Europe, which with its military presence on the ground ensures that no state is in it Hemisphere for Europe’s globally networked economic power disturbingly noticeable, [19] and as co-responsible supervisory power over the atomic armament, thus the need for force of the world of states, [20] France is a great power in the Indo-Pacific. There is therefore no question for France that where most of the nuclear powers are present (F. Parly), the main battle of current and future imperialist competition between the two world powers China and the USA is being fought – and in which it is actively involved as third power, which also and especially acts as autonomously towards the superpowers China and the USA as it owes it to itself and its status in general. In relation to China, France is on a par with the United States, India, Australia and Japan, with whom it shares the same values ​​and concerns with regard to the emerging challenges (long version, p. 17). It positions itself in the dispute over sovereign rights in the South China Sea against China, shows a military presence with its aircraft carrier and various warships and does not allow itself to be deterred from provocations by incidents with Chinese warships: “In continuation of the Asia-Pacific policy affirmed since 2010 by the French Defense Minister at the Shangri-La Dialogue [the counterpart in the Asia-Pacific region to the Munich Security Conference in Europe], the strategy with regard to China’s retention of power is more resolute.

This is striking in the question of freedom of navigation. „We will continue to sail in the South China Sea more than twice a year,“ said the minister. ‚Against this there will be protests and questionable maneuvers at sea. But we are not intimidated by the creation of a fait accompli. ‘” (Defense Minister F. Parly explains the details of the “Indo-Pacific strategy”, Le Monde, 2/3/6/19) France asserts its own reasons for its military engagement against the People’s Republic’s claims to power: France defines China as a major military power with global reach as far as the Mediterranean, [21] which stands in the way of France and Europe’s ambitions for power, i.e. also on its doorstep , in the Indo-Pacific, contained and fought – without declaring China an enemy or even calling for a „decoupling“, i.e. to reverse the far-reaching economic relations with China, which the US government is putting on the agenda as the latest weapon against the People’s Republic: Macron Conversely, finds it logical to conclude a major trade agreement with the Chinese president at the end of 2019 and, at the same time with the threat of violence, to want to commit China to the recognition of its function as a constructive partner, which is responsible for the French-European wealth increase and the Franco-European development of power b contributes.

For the purpose of containing China’s power, France in the post-western era enters into a „coalition of the willing“ that can be terminated at any time with the superior local sea power, the USA: “The United States is a historic ally and a key partner in the Indo-Pacific region because of our converging security and defense interests and the high degree of interoperability between our armed forces. Bilateral cooperation and the coordination of our actions will be strengthened in many areas. The bilateral security and defense dialogue will primarily focus on the South Pacific and Indian Ocean, which are areas of common interest. While maintaining its autonomy of judgment and action, France will support the multilateral initiatives of the United States which deal with our common security interests. „(Long version, p. 17) On the basis of its own strategic claims in the Indo-Pacific, France certainly has common security interests with the USA – which, conversely, means that this cooperation with the USA has nothing to do with the other contradictions and disagreements between France and the superpower that Europe has planned as a theater of war against Russia. relativized. In any event, in order to preserve its autonomy of assessment and action, France leaves no doubt that it reserves the right at any time and in any place which joint actions it is willing to take. Accordingly, it attaches great importance to the fact that in the military contestation of sovereign rights that China grants itself in the South China Sea, „French behavior … will continue to be different from the American Freedom of Navigation operations taking place within 12 nautical miles of the illegally annexed islands in the South China Sea.“ (Defense Minister F. Parly explains …, op. Cit.) And with the attempt to forge a strategic Paris-Delhi-Canberra axis, as well as with a whole network of bilateral security partnerships with Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam, among others, France is resolutely pursuing the program of finding reliable local partners for its autonomous power politics [22] to procure.

For the enforcement of its legal claims in the Indo-Pacific, France appears as an independent great power, which, depending on the case and situation, is more confrontational in its relations with world powers such as the USA and China as well as its partners and opponents in the world of states, depending on their respective calculations. sometimes divides more cooperatively. For France’s leaders, this is also a requirement for a united Europe to finally become the sovereign global world power that it actually is. If France „Intends to share defense and security issues in the Indo-Pacific region with all its European allies and partners and to mobilize them and the institutions of the European Union on the basis of a common vision“ (long version, p. 15), for a French government, the outcome of this dialogue on defense and security issues in the Indo-Pacific region has long been clear. As the only state in the EU boxing in a higher weight class (F. Parly), as the military guarantor of European sovereignty, France, with its claim to sole representation of Franco-European rights in the Indo-Pacific, opens up the common vision of Franco-European freedom for a united Europe will also be defended in the Indo-Pacific in the future. To this end, Macron is campaigning for a European fleet to be deployed – and is betting that, in view of the emerging challenges that global powers such as China and the USA are putting on the agenda, sooner or later the need to obey France’s power politics, can no longer withdraw, so finally want to participate in the imperialist perspective proud France is living up to the best of its ability for a united Europe.

Gegenstandpunkt No.3/2020